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1 Introduction
One  of the major issues of policy makers in The Netherlands is to
reduce the high unemployment rate. In 1988 economic growth was substantial
in  all  OECD  countries,  which  led  to  an  increase in employment. The
economic growth also induced extra labour supply, especially  of  married
women,  which  altogether  led  to a smaller reduction in the unemployment
rate than could have been expected in view of  the  economic  growth  (see
Rapportage  Arbeidsmarkt,  1989). The estimated official unemployment rate
in 1988 is still 11.0% of the total labour force. Therefore,  there  is  a
strong  interest  in policies that seek to increase employment (the demand
side of the labour market) as well as in understanding  the  factors  that
influence labour supply. In this thesis we try to further such
understanding by constructing a detailed model of household labour supply.
The  data  we use relate to Dutch households in 1985. In that year
the official rate of unemployment was 15.9%. A distinguishing  feature  of
Dutch  labour  supply  is  its  very  low  level  of  female  labour force
participation, e.g. in 1985 it was only 35.2%. Apart from Spain, which had
a similar participation rate, most other industrialized OECD countries had
a participation rate of around 60% (see OECD Labor Force Statistics).  As
there  seems  to  be  no  obvious reason why in the long run female labour
force participation in The Netherlands should remain systematically  below
that in  other  European countries, women  could  potentially  cause  a
substantial increase in total labour supply.
In  this thesis labour supply behaviour of individuals is analysed
within a neoclassical framework of utility maximization. Several groups of
individuals are distinguished: single males, single females, married males
, and married females. For each of these groups we have estimated
different models that are developed in the thesis. In the final chapter we
will compare the different models  with  respect  to  their  implied  wage
elasticities of labour supply for these groups.
In Chapter 2 we present the model that serves as a starting  point
for  the  other models, developed in the subsequent chapters. We analyse a
household consisting of one individual who is able to work, and who is
faced  with  the choice on how much to buy of a composite consumption good
at a given price and on how much time to spend on leisure (and not  work).
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The number of hours the individual prefers to work and the quantity of the
consumption good he desires follow from a standard maximization problem in
which  utility  is  maximized  subject  to  a linear budget constraint. To
estimate such models requires the specification of a particular functional
form  for  the  utility or demand functions. Throughout the larger part of
this thesis  we  have  chosen  the  same  specification  for  the  utility
function. This so-called standard model consists of an hours equation that
is quadratic in wages and of a  consumption equation. The influence of
family  composition  is modelled by making one of the parameters dependent
on the number of family members. Closely related to this standard model is
a  two-adult household model, in which the joint labour supply decision of
husband and wife is analysed.
An  extensive description of the data can also be found in Chapter
2. Most models developed in the thesis have been  estimated  on  two  data
sets, the OSA-survey and the SEP. OSA  stands for "Organization of
Strategic Labour Market Research"  and  SEP for "Social Economic Panel".   The
OSA-survey was  held  in  1985  and  only  persons  between  18  and  60
were interviewed. The SEP is a bi-annual panel  of households who are
interviewed in April and October of each year, starting from 1984. For our
analysis we used the October 1985 wave to make it comparable with the  OSA
survey. Information on both working and nonworking individuals is used in
a Tobit-type likelihood function. Since wage rates are  not  observed  for
nonworking  individuals  a  wage  equation  in  terms of age and education
has been estimated on working individuals allowing for possible  selection
bias. The  wage  predictions  from  this  equation  are  inserted  in the
the labour supply models in Chapters 2 through 4.  In  Chapters  5  and  6
simultaneous hours-wage models are estimated.
Chapters 3 through 6 consist of a fair number of extensions of the
standard model, described  in  Chapter 2. In  Chapter 3 we abandon the
assumption of a convex budget constraint. The Netherlands  has  a  complex
social  security and welfare system and a highly nonlinear progressive tax
system. We concentrate on the social security and welfare system. If  an
unemployed  person  receives  unemployment  benefits and plans to accept a
job, he or she will loose these benefits. This  introduces  nonconvexities
in  the  budget  constraint  and  complicates estimation as nonconvexities
require utility comparison.
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Another adjustment made in Chapter 3 is the use of preferred hours
rather than actual hours. Preferred hours is the number of hours  an
individual prefers to work instead of the number of hours he or she
actually works. Since many individuals are not completely free in choosing
the hours they work, actual and preferred hours do not always coincide. By
using preferred hours we have a model of labour  supply  in  which  demand
side restrictions do not play a role. In Chapter 6 we will develop a model
in which demand side constraints are explicitly taken into account.
Chapter  4  emphasizes the differences in utility functions across
individuals due to preference formation. Preference formation refers to
the  phenomenon  that someone's present preferences depend on his own past
behaviour (habit formation) and on  other  individuals'  (past)  behaviour
(preference interdependence). Habit formation is modelled by making one of
the parameters in the model, developed in Chapter 3,  dependent  on  hours
worked by that individual in the previous year. Preference interdependence
is incorporated by making that same parameter also dependent on  the  mean
hours  worked by individuals in one's social reference group. In Chapter 4
we discuss two methods to construct social reference group  variables.  In
the  first  method  the  reference  group variables are constructed on the
basis of a set of assumptions. In the second method we exploit the  direct
information  on  reference groups in the SEP-survey, to construct a number
of indicators for the mean hours  worked  and  mean  family  size  in  the
reference group. With  the help of a factor analysis model we relate the
"true" and unobeserved reference group means to the observed indicators.
In Chapters 2 through 4 the utility function has hours of work and
consumption as arguments. In Chapter 5 we extend the utility function with
job  amenity  as  an  extra  argument.  The  job amenities are for example
social status and good working conditions. Including these allows  one  to
model  the  labour supply decision and job choice simultaneously. We adopt
the home production approach to  model  this  joint decision. (See  e.g.
Pollak  and  Wachter (1975).) In the same chapter we examine two different
specifications for the production function of the job amenity. In a  first
specification  both  job  characteristics and hours worked are part of the
job amenity. Loosely speaking, this specification allows for the fact that
working many hours in a tedious job is worse than working only a few hours
in that same job. In the second specification the  amenity  of  a  job  is
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independent  of the hours worked in that job. One could think of status of
a job as a plausible interpretation in this case.
The  job  choice  involves  a  trade-off between the wage rate and
the job amenity, the idea being that the rewards for working can  be  both
pecuniary  (money  wage) and nonpecuniary (desirable job characteristics).
As a result the budget constraint is nonlinear.
In  Chapter  6  we take a first step towards integration of labour
supply and labour demand into  one  model.  These  models  are  especially
important  if  labour demand and labour supply are not well matched, which
is presumably the case for married women looking for part time jobs, while
part  time  jobs  are  rarely  offered.  Labour  demand  restrictions  are
incorporated by assuming that employers offer jobs with a fixed number  of
hours. Workers face the  market  distribution  of  these  employment
opportunities. It is furthermore assumed that the market  distribution  of
job offers is the same for all individuals. An individual chooses from the
available job offers the one that yields highest  utility.  Note  that  in
this  model the individual can no longer freely choose the number of hours
he prefers to work. Another extension in this chapter is that  the  before
tax  wage  rate is made dependent on hours of work. Rosen (1976) justifies
this procedure by suggesting that there might exist different markets  for
jobs with varying numbers of hours.
To avoid a forbiddingly high degree of complexity of  this  model,
we  have  chosen  for  a  somewhat  simpler  specification  of the utility
function, i.e. one with a linear rather than  a  quadratic  labour  supply
function.
Chapter  7  provides  an  overall  evaluation  of  the  estimation
results.  In  the first part of Chapter 7 we test the hypothesis that both
samples used for estimation have been drawn from the same  subset  of  the
Dutch population. In  the  second  part  we  compare  labour supply wage
elasticities, generated by the different models  and  samples.  Likelihood
ratio  and  goodness  of  fit  statistics  are  presented  as criteria for
choosing between alternative models.
Finally,  in Chapter 8 we summarize and propose issues for further
research.
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2 A simple neoclassical model of labour supply
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter we point out how labour supply  behaviour  can  be
analysed  within the framework of utility maximization subject to a linear
budget constraint. The model we use is neoclassical in the sense that  the
individual  is  assumed  to  maximize  utility  subject  to time and price
constraints. Quite a few researchers have taken the neoclassical model as
a  starting  point of their analysis of labour supply (cf. Pencavel (1986)
and Killingsworth and Heckman (1986)).
In  Section  2.2  and  2.3  a  neoclassical  model  is extensively
described that is used as a starting point of all models developed in  the
following  chapters.  We  first  consider  households  with only one adult
(single adults or adults with children) in Section 2.2. Attention is  paid
to  households  with  at  least  two  adults  in  Section  2.3. All models
developed in this thesis have been estimated on (either of) two  different
data  sets,  the  OSA-survey  and the SEP. In Section 2.4 we describe both
data sets, and in Section 2.5 estimation results  are  presented.  Section
2.6 concludes.
2.2 The model specification for one-adult households
The  labour  supply  of the adult is assumed to be consistent with
the following model
h k=E+ ywk + B[Ik +8+6wk + 1/23·w ] (2.1)
where   h c = number of hours the individual k would like to work per week
wk = after tax marginal wage rate of individual k
Ik = (weekly) nonlabour income of household k
8, 6, 1, B are parameters.
Equation (2.1) states that labour supply is a quadratic function of wages.
The  obvious  advantage  of  a  quadratic  specification over a linear one
(which is used for instance by Hausman (1980,1985),  Blomquist  (1983)  or
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Bekkering  et al. (1987)  is that it is more flexible. For instance, for
certain levels of the wage rate labour supply may be forward  bending  (an
increasing  wage  rate implies increasing labour supply) whereas for other
wage levels it may be backward bending (an increasing wage rate implies  a
decreasing  labour  supply). With a linear specification, labour supply is
either everywhere forward bending or everywhere backward bending.  Another
argument  in  favour of this specification is the relative ease with which
shadow wages can be computed. For instance since we allow for
nonconvexities  in the budget set in Chapter 3, we have to compare utility
in different points of the choice set. To be able to do this, without
recourse  to a direct utility function, shadow wages and shadow income are
needed. For other flexible forms, such as the indirect  translog  and  the
AIDS, the computation of shadow wages is cumbersome.
Under mild conditions on the parameter values, equation (2.1) can
be  obtained as the result of maximization of a household utility function
under a linear budget  constraint.  To  be  more exact, let  the  budget
constraint for individual k be
yk = wkhk + Ik (2.2)
where  Yk is total household consumption in a given period. Equation (2.2)
simply says that the amount of money available for consumption is the  sum
of  nonlabour  income (e.g. from returns on investments or money earned by
children whose labour supply is taken exogenous) and  labour  income  (the
number  of  hours  worked by individual k per period times the wage rate).
Next, consider the following utility function
*               A                                     *
U(hk'Yk) -I k exp[; (hk -6- BIk) ] (2.3)
1/2
where   Ik = 2-[ 4+  2{(hk - 6)2  1-2(yk + 8)}] . (2.4)
Equation  (2.3) says that household k derives utility from consumption and
from hours worked on a paid job. The marginal utility derived from working
in  the  market  may very well be negative; in fact we could as well write
(2.3) as a utility function of leisure T - hk (where T is the total amount
of  time  available per period) and Yk. On the right hand side of (2.3) we
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would then everywhere replace hk by T - Lk with Lk the amount  of  leisure
enjoyed by the adult in household k.
Under a mild regularity condition (Kapteyn, Kooreman, Van Soest
(1989)), one can straightforwardly show that maximization of U(hk'yk) with
respect to hk and Yk under the budget  constraint  (2.2)  yields  relation
(2.1)  as  a  solution  for  h c.  The solution for Yk (not given here) can
easily be obtained  by  substitution  of  (2.1)  into  (2.2).  Like  other
researchers  we have treated the qualitative implications of the theory as
maintained hypotheses (cf. Burtless and  Hausman  (1978)  and  Van  Soest,
Kooreman  and  Kapteyn (1988)). In the latter paper it is noted that if in
more  complex  models  such  as  those  dealing with nonlinear budget
constraints  or  corner  solutions, the Slutsky restrictions are violated,
the endogenous variable may no longer be determined unambiguously  by  the
model. For that reason appropriate restrictions on the parameters have to
be imposed. For the specification that we use only concavity of  the  cost
function  has  to  be imposed a priori, since homogeneity and monotonicity
with respect to u are  satisfied automatically. This  implies  that  the
implications  of  the  theory  of  utility  maximization for labour supply
analyses  cannot  be  modelled as testable hypotheses. The  concavity-
2*
condition  in  this  model  is  y  >  B Ik'  which guarantees convexity of
indifference curves. It turns out that for the data described in Sections
2.4 and 2.5 the condition is satisfied at most data points. We also impose
the assumption that leisure is a normal good (B<0) and  that  the  largest
part of the wage effect is positive (r>0).
Thus, if equation (2.1) turns out to give a  good  description  of
the  relation  between  labour supply, wages and nonlabour income, then we
can interpret household behaviour as the result of maximizing the  utility
function  U(h c'yk)  subject  to  the  budget  constraint.  Of course if we
estimate the parameters 6, 1, 8 and B on the basis of empirical data,  the
household utility function is estimated implicitly.
The exposition SO far implicitly assumed that different
individuals have identical utility functions, SO that variation in
observed behaviour can be ascribed  solely  to  variation  in  the  budget
constraints  faced by different individuals. One can relax this assumption
in  various  ways.  One  possibility  is  to  assume  only that certain
homogeneous groups of individuals have the same utility function. Then one
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can apply the procedure  described  to  each  of  the  homogeneous  groups
separately. A variation on this possibility is to make the parameters of
the utility function dependent on personal characteristics of individuals.
The variation of behaviour across individuals  is  then  exploited to
estimate how the parameters  of  the  utility  function  depend  on  these
personal characteristics. In this thesis we adopt the latter procedure. We
shall pay a fair deal of attention to  a  model  which  explains  how  the
parameter  6  varies  across  individuals  according to family composition
(below), and behaviour of other individuals, and  own  past  circumstances
(Chapter 4).
Somewhat arbitrarily, we model the influence of family composition
by  making  the  parameter  6  dependent  upon an indicator of the size of
household k. This indicator may for instance comprise the number of family
members, and the number of children under six. We have chosen for the
following specification
6  =6 +6 f (2.5)k 0 l k
where   fk is the log of family size of household k
60 and 61 are parameters.
The delta parameters are so-called translation parameters (cf. Pollak  and
Wales  (1981)).  To  illustrate  what  this  means,  consider  the utility
function (2.3). It is immediately clear that this function can be  written
in general terms as
U(hk'Yk) = F(hk - 6k'yk)
(2.6)
Now, consider  for  example a woman in two different situations (i.e with
different parameters 61 and 62). Suppose she has more  young  children  to
take care of in situation 2 than in situation 1 and therefore: 61 > 62. In
that case she will have a stronger taste for leisure in the second
situation  and  this is illustrated by a lower delta. Let us assume that F
is decreasing in h c (more hours of work yields lower utility) and  that  F
satisfies  full  comparability  (Blackorby  and  Donaldson  (1988)).  As a
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result, for a given combination of y and h, she  will  be  better  off  in
situation 1 than in situation 2.
Both  situations  are  illustrated  in   Figure 2.1. The two
indifference curves represent  exactly  the  same  utility  level  for
individual in the two situations. Relative to curve 1, curve  2  has  been
shifted  to  the right over a distance 61 - 62. This clearly indicates the
stronger preference for leisure in situation 2. Given the (linear)  budget
constraint ABC, point  B  is  optimal in situation 1. We see that she is
worse off in situation 2 because indifference curve 2 (which  would  yield
her  the  same utility level) is unattainable with this budget constraint,
so she has to be satisfied with a lower level of utility.
YT
6 -61   2
M                                                  31
C'            1             2
C
B               B
1
1         A'
1
1




T-L T-L T   -*L
1                        2
Figure 2.1  Two translated indifference curves
Incidentally, it is easy to construct a  "money  metric"  for  the
utility  difference  between  both  individuals.  The line A'B'C' has been
drawn parallel to ABC. It is tangent to indifference curve 2 in point  B'.
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The  points  B and B' correspond to identical levels of consumption and to
identical utility levels, but to different levels of leisure. The
horizontal  distance  between  B  and  B'  equals  62  -  61.  The  budget
constraints ABC and A'B'C' only differ with respect to the level  of  non-
labour  income.  Apparently,  she  has  to be compensated for her stronger
preference for leisure by an additional amount of unearned income equal to
AA' to achieve the same utility level as in situation 1.
Our choice to  let  family  composition  only  affect  the  deltas
implies  that  indifference  curves  can  only shift sideways. This may be
restrictive (although it still allows for shifts in both the intercept and
the  slope  of  the  labour  supply  curves),  but the tractability of the
specification is an important reason to adhere to it.
An  important  issue  is  the  identification of the parameters in
equation (2.1) and (2.5). Clearly equation (2.1)  is  exactly  identified.
Substituting equation (2.5) into (2.1) and rewriting yields
hk = BIk + (60+Be) + (7+B6O)wk + 1/2,Bw2 + 6lfk + B61fkwk  (2.7)
From equation (2.7) it is easy to see that this model is (over)identified.
Following common practice in estimating labour supply functions, a
normally distributed error term with zero mean and variance 62 is added to
the hours equation
h =hk+shk if hk+ehk2 0
(2.8)
=0
hk    +    e hk<     0
where  ehk - N(0,  h) (2.9)
h  = observed number of hours individual k works.
The additive error term ehk could represent a  measurement  error  in  the
hours  variable or an optimization error on the part of the individual. Or
it could represent deviations from the optimal  number  of  hours  due  to
demand  side  restrictions. In that case we have already deviated somewhat
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from a standard neoclassical labour supply model in the sense that  it  is
no longer assumed that all unemployment is voluntary.
In fact, the whole  model  consists  of  2 equations, the hours
equation  and  the consumption equation. Because of adding-up restrictions
the variance-covariance matrix  of  the  error  terms  is  singular.  This
problem  can  be  accounted  for by dropping arbitrarily one equation (cf.
Barten (1969)). We have dropped the consumption equation.
2.3  The model specification for two-adult households
For ease of language we  shall  usually  indicate  the  first  two
adults  in  a  household  as  husband  (or  male)  and  wife  (or  female)
respectively, and  we  will  use  two-adult  households  and  families  as
synonyms. If  there  are  any other adults in the household, their labour
supply is taken to be exogenous just as the labour supply of children. The
model to explain the joint labour supply decision of husband and wife is a
generalization of the model for one-adult households, also referred to  as
single individuals. It is due to Hausman and Ruud (1984)
*
11mk = 6mk + Ymwmk + owfk + BmIk (2.10)
hfk - 6fk + Tfwfk + 0:wmk + BfIk (2.11)
*
Ik = Ik + 8+ 6mkwmk + 6fkwfk + 1/2('mwm + Yfwf (2.12)
+ crwmkwfk
where
hmk = number  of  hours  the male partner in household k would
like to work per week
h       = number  of hours the female partner in household k wouldfk
like to work per week
wmk' wfk= after  tax  marginal  wage  rates  of  male  and female,
respectively
I       = (weekly) nonlabour income of household kk
8. 6mk' 6fk' Tm' Tf' a' Bf' Bm are parameters.
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The  system (2.10)-(2.12) is quadratic in wages and hence exhibits
a certain amount of flexibility in  describing  household  labour  supply.
Clearly, a major assumption underlying this model is that the household is
a homogeneous decision  making  unit,  so  that  its  preferences  can  be
represented  by  a  joint  utility function. A different approach could be
followed by placing the household decision making process in a  bargaining
framework. See, for example, theoretical papers by Manser and Brown (1980)
or McElroy and Horney (1981) and empirical work by Bjorn and Vuong  (1984)
and Kooreman and Kapteyn (1985).
Under some regularity conditions the model is consistent with  the
maximization  of a household utility function U(hmk'hfk'yk) under a linear
budget constraint of the form
yk - wmkhmk + wfkhfk + Ik (2.13)
which states that the total amount of money available for consumption in a
given  period  is the sum of unearned income Ik' labour income of the male
w khmk and labour income of the female  wfkhfk.  The  functional  form  of
U(hmk'hfk'Yk) has been derived in Kapteyn, Kooreman and  Van Soest (1989)
U(hmk'hfk'Yk) = ik exp(B'wk) (2.14)
where   Ik = (B'A-1B)-1_   (B,A-1B)-2 + (B,A-1B)-1
(2.15)
{(hk- 61c)'A-1(hk- 61c) - 2(Yk+ 8)}]
1/2
Wk    =   A- 1 (hk   -61c-   I B) (2.16)
f y     al
BIIX 1.AIL. „ (2.17)m f
The concavity condition in this model is  (B'A-lB)Ik  5  1  for A
positive definite (Kapteyn, Kooreman and Van Soest (1989)). The parameters
6   and 6 have been parameterized analogous to  the  model  for  single-mk fk
adult households
6 =6 +6 f (2.18)mk    mO    ml k
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6 =6 +6 f (2.19)
fk fO fl k
The model described in equations (2.10)-(2.12)  and  (2.18)-(2.19)
is  clearly  overidentified. To make this an estimable model, a stochastic
specification is added to the model. This yields the following explanation
of labour supply
0
hmk = hmk + Gmk if hmlc + Emk 2 0
(2.20)
=0 if hmk + Smk < 0
0
hfk   =  hfk  +  s fk if hfk + Efk 2 0
(2.21)
=0 if hfk + Eflc < 0
. .    I-
2
6         0    dm    edm6fmk -N (2.22)
E
fk       0    eamaf    d2-0 0    -
0                             0                                                  -                                                                                                                                                                                     -
where       h   and  h k are observed hours worked by husband  and  wi fe,   h k  and
hfk are given by equations (2.10)-(2.12)   and  emk  and  efk are error terms.
Just  as  in  the  model  for  single-adult households the error terms can
represent measurement errors, optimization errors, deviations from the
optimal number of hours due to demand side restrictions.
2.4 Data
- OSA-Survey
The OSA-survey, which serves as one of the data-bases for
estimation  of the model, was held in 1985. Only persons between 18 and 60
years of age have  been interviewed. In total the data set contains
information on 4,020 individuals, of whom:
2,325 have a paid job;
177 are self-employed;
272 have no paid work, but are seeking;
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1,243 have no paid work, and are not seeking;
3 are full time students.
For  our  model  we need a fair amount of information per individual. As a
result, a number of observations could not be used because the information
for that individual was incomplete. Furthermore, we have excluded the
self-employed from the sample, because the behaviour of this group appears
to  require  a  different  model  than  the  one  set  out in the previous
sections. Disabled people, and  students  have  been  excluded  as  well,
because they are not available for paid work in the short run. As a result
the sample that is used for estimation consists of 849 households with two
adults  and  341 single-adult households. More detailed information on the
composition of the sample is given in Table 2.1.
Sample  means  for  some of the main variables of interest in this
study, are given in Table 2.2. The wages reported are not only the  actual
wages  observed  in  the  sample, but also predicted wages. The reason for
this is that in order to explain the behaviour of all  households  in  the
sample  we  need  to  know, also for those not working, what the potential
wage rate is. Since no wage rate is observed for nonworking individuals  a
wage  equation  is estimated which explains an individual's wage rate as a
function of his (or  her)  education  and age. There are two ways of
estimating  this  equation.  The  first  method is to only use information
about the wages of working individuals and estimate the equations by means
of  some  method  which corrects for the selectivity bias which may result
from the fact that  working  and  nonworking  individuals  may  differ  in
certain  unobservable  but relevant aspects. The correction method used is
Heckman's well known two step approach (Heckman(1979)). However,  we  have
employed an alternative method, which exploits the fact that in the survey
job seekers are asked the following question
"If you could find the new job you are looking for, how many hours
do you expect to work, and what do you think your  net  wage  would
be, taking into account your present chances in the labour market,
and the kind of job you are looking for?"
The  wage  rate  that nonworking seeking individuals report in response to
the above question will be referred to as "expected wage rate". We  assume
that  for  nonworking  individuals the expected after tax wage rate is the
appropriate variable for the explanation of the labour  supply  decisions.
-15-
Thus  we estimate for each level of education (log)wage equations for both
workers and nonworkers together with the log of age and the squared log of
age as explanatory variables. Estimation results are given in Appendix 2A.
We don't present the estimation results obtained by the Heckman correction
method, but  it  turned  out  that  the  sample  means  of the wage rates
predicted according to the two different methods are not too far apart. It
also  turns out that for the estimation of the labour supply model it does
not make a big  difference which of the two wage equations is being  used.
See Kapteyn, Woittiez and ten Hacken (1989).
Regarding the sample means of actual hours, one observes that  for
males  the  number of hours worked per week seems to have gone up slightly
from 1984 to 1985. This is not likely to be true, as during this period  a
strong political movement in the Netherlands has succesfully lobbied for a
mandatory reduction of the working week. An explanation for  the  apparent
rise  in  actual  working  hours  may  be  that respondents tend to forget
overtime hours they worked a year ago, so that the hours reported for last
year  are  an  underestimation.  To  the  extent that this is a systematic
effect it need not affect the estimation of the labour  supply  model  too
much, as  it  is  mainly the variation across individuals in actual hours
that serves to explain the current labour supply of households. The number
of  hours one prefers to work  is  also lower than the number of hours
actually worked. For an extensive  discussion  of  this  variable  one  is
referred to Chapter 3. Here it suffices to give the definition
"Suppose you could freely choose the number of hours you work  per
week. How  many hours would you like to work in your present job,
if you could choose them yourself and if you would earn on average
the  same amount of money per hour as you do at the moment. If you
choose fewer hours of work, you choose for less income.  And  more
hours of  work means more income. Assume that the number of hours
of other members of the household, if any, do not change".
Next  we  turn  to a graphical exposition of the distribution of wages and
hours in the sample. Figure 2.2 gives the distribution of wages (including
the distribution of predicted wages  according to the method described
above) of married males (married males and males in  two-adult  households
are used as synonyms) and married females. First of all it is obvious, and
as one might expect, that predicted wages vary  less  than  actual  wages.
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This is a direct result of the fact that in the prediction the random part
of the equation is ignored. Since wage equations are rather notorious  for
their poor statistical fit, ignoring the random part amounts to a sizeable
reduction of observed  variation, and this is  exactly  what  the  figures
show. For the estimation of the linear labour supply model the rather poor
fit of the wage equation has no dramatic implications, because the fit  of
the wage equation does not affect the consistency of the estimation of the
parameters in the model. However,  consistency  of  the  estimated  labour
supply  parameters is lost if wages not only appear linearly in the labour
supply equation but also quadraticly. Despite this, it is common  practice
to impute wages into the labour supply equation. We will commit this error
in Chapters 2 to 4. but in Chapter 5 and 6 we deal  with  the  problem  by
estimating  a simultaneous  wage-hours model. Since the wage distributions
of married males, single males, married females  and  single  females  all
show  the  same  features, we present only two of them. For the other wage
distributions is referred to Kapteyn, Woittiez and ten Hacken (1988).
Comparing  the wage distribution of males and females, it is clear
that the distribution for the males is located more to the right than  the
distribution  for  females, in other words, generally males earn more than
females.  Comparing married  males  to  single  males shows that the
distribution  for  the  single  males tends to be more to the left (single
males earn less). For females  the  situation  is  rather  the  other  way
around.  The  higher  wages of single females compared to those of married
females may be explained by a  difference  in  employment  situation.  The
married females typically work part time  and  have  experienced
interruptions of their labour force  participation  (for  example  due  to
child bearing). These factors tend to reduce the wage one can earn.
Figure 2.3 presents distributions of actual and preferred hours
for  the  same  four  groups as distinguished above. Considering the males
first, we see that  both  the  distributions  for  actual  hours  and  for
preferred hours show a spike at 40 hours a week. For single males there is
a second spike at 32 hours. Generally the preferred hours  distribution
lies a bit more to the left than the actual hours distribution. The
distributions for females are more dispersed with spikes at 20, 32, and 40
hours  a  week.  For married females there is also a very large spike at 0
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hours: more than 60% of the married females are not working. Also here the
preferred hours distributions lie somewhat more to the left.
Table 2.1 Sample compositiona)
male working nonworking nonworking all
female nonseeking seeking
working 315         3           13          331 (131)
nonworking,
nonseeking 453         0           26          479 ( 36)
nonworking,
seeking              33         0            6           39 ( 31)
all 801 (112) 3 (2) 45 (29) 849 (341.143+198)
a) The numbers in parentheses refer to singles
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Table 2.2. Sample means
male in families single all
actual hours per week 39.70 30.75 38.41
actual hours per weeka) 42.07 39.26 41.73
actual hours per week, lagged 1 year 38.14 29.08 36.84
actual hours per week, lagged 1 year 39.50 34.63 38.90
a)
preferred hours per week 36.49 28.08 35.28
preferred hours per week 38.68 35·86a)                                             38.33
a)
actual net wage rate (guilders) 15.97 15.59 15.92
predicted net wage rate (guilders) 13·61
b) 12.94 13·51
educl (lst level of education) 0.16 0.11 0.15
educ2 (2nd level of education) 0.20 0.15 0.19
educ3 (3rd level of education) 0.40 0.36 O.40
educ4 (4th level of education) 0.24 0.38 0.26
age 39.68 35.60 39.09
nonlabour income (guilders per week) 74.1 32,9 68.2
family size 3.46 1.10 3.12
seek (dummy=1 if individual
C)
is seeking, =0 if not) 0.94 0.94 0.94
unemployment benefit 333.6 303.5
d)                                   261.5
number of all individuals 849 143 992
number of working individuals 801 112 913
number of nonworking individuals         48             31          79
number of individuals receiving
unemployment benefit                     42             30          72
a) Means based on working individuals.
b) Predicted wages. based on  a  wage  regression  for  both  working  and
nonworking individuals. Expected  wages  are used as observations for
nonworking individuals. See Appendix 2A.
c) Means based on nonworking individuals.
d) Means  based  on  nonworking individuals, receiving  an  unemployment
benefit.
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Table 2.2. Sample means, continued
female in families single all
actual hours per week 10.64 23·63 13·10
a)
actual hours per week 27·29 35.72 29.68
actual hours per week, lagged 1 year 11.96 22.05 13·87
a)                                28.53actual hours per week, lagged 1 year 27·30 31.64
preferred hours per week 9.60 21.58 11.86
a) 24.62 32.61 26.89preferred hours per week
a)                        14,13actual net wage rate (guilders) 12.54 12.99
b)                                  11.17predicted net wage rate (guilders) 11.13 11.31
educl (lst level of education) 0.26 0.18 0.24
educ2 (2nd level of education) 0.26 0.14 0.24
educ3 (3rd level of education) 0.38 O.44 0.39
educ4 (4th level of education) 0.10 0.24 0.13
age 37.16 36.20 36.98
nonlabour income (guilders per week) 74.1 121.0 83.0
family size 3.46 1.51 3.09
seek (dummy=1 if individual
C)
is seeking, =0 if not) 0.08 O.46 0.12
d) 211.7 258.7 238.1unemployment benefit
number of all individuals 849 198 1047
number of working individuals 331 131 462
number of nonworking individuals 518             67         585
number of individuals receiving
unemployment benefit                     12             48          60
a) Means based on working individuals.
b) Predicted wages, based on  a  wage  regression  for  both  working  and
nonworking  individuals.  Expected  wages  are used as observations for
nonworking individuals. See Appendix 2A.
c) Means based on nonworking individuals.
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- SEP-survey
The  SEP is a bi-annual panel of households who are interviewed in
April and October of each  year.  The  panel  started  in  1984.  For  the
estimation  of the household labour supply models the wave of October 1985
has been used. The data set used contains 4225  households.  In  principle
all persons in a household of 16 years or older have been interviewed. The
information collected pertains primarily to incomes, labour market status,
subjective  evaluation  of  incomes, and various background variables like
household composition, education, etc.  It turns Out that the income
information  for  many  households  is  incomplete,  so that, even after a
considerable amount of imputation,  358  records  could  not  be  used  in
estimation.  Table  2.3  gives  information  on the characteristics of the
sample that remains after  the  removal  of  the  incomplete  records  and
compares  them  with corresponding population information. Table 2.3 shows
that compared with the population the sample contains fewer older  people.
In  agreement  with this, the  percentage  of widows and widowers in the
sample is lower than in the population. Similarly,  married  couples  are
slightly overrepresented in the sample.
Taking this data set as a starting point of the analysis, we  give
its  composition  with respect to the employment status of the individuals
in it. In total the data set contains 11881 individuals, of whom:
7237 (4020) are between 18 and 65 years old;
2805 (2325) have a paid job;
351 ( 177) are self-employed;
181 ( 272) have no paid work, but are seeking;
1908 (1243) have no paid work. and are not seeking;
30 C 0)are in military service;
289 ( 3)are full time students.
The numbers in parentheses are the corresponding numbers  for  the
OSA-survey.  As with the OSA-survey, additional records had to be removed,
since some other information needed for the estimation of the household
labour supply model was lacking.
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marital status male female
populationa)(%) SEP(%) populationa)(%) SEP(%)
married 48.1 51.2 47·0 50.9
divorced 3.0 2.1 3.8 3.1
widowhood 2.1 1.7 9.0 6.4
unmarried 46.8 44.9 40.2 39.5
other 0.1 0.2
49.5 49.8 50.5 49.8
type of household populationa)(%) SEP(%)
one-person household 28.6 20.0
no-family household 5.8 4.4
couple without children 20.9 23.7
couple with children 38.0 44.5
single parent family 5.2 5.3
other 2.5 2.0
a) See "Statistisch Zakboek", 1986.
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The composition  of  the  sample  that  was  actually  used  for
estimation, is given in Table 2.4. The table is analogous to Table 2.1.
Table 2.4 Sample composition
a)
male working nonworking nonworking all
female nonseeking  seeking
working 308          9           1          318 ( 85)
nonworking,
nonseeking 589         44          10          643 (115)
nonworking,
seeking              23          0           1           24 ( 12)
all 920 (117) 53 (32) 12 (22) 985 (383=171+212)
a) The numbers in parentheses refer to singles
It  is  rather striking that the SEP-sample used for estimation is
approximately the same size as the OSA-sample, although the initial sample
size of the SEP was about twice as large. The huge reduction of the sample
size is mainly due to the large number of incomplete or  unusable  records
that  we  have encountered in the data. The composition of both samples is
roughly the same, except for one very striking fact, namely the percentage
of  nonseeking men. In the OSA-sample 45 out of the 48 nonworking males in
families are seeking work and 29 out of 31 nonworking single males. In the
SEP-sample  the  picture is quite different: 53 of the 65 nonworking males
in families are nonseekers, and 32 of the 54 nonworking single males.  All
of these nonworking males receive some kind of benefit and the average age
among this group is 52. This high age might explain why these  individuals
are not seeking.
Information on hours worked and wage rates in  the  SEP-sample  is
given  in  Table  2.5.  Comparing Table 2.5 with Table 2.2 the differences
between both samples appear to be small for males, but for females we  see
substantial  differences.  In  the  SEP-data  the  average number of hours
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Information  on  hours  worked and wage rates in the SEP-sample is
given in Table 2.5. Comparing Table 2.5 with  Table  2.2  the  differences
between  both samples appear to be small for males, but for females we see
substantial differences. In the SEP-data the average number of hours
worked  by  married  females  is considerably less than in the OSA survey,
this holds both for actual and preferred.
Like in the OSA-sample, the predicted wages vary less than the
actual wages (see Figure 2.2). The wage  distributions  generally  display
the same features for both data sets:
- males earn more than females
- single males earn less than males in families
- single females earn more than females in families.
Figure  2.4  presents  hours  distributions. Comparing this figure
with Figure 2.3 shows that once more spikes at 40 and 32  hours  per  week
are  present  for males. For females there are also big spikes at 20 and 0
hours.
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Table 2.5. Sample means
male in families single all
actual hours per week 39.41 26.47 37.49
actual hours per weeka) 42.19 38.69 41.80
actual hours per week, lagged 1 year 39.09 25·84 37.13
actual hours per week, legged 1 yeara 41.43 36.93 40.92
preferred hours per week 38.23 32.85 37.44
a)
preferred hours per week 39·52 35.37 39.05
actual net wage rate (guilders)a) 14.50 13·22 14.35
predicted net wage rate (guilders)b) 13·60 12.48 13·44
educl (lst level of education) 0.14 0.20 0.15
educ2 (2nd level of education) O.18 0.25 0.19
educ3 (3rd level of education) 0.47 0.36 0.46
educ4 (4th level of education) 0.21 0.18 0.21
age 39·93 37.90 39.63
nonlabour income (guilders per week) 102.2 165.0 111.5
family size 3.49 1.50 3.20
seekc) (dummy=l if individual
is seeking, =0 if not) 0.18 0.41 0.29
unemployment benefitd) 418.9 290.3 350.7
number of all individuals 985 171 1156
number of working individuals 920 117 1037
number of nonworking individuals         65              54         119
number of individuals receiving
unemployment benefit                     39             44          83
a) Means based on working individuals.
b) Predicted wages, based on  a  wage  regression  for  both  working  and
nonworking individuals. Expected  wages  are used as observations for
nonworking individuals. See Appendix 2A.
c) Means based on nonworking individuals.
d) Means based on nonworking individuals receiving an unemployment benefit
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Table 2.5. Sample means, continued
female in families single all
actual hours per week 7.31 13·58 8.42
actual hours per week 22.65 33.88 25·02
a)
actual hours per week, lagged 1 year 7.76 13·80 8.83
actual hours per week, legged 1 yeara 21.75 32,91 24.10
preferred hours per week 10.00 17·04 11.25
preferred hours per weeka) 21.70 31.66 23·80
actual net wage rate (guilders)a) 12.54 12.87 12.61
predicted net wage rate (guilders)b) 11.17 11.19 11.17
educl (lst level of education) 0.19 0.32 0.22
educ2 (2nd level of education) 0.34 0.18 0.31
educ3 (3rd level of education) 0.36 0.32 0.35
educ4 (4th level of education) 0.10 0.18 0.12
age 37.34 44.87 38.67
nonlabour income (guilders per week) 102.2 216.4 122.4
family size 3.49 1.62 3.16
seek (dummy=1 if individual
C)
is seeking, =0 if not) 0.04 0.09 0.05
unemployment benefit 211.7 255.7
d)                                 262.4
number of all individuals 985 212 1197
number of working individuals 318             85         403
number of nonworking individuals 667 127 794
number of individuals receiving
unemployment benefit                     12             78          90
a) Means based on working individuals.
b) Predicted  wages,  based  on  a  wage  regression  for both working and
nonworking individuals. Expected wages are  used  as  observations  for
nonworking individuals. See Appendix 2A.
c) Means based on nonworking individuals.
d) Means  based  on  nonworking  individuals,  receiving  an  unemployment
benefit
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The exact specification of the model  is  given  in  Section  2.2,
equations (2.7) and (2.8). As endogenous variable we use the actual number
of hours worked. By using the average wage rate instead  of  the  marginal
wage  rate  it  is  implicitly  assumed that the individual faces a linear
budget constraint. Of course this is a simplification of reality,  but  it
turns  out that in practice this assumption doesn't alter the results very
much. In  Chapter  3  we  will  nevertheless  relax  this assumption. In
estimation  predicted  wages  are  used  both  for working and not working
individuals. The wage equations used for prediction are given in  Appendix
2A.  We have excluded individuals receiving unemployment benefits from the
sample.
The appropriate likelihood contribution of working individuals is:
Ll  -  1  P f  ho-  h  (2.23)ah l  ah
where p is the standard normal density function.
For nonworking individuals in the data  sets  used,  it  is  known
whether  they  are  looking  for a job or not. If one is looking for a job
this means in terms of (2.1) that hk  is  positive,  and  if  one  is  not
seeking,  h c is less than or equal to zero. The likelihood contribution of
an individual who is not working and not looking for a job is:
'2",It 1 (2.24)
where 0 is the standard normal distribution function.
The contribution of a non-working job seeker is:
0 - ,I t] (2.25)
The  estimation  results  are  given  in  Table  2.6. Let us first
concentrate on the results based on the OSA-data. Looking  at  the  labour
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supply equation  for  males, it emerges that neither nonlabour income nor
family size  nor  the  wage  rate  are  significant.  According  to  these
estimation results, male labour supply is explained by a constant of about
37 hours  per week. These  results  are  confirmed  by  a  reduced  form
estimation where we have regressed male hours per week on a constant, (the
deviation in) the wage rate, (the deviation in) the squared wage rate  and
the  (deviation in) family size. The estimation results of this regression
are presented in Appendix 2B. For  females  almost  all  coefficients  are
significant, except for family size and the constant term. The lower panel
of Table 2.6 is based on the SEP-data. For males the income coefficient is
significantly  negative  implying  leisure  to be a normal good, all other
coefficients are insignificant, while for females  the  wage  rate  has  a
positive  effect  and  nonlabour income a negative effect on hours worked,
both significant. The coefficient 8 is fixed since we ran  into  numerical
identification  problems, due to the small estimated value of B (note that
8 cannot be  identified  if  B=O).  One  should  realize  that  all  other
parameter estimates and their estimated standard errors are conditional on
the fixed value of e. The parameter  estimates  based  on  the  OSA-sample
differ quite a bit from the estimates based on the SEP-sample. This is not
surprising in the light of the differences in the sample composition.  For
example,  13.1%  of the single females in the OSA-sample. and 38.9% of the
single females in the SEP-sample do not participate (Compare Table 2.2 and
2.5)·  Note  that  we  use  nonparticipants  and  nonworkers  as  synonyms
,contrary to what is common in the literature. In Chapter 7 we  will  test
two data sets against each other.
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Table 2.6  Estimation results for the standard modela)
OSA
males females
6         37        (6)              4         (10)0
8         -0.000001 (u.b.) -O.041 (0.005)
61         0.6      (6)             -8          (5)
y 0.1 (0.5) 2.6 (0.6)
e -1650 (fixed) -355 (fixed)





6        14 (10) -24.6 (8.2)0
B -0.0091 (0.003) -0.067 (0.008)
6 4.8 (3.8)           4         (14)
1
7 0.8 (0.6) 2.6 (0.4)
8 -1650 (fixed) -355 (fixed)
dh
16.0 (1.0) 22.0 (1.8)
log likelihood
-486.5 -380.8
a) u.b. = upper bound, 1.b. = lower bound
Standard errors in parentheses
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- Two-adult households
Equations (2.10)-(2.12) and (2.20)-(2.22) specify the  model  that
has been estimated for two-adult households. The likelihood function
consists of different parts (L c) corresponding to the different situations
households face. Let 0 and p  be the standard normal distribution and
density function respectively. Let B* and bp  be  the  bivariate  standard
normal  distribution and density functions, respectively (with correlation
e).
We  distinguish  the  following  situations  (where i,j stands for
m(ale) or f(emale)):
1) both spouses are working (h'k > 0, h k > 0)
f o
Ih   - h
ho  -h      11 I ik    ik   jk   jk




2) spouse  i is not working and not seeking a job, and spouse j is working
(hok = 0, seekik= 0, hjk >0)
-h     , hjk - hjk .1   hjk - hjk 2         ik
Lk = 0-di/1-e2 -   aj/1-p2     GI  l    Gj j (2.27)
3) spouse i is not working but seeking a job, and spouse j is working (h 
= 0, seek  .1  h:. >0)
ik  '  Jk
-          f o .- rho-hl
L, = F,-0 -hik
plhjk - hjk 1  | jk    jk I
-                  37. P' (2.28)k               2   2L aiJi-p a.11-9 il    5   j3
4) Both spouses   are not working  and not seeking  a  job   (h'k   =   0,   seekik=  '
hjk = 0, seekjk=0)
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.                                I
-h      -h.
L4 = Be ik      Jk• '9 (2.29)
- ai cj    -
5) Both spouses are not working and i is not  seeking  a  job,  but  j  is
seeking (h'k = 0, seekik-0, hjk = 0, seekjk=l)
.                                -
L  = 80  -hik .  hili_, -p (2.30)
-  ai    Gj     -
6) Both  spouses are not working but seeking a job (h'k = 0, seekik=l, hjk
= 0, seekjk=1)
6         ik     jk
hh
Lk=BA (2.31)
6.    61-      1
where seekik = 0 if spouse i in household k is not seeking a job
= 1 otherwise.
The first column of Table 2.7 corresponds with the  OSA-data  set,
the  second  with  the  SEP.  We  note that both columns of Table 2.7 show
negative income effects (Bm and Ff), implying leisure to be a normal good,
and  positive  own  linear wage effects (Ym and Yf)' Note however that for
the SEP-sample the male wage coefficient and the female income coefficient
had  to be set at the lower and upper bound, respectively and for the OSA-
sample most wage and income effects are insignificant. Furthermore, we see
that  in  both  models  family  size has a negative effect on the female's
labour supply. In fact the first child reduces the number of working hours
of the wife by 19 (17), the second child by 14 (12) more in the OSA-sample
(SEP).
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a)Table 2.7  Estimation results for the standard model
OSA SEP
a -0.1 (2.8) -0.02 (0.15)
Bm -0.002 (0.002) -0.021 (0.001)
B -0.022 (0.006) -0.000001 (u.b.)f
Tm
0.1 (0.3) 0.01 (1.b.)
Yf       2 (26) 4.1 (0.6)
6 -0.2 (1.4) -6.5 (1.9)m1
6 -61.5 (8.1) -41.8 (3.6)f1
6       33 (89) -11.9 (5.1)m0
6 -31 (828)                      -4         (6)f0
e -3183 (38977) -2436 (192)
a 6.88 (0.08) 9.4 (0.1)m
df 24.0 (1.6) 24.5 (1.6)
e -0.03 (0.04) 0.05 (0.04)
log likelihood
-4384.2 -4971.0
a) u.b. = upper bound, 1.b. = lower bound
Standard errors in parentheses
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In Table 2.8 own wage elasticities for  both  one-adult  and  two-
adult households are given.
Table 2.8 Wage elasticities for the standard modela)
OSA SEP
one-adult two-adult one-adult two-adult households
Ah  w
m -m 0.04 -0.00 0.20 0.14
Awm hm
(0.16) (0.06) (0.21) (0.04)
3h  wf  f
3Wf hf
0.43 2.04 0.91 4.72
(0.24) (3.92) (0.31) (4.22)
a) Standard errors in parentheses
The  elasticities  in  Table  2.8 are aggregate elasticities. They
measure the responsiveness of the total labour supply of  all  individuals
to a one percent increase in each individual's wage rate. This is
different  from  calculating the elasticity in the sample mean.
Unfortunately, it  is  not  common practice to present standard errors of
elasticities. But especially if the standard errors of the parameters  are
large, one expects the standard errors of the elasticities also to be
large. In Appendix 2C the derivation of the standard errors  presented  in
parentheses  in  Table  2.8 is given. A couple of remarks can be made with
respect to this table. The wage elasticities for males are all low and not
significantly  different  from 0, except for married males in the SEP. The
wage elasticities for single females are somewhat larger and significantly
different from 0. For married females the elasticities are much larger but
their standard errors are large too. It is  striking  to  note  the  large
differences between the OSA and SEP estimates of the elasticities. In all
cases the SEP estimates are higher than the OSA  estimates.  Whether  this
tendency  is  found  for other specifications as well will become clear in
Chapter 7 of this thesis.
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In  Figures  2.5  and  2.6 the labour supply curves are shown. The
figures are obtained as follows: Each individual's wage rate is varied  by
10%  steps  from  -25%  to +25% of the original wage rate. For each of the
different wage rates and for each individual the deterministic part of the
optimal number of hours is simulated. These numbers are then averaged over
the sample of working individuals. One should note that the labour  supply
wage elasticities and  the  labour  supply  curves  display  different
information. The elasticities are computed as aggregates, based on all
individuals.  The  labour  supply  curves  are  based  on means of working
individuals only. As one can see mean male labour supply varies from 38 to
40  hours  per week for singles and is constant at about 42 hours per week
for males in families (OSA-sample). In the SEP-sample male  labour  supply
varies  a bit more between 35 and 40 hours for single males and from 39 to
43 for males in families. Both male  labour  supply  curves  in  two-adult
households  are  higher than the corresponding curves for single males. As
one would expect, the female labour supply  curves  of  singles  lie  well
above  the supply curve of married females. The latter lies between 12 and
18 hours per week in the OSA sample and between 5 and 15 hours in the SEP.
The  OSA  female  labour supply curves lie higher than the SEP curves. The
figures show quite clearly  that  female  labour  supply  is  a  quadratic
function  of  the wage rate, while for males the labour supply function is
almost linear in wages.
Finally,  Figures  2.7  and  2.8  display the actual and simulated
hours distributions. The simulated hours distributions are spread  out  by
the  stochastic term, and are not able to explain the spikes in the actual
hours distributions. The simulated hours distributions of males show small
thick  peaks  around  40,  while the actual hours distributions show large
thin peaks at 40. The model cannot reproduce  the  8%  nonparticipants  of
single  males  in  the SEP; the simulated percentage of nonworkers is 1.2.
The peaks in simulated hours at 64 hours per week arise  because  we  have
cut  off  the  distributions  at  64. The peaks in the actual female hours
distributions at 0 are all reproduced, although in all cases the degree of
nonparticipation is underestimated. But the other small peaks at 20 and 40
hours  cannot  be reproduced. Due to the high actual degree   of
nonparticipation  of  married  females  the  peak  in  the simulated hours
distribution is at 0.
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2.6 Concluding remarks
This chapter has two major points of emphasis. The  first  is  the
modelling  of  a  standard  neoclassical labour supply model for one-adult
households (Section 2.2) and two-adult households (Section  2.3).  The
second  is the extensive description of the two data sets: Namely the OSA-
data set  and  the  SEP-data  set  (Section  2.4).  In  Section  2.5  some
estimation  results  are  shown  for  simple neoclassical models of labour
supply. The use of different data sets  yields  results  that  are  rather
different  as  far  as  wage  elasticities, hours distributions and labour
supply curves are concerned, although in each case we find  low  own  wage
elasticities  for  males and higher elasticities for females. Moreover, we
find that the presence of children has a strong negative effect on  the
labour supply of females in families.
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Appendix 2A Wage equations
The data sets we use do not only contain actual net wage rates for
working individuals, but also  expected  net  wage  rates  for  nonworking
individuals. We  have  estimated  a  wage  equation  using  both types of
information. Estimation results for the OSA-data are presented in  Table
2A.1, the results for the SEP can be found in Table 2A.2.
From Table 2A.1 it can be concluded that the higher the  education
the  higher  the  age for which the male wage-age curve takes its maximum:
The age at which the maximum is attained increases from 41 for the  lowest
level  of  education,  via  43  and  52  to  61  for  the highest level of
education. In contrast females generally receive  the  highest  wage  rate
when  they  are about 40 years old, irrespective of level of education. In
Table 2A.2 (SEP) the same phenomena are present, except that both men  and
women  with  the  highest  level  of education do not reach the top of the
wage-age profile (the corresponding age is well above 65).
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Table 2A.1: Wage-equations, based on actual and expected wage-rates
a),b)
(OSA-data)
Log wage-equation for men
level of constant log(age) [log(age)]2   number of      RZ
education observations
1 -9.34 6.40 -0.86 290 0.11
(2.13) (1.29) (0.18)
2 -12.60 8.12 -1.08 34o 0.27
(2.06) (1.17) (0.17)
3 -7.72 5.30 -0.67 656 0.16
(1.94) (1.08) (0.15)
4 -6.01 4.27 -0.52 385 0.16
(2.75) (1.53) (0.21)
log wage-equation for women
level of constant log(age) [log(age)]2   number of      R2
education observations
1 -6.11 4.46 -0.59 250 0.12
(2.30) (1.31) (0.19)
2 -10.46 7.04 -0.96 280 0.18
(2.28) (1.31) (0.19)
3 -8.41 5.85 -0.78 540 0.15
(1.79) (1.03) (0.15)
4 -7.98 5.65 -0.75 194 0.09
(4.11) (2.31) (0.32)
a) Standard errors in parentheses.
b) Education has been coded in 4 levels, ranging form 1  (lowest)  till  4
(highest).
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Table 2A.2  Wage-equations, based on actual and expected wage-rates
a),b)
(SEP-data)
Log wage-equation for men
2                    2level of constant log(age) [log(age)] number of     R
education observations
1 -2.58 2.68 -0.36 141 0.02
(4.01) (2.21) (0.30)
2 -2.01 2.35 -0.31 214 0.03
(2.83) (1.58) (0.22)
3 -8.06 5.66 -0.75 589 0.07
(2.22) (1.22) (0.17)
4 -3.13 2.79 -0.31 270 0.11
(5.01) (2.71) (0.37)
log wage-equation for women
2                    2
level of constant log(age) [log(age)] number of     R
education observations
1 -14.1 9.27 -1.29         68           0.07
(7.41) (3.40) (0·56)
2 -19.8 12.6 -1.77 138 0.07
(6.8) (3.8) (0.54)
3 -9.07 6.34 -0.87 192 0.07
(4.03) (2.30) (0.33)
4 -0.87 1.54 -0.15         78           0.05
(11.20) (6.29) (0.88)
a) Standard errors in parentheses.
b) Education  has  been  coded in 4 levels, ranging form 1 (lowest) till 4
(highest).
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Appendix 2B A reduced form estimation of single male labour supply
The results presented in Table 2.6  seem  to  indicate  that  male
labour  supply is best explained by a constant of about 37 hours per week.
It could be the case that the functional form  we  have  imposed is too
restrictive.  Therefore,  we  have  estimated  the  following reduced form
equation instead of equation (2.1) by means of maximum likelihood
-
hk = cl + c2(Ik-I) + c3(wk-w) + cll(w -w2) + c5(fk-f)
(2B.1)
+ c6(wkfk-wf)
where a bar (-) on a variable denotes its sample mean.
We  have  substracted  the  mean  of  each  variable  to minimize possible
numerical problems. In Table 2B.1 the estimation results are presented.
The near equality of the two likelihood values in Table 2.6 and Table 2B.1
suggests that the imposed functional form is not too restrictive.
a)Table 2B.1 Estimation results for the standard model
OSA
males
















Appendix 2C Derivation of the standard errors of elasticities
In this Appendix is shown how the standard errors of an elasticity
can  be  derived.  The elasticities shown in Table 2.8 are aggregated over
the individuals in the sample. The aggregate  wage  elasticity  of  single
males, for example, can be written as
K                          K
I
[hk(wk+Awk)-hk(wk)] I  w
k=1 k=1
k
elas = (2C.1)K                  K
I Awk
k=1 hkk=1
where        h from equation (2.1)i s written   as a function  of   wk:   hk (wk)    and
Awk= 1.Olwk. This elasticity measures the total increase (or decrease)  in
hours  worked  of  all  individuals  in the population as a result of a 1%
increase in each person's wage rate.
From (2.1) we know that h  is a nonlinear function of the parameter vector
e   and exogenous variables   X c:
hk = gl(e,Xk) (2C.2)
where   e = (60  61  1  B 8) and
Xk = (wk Ik fk)
Likewise the aggregate elasticity can be written as a function of e
elas = g2(0•X) (2C.3)
The parametervector e has been estimated by means of  maximum  likelihood.
Therefore
-        A
JK (e-e) - N (0, I) (2C.4)
Then the asymptotic distribution of elas is
/K (g2(e.x)-g2(e,X)) 8 N(0, Vg2) (2C.5)
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"2= f f [ 26. '2(0·*)10}I ,&; g.(e·x,1
1' (2C.6)
i=1 j=1 l 1       le J ij
where I is the number of parameters
Bi is a typical element of the parameter vector e
E., is a typical element of Z.
1J
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3 The social security and welfare system, and institutional constraints
3.1 Introduction
Generally, the budget constraint will not  have  the  linear  form
that  was assumed in Chapter 2. Due to the tax and the social security and
welfare system, it will be nonlinear and nonconvex. In Section 3.2 we will
concentrate on modelling labour supply if the budget set is nonconvex, the
nonconvexity being caused by the Dutch social security and welfare system.
It is common practice to use actual hours worked as the endogenous
variable in labour supply models.  But  actual  hours  are  generally  the
result   of the interplay of  household preferences, institutional
constraints and the demand for labour. In Chapter 6 of this thesis we will
deal  explicitly  with demand side constraints. In Section 3.3, however, a
model of labour supply is presented in which the problem of  dealing  with
demand  side  constraints has been circumvented. For that purpose we use a
specific question in both the OSA and SEP survey about how many  hours  an
individual  would like to work. Rationing theory has to be used due to the
wording of the question (see Kapteyn, Kooreman and van Soest  (1989)).  In
Section 3.4 estimation results are presented and Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 A nonconvex budget set
For  the  moment we abstract from the nonlinearities cuased by the
tax system. Let us concentrate on the Dutch social security system.  If  a
presently  unemployed  person  receives  unemployment  benefits,  and this
person takes a job, his or her benefits wil be  reduced.  This  introduces
nonconvexities  in  the  budget constraint. An  illustration is found in
Figure 3.1, which for ease of presentation has been  drawn  for  a  single
individual.  The  individual  receives an unemployment benefit equal to b.
Other nonlabour income equals I. The budget  constraint  consists  of  the
point  B  and  the  line AC. So, if the individual works non-zero hours he
looses his benefit. This is a simplification of reality, because if  an
unemployed  person  starts earning money but his total income is below the
official poverty line, his income is supplemented with  welfare  benefits.
In  Figure  3.1  two  situations  are  shown that can occur in the case of
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nonconvex budget sets. In Figure 3.1.B the individual under  consideration
prefers to  work  h hours, since  working  h  hours  without  receiving
unemployment benefit b yields a higher utility (Ul) than not  working  and
receiving  unemployment  benefit equal to b (U ) , whereas
in Figure 3.1.A
the individual prefers not  to  work.  By  means  of  the  direct  utility
function  the point of highest utility is computed.


















(T-h)                                                    T                            +L
B. Involuntary unemployment
Figure 3.1  Nonconvex budget sets
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Thus  hours  worked are explained by our model as follows: Let U1k
be the utility of working h c hours without unemployment compensation,      and
let U be  the  utility  if  the  individual doesn't work, but receivesOk
unemployment benefit bk' Uok and Ulk can be calculated directly  by  using
the  utility  function  given  in  equation (2.3). Assuming absence of op-
timization errors, the choice to work or not (or rather to look for a  job
or not) for an individual receiving unemployment benefit bk' is determined
by Ulk-UOk. It is important to note that, contrary to what  is  common  in
search theory, the  receipt  of an unemployment benefit is assumed to be
exogenous. As a result the model can be written as follows
For individuals who do not receive any benefit
h -hk' 'hk if    hk    +    Ehk    10
(3.1)
=0 if hk + Ehk <0
For individuals who receive a benefit
0
hk    =    hk    + Ehk if hk+Shk- lk-UOk+vklo>0 and U
(3.2)
=0 if h +6 <0 or U -Uok+vk<0-k hk lk
where  hk =6 k+ Twk + B[Ik +8+ 6k k + 1/2yw ] (3.3)
6   =6 +6 f (3.4)k 0 l k
vk - N(0, 62) (3.5)
Ehk - N(0, (4) (3.6)
The  additive  error term vk can only represent an optimization error. Uok
and U can  be  calculated  by  inserting  respectively  (O,Ik+bk)  and1k
(hk,Ik+wkhk)   for   (hk'yk) into equations  (2.3)  and  (2.4) .  Note that h  is
the number of hours individual k would like to work if he didn't receive
any benefit and bk is the amount of unemployment benefit.
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The  utility  of  working  an  optimal  number  of  hours  without
benefits,  Ulk  (i=f,m),  and the utility U k (i=f,m) of not working and
receiving benefits can be computed for two-adult-households in  a  similar
way  by  using equations (2.14)-(2.16). The model for these individuals is
now written as follows
For individuals who do not receive any benefit
ho  =h   +E
mk    mk mk if hmk+Emk2 0
(3.7)
=0 if hmk+Emk< 0
ho  =h + £ if h +E >0fk    fk fk fk  fk-
(3.8)
=0 if h +E <0
fk  fk
For individuals who receive a benefit
ho  =h +E
if hmk+Emk20 and U k-U k+vmklomk    mk    mk
(3·9)
=0 if h  +6  <0 or U  -U2 +v  <0mk mk lk Ok  mk
o                                      ff




f   f=0
if hfk+Efk<0 or Ulk-Uok+vfk<0
.
where
Emk 0   famcrf
-N (3.11)2
Efk D ecmer Cf
--.
2
v         00       0
mk vm-N (3.12)2
Vfk 0 0 6vf
---    0
and  v    is  assumed uncorrelated with E and € and so is v with E
mk mk fk fk       fk
and Emk' hInk and hfk are given by equations (2.10)-(2.12), and Ulk and Uok
can  be  calculated from (2.13)-(2.16). Like in the model for singles, the
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additive error terms vmk and vfk can only represent optimization errors on
the part of the individual.
3.3 The use of preferred hours
Suppose  that there are institutional constraints on the number of
hours one can work; say one can only work zero or  fourty  hours  a  week.




0                                                                                                                    T                                   +L
168              40             34                    0
Figure 3.2  Institutional constraints
Point B would represent a utility maximum, but actually  point  A  is  ob-
served.  The  latter  point  does not convey information about the utility
function, because it does not represent a point of tangency of  an  indif-
ference  curve  with  the  budget curve. Yet, in most empirical work it is
assumed that observed hours are also preferred hours.
A   rather  straightforward  way  to  find  out  whether  observed
behaviour represents a utility maximum or a constraint of some kind (apart
from the budget constraint) is to ask respondents in a survey directly how
many hours they would like to work. In the  surveys  that  serve  as  data
sources  for the empirical work in this study adults in each participating
household are asked the following question
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"Suppose  you could freely choose the number of hours you work per
week. How many hours would you like to work in your present  job,
if  you  could  choose  them  yourself  and  if you would earn on
average the same amount of money  per  hour  as  you  do  at  the
moment. If  you  choose fewer hours of work, you choose for less
income. And more hours of work means more income. Assume that the
number of hours of other members of the household, if any, do not
change".
We will refer to this question as the "preferred hours question" and the
answer to the question as the number of preferred hours of the respondent.
Figure  3.3  illustrates  how  the  answer  to this question should be in-
terpreted within the model.










It                                                                 A
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Figure 3.3  Interpretation of the response to the preferred hours question
The  budget constraint faced by the individual is BCDEF. Non-labour income
equals AT. The optimal number of hours for  the  individual  is E, since
indifference  curve  II  is  the  highest  attainable one given the budget
constraint. Due to institutional constraints the actual number  of  hours
worked  by  the individual deviates from the optimum. The actual number of
hours is h and the indifference curve I passing  through  G  represents  a
lower  utility  level  than indifference curve II. In the actual situation
-54-
labour income equals GI. Now consider the preferred hours  question.  In
this question the respondent is invited to keep the average after tax wage
rate constant. In other words, the respondent is offered a  linear  budget
constraint  AGH  and is asked which number of hours is optimal. The answer
is hP. Obviously the point H does give us information on the  respondent's
utility  function  because  the  indifference  curve  is  tangent  to  the
"virtual" budget constraint and both the wage rate w and unearned income
AT  are known.  Thus by using information on preferred hours h , wages w c
and non-labour incomes Ik for individual k in some sample we can  estimate
the  parameters  in  (2.1)  and  thereby measure utility functions of con-
sumption and hours worked. The model we have  estimated  is  described  by
equations  (3.1)-(3.6),  except  that h . the observed number of hours in-
dividual k actual works,    is now substituted   by   h , the observed number     of
hours an individual prefers to work.
There is an essential complication in the two-adult household case
which was not present in the one-adult household case. Recall the last
sentence of the preferred hours question which suggests to the  respondent
to  keep  actual  hours  of  other  family  members  constant. In terms of
equations (2.10)-(2.12) this means for example that if a  male  respondent
says  he  would like to work hmk hours he assumes that the number of hours
worked by his wife remains at its actual level. The actual number of hours
worked  by  the  female need not correspond to a household utility maximum
(e.g., due to institutional constraints). In  more  technical  terms,  the
female may be rationed at her actual number of hours. Denote her actual
0
number of hours by h Then we assume that the male response to thefk'
preferred hours  question  is the result of maximization of U(hmk'hfk'yk)
subject to
0
hfk = hfk (3.13)
yk = wmkhmk + wfkhfk + Ik (3.14)
where      h       is the actual number of hours worked   by the female    ( see   also
Neary and  Roberts  (1980)).  Analogously,  a  female's  response  to  the
preferred hours  question  is  assumed  to  be the result of maximizing a
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household utility function with hmk rationed at the actual number of hours
h'k   hours   and vice versa.
Let h  and hfk be the preferred number of hours of the  male  and
the  female  in family k, given that the partner is rationed at his or her
actual number of hours. The values  of  h   and  h   are then generated    by
rationed versions of (2.10) - (2.12) as follows (see Kapteyn, Kooreman and
Van Soest (1989))
f*
hl = 6mk + Ymwmk + awflc + Bm ik (3.15)
*r                  -       -m
hfk = efk + Tfwfk + 0(wmk + Bf Ik (3.16)
-                 -2
If*  =I     +  8  +  6mkwmk + 6fkwfk  +  i (Tmw k  +  Yfwfk)   +kk
+ «wmkwfk + h k(wfk - Gfk) (3.17)
*
I   -I k+8+ 6mk mk + 6fkwflc + 6(Ymwl + 'fw k) +
+   «wmk"fk    +    h,I (wmk    - wmk) (3.18)
*
h k = 6mk + Tmwmk + awfk + Bm ik (3.19)
0            -               -f*h   =6
fk    fk + 7-fwfk + crwmk + Bf Ik
(3.20)
Equations (3.19) and (3.20) define the shadow wages wmk and wfk.
To  make  this  an  estimable model, a stochastic specification is
added to the model. For individuals who do not receive a benefit this
yields the following explanation of preferred hours
hP  = hr  + 6 if hr
mk    mk mk mk+Emk   2   0
(3.21)
=0 if hr  + E <0mk   mk
hP  = hr  + E
if hfk + efk 2 0fk    fk    fk
(3.22)
=0
if   h k    +    Efk   <    0
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For individuals who receive unemployment benefit
h k = 1'1 + E.,k if h k"mkk 0 and U k-Ul.vmk*0
(3.23)
=0 if h k.,mk<0 or Ul-Ul.vmk<0
hP  = hr  + E if hr +6  20 and Uf -Uf +v  20
fk fk fk fk  fk lk Ok fk
(3.24)
=   0                         if  hrk+6 ftc<0  or  U k-U k+vfk<0
-       - -
2
where    s mk     0   dm edmdf (3.25)-N
2
E
fk 0       9cme f          Cf- -  -              -
---
...                  -
2
v       o   G      0                                        (3.26)mk vm
-N·
Vfk     0    0     6
2
--  -    vf
---   -
and vmk is assumed uncorrelated with emkand Efk and so is vfk with Efk and
Emk' 11 k and hPR are observed preferred hours  of  man and woman,      hl     and
hfk are given in equations (3.15)-(3.20). The additive error terms in the
hours equation, emk and E can represent measurement errors or OP-fk'
timization  errors.  But they cannot represent random preferences: Because
if part of 8 is random and let us say normally distributed, then the error
term  in  the hours equation would be a nonlinear function of the normally
distributed random term in 8 and as a consequence it  cannot  be  normally
distributed.  This  is due to the fact that the shadow wages are nonlinear
functions of the hours variables. The v and v can  only  representmk fk
optimization errors.
One more complication with respect to the preferred hours question
arises.  Nonworking  respondents  are  asked  a different question, namely
whether they are looking for a job or not. If, for example, an  individual
reports  not  to  be  looking for a job this is taken as evidence that the
utility of not working is higher than the utility of working.
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3.4 Estimation results
- Actual hours, recipients of an unemployment benefit included
The model specification  for  the  standard model in which the
nonconvexity  of the budget constraint is taken into account, are given by
equations (3.1)-(3.6) for singles and by equations (3.7)-(3.12)  for  two-
adult households. The  endogenous variable is actual hours worked by the
individual. The likelihood function is given in Appendix 3A. Note that the
results  are  based  on  samples  which  include  individuals receiving an
unemployment benefit (in contrast with the samples used in Chapter 2). The
sample composition is given in Table 3.1 (compare Tables 2.1 and 2.4).
In Table  3.2  the  estimation  results  for  singles  are  given.
Comparing Table 3.2 and 2.6 reveals that including individuals who receive
an unemployment benefit does not change  the  estimated  parameter  values
very much. The parameter 6 represents the standard deviation of theV
random component in the utility  difference  between  working  an  optimal
number  of hours without unemployment benefits and working zero hours with
unemployment benefits. Its estimated value for males is very  inaccurately
determined,  mainly  because in the sample there is only a small number of
individuals who have to make this utility comparison (cf. Table 3.1).  For
females the value of ev is more accurately determined. In general the same
conclusions of no large changes in the estimated parameter values hold for
two-adult  households  (Table  3.3).  Only for the OSA-data set the insig-
nificant female wage coefficient changes  from  2  to 0.2. All standard
errors  of  the  random  components  in the utility differences (ev's) are
inaccurately determined and all are large  in value, except  for  single
females.  In  Table  3.4  wage  elasticities are shown. All own wage elas-
ticities for males are positive. They  have  increased  slightly  compared
with the elasticities shown in Table 2.8. The female own wage elasticities
are still much higher than the male ones. For the OSA-sample  the  numbers
have  decreased  a bit in comparison with the ones shown in Chapter 2. One
can conclude that including behaviour of individuals who receive a benefit
into the standard model hardly changes the estimation results of the model
(in Chapter 7 we will present a formal test).
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Table 3.1 Sample compositiona)
OSA male h>0 h=0
seek=0 seek=1
female b=0 b>0 b=0 b>0
h>0 314     2       1       4        9      330 (131)
h=O,seek=0,
b=0 449     0       0       0       25      474 ( 15)
b>0 3     0       0       0        1        4( 21)
h=O,seek=1,
b=0 26     0       0       0        4       3 0(  4)
b>0 6     0       0       0        2        8( 27)
all 798     2       1       4       41      846 (341=198+
(112) (0)     (2)     (1) (28) 143)
SEP male h>0 h=0
seek=0 seek=1
female b=0 b>0 b=0 b>0
h>0 296      5       3       0       1      305 (77)
h=O,seek=0,
b=0 567 20      23       0      10      620 (49)
b>0         6      1       0       0       0        7 (66)
h=O,seek=1,
b=0        19      0       0       0       1       20 (0)
b>0         4      0       0       0       0        4 (12)
all 892     26      26       0      12      956=(371=204+
(113)    (9)    (23)     (1) (21) 167
a) The numbers in parentheses refer to singles. Individuals who work (h>0)
and  receive  an  unemployment  benefit  (b>0)  have been excluded. For
definition of the variable "seek" see Table 2.2.
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Table 3.2  Estimation  results  for  the  standard model, including  in-




6         36        (6)             14         (3)0
B         -0.000001 (u.b.) -0.038 (0.005)
61         0.4      (6)             -8         (4)
y 0.2 (0.5) 2.0 (0.2)
8 -1650 (fixed) -355 (fixed)
ah 11.7 (0.5) 15.5 (1.0)





6        14 (10) -25        (8)0
B -0.009 (0.003) -0.069 (0.008)
61
4.8 (3.8)          -1         (15)
1 0.8 (0.6) 2.5 (0.4)
e -1650 (fixed) -355 (fixed)
 h
16.0 (1.0) 22.6 (1.9)
a 32883 (337671) 136 (32)V
log likelihood
-517.0 -414.4
a) u.b. = upper bound, 1.b. = lower bound
Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 3.3  Estimation  results  for  the  standard model, including  in-
dividuals who receive unemployment benefits, two-adult
householdsa)
OSA SEP
0 -0.2 (0.5) 0.4 (0.1)
Bm -0.003 (0.002) -0.023 (0.001)
B -0.02 (0.006) -0.000001 (u.b.)f
'm
0.2 (0.2) 0.01 (1.b.)
Tf
0.2 (4.9) 4.1 (0.6)
6mi
-0.4 (1.5)                      -3         (2)
6      -62       (8)                      -41         (4)f1
6       31 (15) -17 (5)m0
6 -45 (128) -12         (7)f0
8 -3632 (5361) -2211 (201)
0 6.91 (0.08) 11.5 (0.2)m
af 24.3 (1.6) 25·4 (1.8)










a) u.b. = upper bound, 1.b. = lower bound
Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 3.4 Wage  elasticities for the standard model, including individuals
who receive unemployment benefitsa)
OSA SEP
one-adult two-adult one-adult two-adult households
3h  Wm m- - 0.08 0.02 0.20 0.11Bw  hm m
(0.16) (0.06) (0.21) (0.03)
3hf Wf
--- -- 0.23 1.83 0.94aw h 5.02f f
(0.08) (1.28) (0.50) (5.15)
a) Standard errors in parentheses
- Preferred hours
The model for  singles  which  has  been  estimated  is  given  by
equations  (2.7)-(2.9),  except  that  the  dependent variable h  has been
replaced by h (observed preferred hours of work). Equations (2.10)-(2.12)
and  (2.18)-(2.22) display the model for two-adult households with h  and
ho     replaced  by  h   and  hP In Tables   3.5   and  3.6 the estimation resultsfk                       fk '
are  shown for the model in which preferred hours is used as the dependent
variable and recipients of benefits are not included. By comparing  Tables
2.6  and 2.7 with Tables 3.5 and 3.6 it can be seen what effect the change
in the dependent variable has on  the  parameter values. We would have
expected that the wage and income coefficients are lower in the actual
hours version than in the preferred hours version. The obvious explanation
for  this  is  that  actual  hours  are partly determined by institutional
constraints. This is only true for single males (OSA). In most other cases
the wage and income coefficients are slightly lower in the preferred hours
version, but not significantly so. In  Table  3.7  the  wage  elasticities
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corresponding  with  this  model  are presented. In some cases (two-adult-
households (OSA), one-adult-households (SEP)) the own male wage elasticity
becomes  negative.  Almost  all  wage elasticities, both for men and for
women, have decreased compared with the actual hours version of the model.
The standard errors of the elasticities decreased a little. In Tables 3.8,
3.9 and 3.10 estimation results are presented for the model with preferred
hours  as  the  endogenous  variable  and where recipients of benefits are
included. This yields similar results as compared to the  model  in  which
recipients  of  benefits  are excluded. (Compare Tables 3.5 and 3.6 with
Tables 3.8 and 3.9.) This is in correspondence with  the  results  earlier
mentioned  in  this  section, namely that including recipients of benefits
does not change the estimation results very much.
In Table 3.10 the rationed version of the above mentioned model is
shown (equations 3.15-3.20). The estimated parameter values differ quite a
bit  from  the ones shown in Table 3.9. Most striking is the fact that the
linear wage coefficients (7) and the income coefficients in the SEP-sample
have increased. From  a  theoretical  point of view this is the model we
should use. The numbers in Table 3.11, in which the wage elasticities  are
presented, show  in general somewhat lower elasticities than the model
which has actual hours as the dependent variable (Table 3.4). This is also
clear  from the labour supply curves presented in Figure 3.4 and 3.5. From
Figures 3.6 and 3.7 it is most interesting  to  see  that  there  is  more
variation  in the preferred hours than in the actual hours distribution.
Compare Figures 2.3 and 2.4. The general pattern of the figures.  however,
is the same as the  one we have seen in Chapter 2. The simulated hours
distribution is not able to reproduce the spikes in the preferred hours
distribution. The  model  predicts  that all men prefer to work about 40
hours per week. The percentage of nonworkers  is  largely  underestimated,
especially in the OSA-sample.
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Table 3.5  Estimation results for the standard model, with preferred hours




6         16        (17)             9          (8)0
B -0.01 (0.01) -0.034 (O.004)
6          4         (4) -6.0 (4.0)
1
0.5 (0.3) 1.9 (0.5)
8 -1650 (fixed) -355 (fixed)





6 22 (10) -20         (9)0
B -0.008 (0.003) -0.061 (0.007)
61        3          (3)              9          (11)
7 0.1 (0.6) 2.4 (1.9)
8 -1650 (fixed) -355 (fixed)
ch 16.3 (0.9) 20.3 (1.8)
log likelihood
-488.1 -376.0
a) u.b. = upper bound, 1.b. = lower bound
Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 3.6  Estimation results for the standard model, with preferred hours
as the dependent variable, recipients of benefits not included,
two-adult householdsa)
OSA SEP
0 -0.4 (1.5) -0.1 (0.2)
 m -0.002 (0.002) -0.022 (0.0009)
Bf -0.016 (0.005) -0.000001 (u.b.)
Tm 0.0
1 (t.b.) 0.01 (t.b.)
1-f       2 (11) 3.8 (0.6)
6ml
1.2 (1.0) -5.2 (1.9)
6      -48       (6)                       -38         (4)f1
6 .     37       (70)                      -2         (5)mu
6 0.1 (535)                      -4         (6)f0
8 -2129 (33986) -1814 (149)
a 6.3 (0.1) 9.3 (0.1)m
Gf
21.2 (1.4) 23·8 (1.4)
e -0.12 (0.04) 0.02 (0.04)
log likelihood
-4271.3 -4955.7
a) u.b. = upper bound, 1.b. = lower bound
Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 3.7 Wage elasticities for the standard model, with preferred hours
as the dependent variable, recipients of benefits not includeda)
OSA SEP
one-adult two-adult one-adult two-adult households
3hm Wm -0.04 0.08--- -- 0.09 -0.02
3Wm hm
(0.12) (0.06) (0.20) (O.04)
3hf Wf
--- 0.34 2.00 0.82 4.95
3wf hf
(0.21) (2.66) (0.31) (4.81)
a) Standard errors in parentheses
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Table 3.8  Estimation results for the standard model, with preferred hours




6                  17 (18) 13.5 (3.3)0
B -0.01 (0.01) -0.038 (0.005)
6                   4       (4) -8.3 (4.3)1
0.5 (0.3) 2.00 (0.22)
8 -1650 (fixed) -355 (fixed)
dh 8.3 (0.6) 15·5 (1.0)





6                 19 (10) -21          (9)0
B -0.009 (0.003) -0.06 (0.01)
61                 4        (3)                  4         (11)
0.3 (0.6) 2.4 (O.4)
8 -1650 (fixed) -355 (fixed)
0 16.3 (0.9)               21          (2)
6 52118 (136502) 145 (34)V
log likelihood
-518.8 -409.9
a) u.b. = upper bound, 1.b. = lower bound
Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 3.9  Estimation results for the standard model, with preferred hours
as the dependent variable, recipients  of benefits included,
two-adult householdsa)
OSA SEP
, -0.3 (0.3) O.194 (0.006)
Bm
-0.002 (0.002) -O.018 (0.001)
Bf
-O.018 (0.006) -0.000001  (u.b.)
Tm
0.1 (0.2) 0.01 (,t.b.)
Tr 2.1 (2.6) 3.8 (0.2)
6ml
1.0 (1.0) -2.0 (0.1)
6      -48       (6)                       -39          (3)f1
6       40 (15) -0.4 (0.1)m0
6       30 (105) -7.9 (1.6)f0
8 -361 (5993) -1814 (109)
6 6.3 (0.1) 11.3 (0.2)m
'f 21.6 (1.4) 24.6 (1.3)
e -0.12 (0.04) 0.11 (0.04)
6
cr 6.10 (8.107) 716 (110)vm
6     4.106     7(7.10 ) 1000 (3064)vf
log likelihood
-4392.6 -5264.1
a) u.b. = upper bound, L.b. = lower bound
Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 3.10  Estimation results for  the  standard model, with preferred
hours as the  dependent variable, recipients  of benefits
included, rationed version, two-adult householdsa)
OSA SEP
0.9 (O.4) 1.7 (0.3)
Bm      -0.0014 (0.0004) -0.023 (0.002)
Bf      -0.0094 (0.0002)
-0.012 (0.004)
7-m
0.28 (0.14) 1.48 (0.34)
Yf 8.7 (3.6) 4.20 (0.63)
6 1.7 (0.7) -22.8 (8.4)m1
6 -45.4 (4.4) -47.8 (8.5)f1
6 120 (33) 13·6 (7.1)m0
6 612 (272) -37.5 (11.8)f0
8 62565 (29264) 713 (358)
a 6.20 (0.07) 12.8 (0.2)m
6 21.9 (1.4) 24.9 (1.1)f
e -0.041 (0·058) -0.723 (0.019)
a 2616 (1865) 1661 (593)vm
 vf 3209 (27062) 3882 (21185)
log likelihood
-4386.7 -5220.4
a) u.b. = upper bound, 1.b. = lower bound
Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 3.11 Wage elasticities for the standard model,with preferred hours
a)as the dependent variable, recipients of benefits included
OSA SEP
one-adult two-adult one-adult two-adult households
no rat. with rat. no rat. with rat.
ah  wm m-- 0.09 -0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01Aw h 0.03m m
(0.12) (0.06) (0.00) (0.20) (0.00) (0.08)
3hf Wf
--- 0.23 1.83 1.74 0.89 2.17aw h 5.05f  f
(0.08) (1.38) (1.29) (0.50) (2.89) (4.21)
a) Standard errors in parentheses.
-70-





34·,    .    ,    .    ,    .    ,    .    ,    . , 38-,    .    ,
9 11 13 15 17 19 10 12 14 16 18 20
mole wage rate mde woge rate
Mcle labour supply curte, one-adult households (OSA} Wole labour supply cum, two-adult households {OSA)
female hours female hours











265    .    ,    .    ,    .    ,    .    ,    . , 8,   .   ,   .   ,   .   ,   .   ,   .   ,
8 10 12 14 16 18  7 9 11 13 15 17
fernole wage role female wage role
Female :cbour supply curve, one-cdult households <OSA) female labour supply curve, two-odult households (OSA)
Figure 3.4 Labour supply curves (OSA)
-71_
mole hours mole hours








28-:         ,    .    i
9          11          13          15          17          19                 10             12             14             16             18
male wage rate mole wage rate
liale labour suopiy curve, one-adult households (SEP Mole labour supp& cume, two-adult households  SEP)
lemo,e hours lemole hours









8 10 12 14 16  8 10 12 14 16 18
female wage rate femole wage rote
Femole labour supply cume, one-adult households (SEP) Femole lobour supply curve, two-odult households (SEP)
Figure 3.5 Labour supply curves (SEP)
-72-
- prefemed, nonparticipants: 21.83% preferred, nonporticiponts: 5.67I
- - - simulated, nonporticiponts: 0.00% - - - simulcted, nonparticiponts: 0.00%
Frequency (%) frequency (%)
40-                                      70-




20-              -
30.
20
10-      ;- -  
--      '         10-        1 -  -7
.-.
r -1-          -1     :- -
Fl-9-1t. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
081624324048 5664 081624324048 56 64
mmber of hours number of hours
Preferred and simuloted hours woRed by single males (OSA) Preferred and simulated hours worked by mded moles (OSA}
prefemed, nonporticipants: 34.72% prefer ed, nonparticipants: 60.99%
- -- simuloted, nonporticiponts: 10.5D - - - simuloted, nonporticipants: 42.729
frequency (%) frequency (2)





5-             -1
1--
10-                                                                            -






0,    f 7 . . . . . . - -7
'--L_i
0-,
0816243240'18 5664 0816243240 48    56    64
number of hours number of hours
Prefmd and simulated hours worked by single females (OSA)       Preferred and simu ated hours worked by maTied females (OSA}
Figure 3.6 Hours distributions (OSA)
-73-
preferred, nonparticiponts: 9.58x preferred, nonparticiponts: 3.35%
- - - simulated, nonporticiponts: 2.30% - - - simulated, nonporticipants: 1.08:
frequency (%) frequency (2)
50-                                                         60-










.<7 -,    ,                            .                     .-I
,1=C L- m_f L_-v .-i-:- -LI-EXh. ' . . . . . . . . . . . . , L  .  ,  .  i  .  i  .  .  .  ,  .  .  .  :  ·  .
0 8 16 243240485664 081624324048 56 64
number of hours number of hours
Preferred and simulated hours worked by single males (SEP) Prefmed md simulated hous worked by maded males (SEP)
preferred, nonporticiponts: 47.55% preferred, nonpoicipants: 51.78%
- - - simulated, nonparticipants: 33.44: - - - simuloted, nonporticiponts: 46.35%
frequency (r) Irequency (%)
20-                                                     15-
-                                             10-
10-




_f                                 -0.-'----f
L L_r f..Ill-'ll
0-.  .......  ,  ....... , 0, . . . ' . . . . . . . . . . . ,
0816243240(85664 0816243240 48    56    64
number of hours number of hours
Preferred and simulated hours wod(ed by single females (SEP)        Preferred and simulated hours
wodced by mated femoles (SEP)
Figure 3.7 Hours distributions (SEP)
-74-
3.5 Concluding remarks
In Section 2 of this chapter a first step towards a more realistic
model is made by modelling the social security and  welfare  system  which
lead  to a nonconvex budget set. We find that taking into account the non-
convexity of the budget constraint hardly changes the estimation results.
Since  we  believe that actual hours worked is not the appropriate
endogenous variable in a labour supply model, we introduce  in  Section  3
the preferred hours variable.
Contrary to our ex-ante expectations, both the income coefficients
and the wage elasticities are lower in the preferred hours version than in
the actual hours version (see Section 3.4).
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Appendix 3A. Likelihood contributions
In this appendix the likelihood functions for both the one-adult household
the  two-adult  household model. described in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 will be
given.
The  likelihood  function  consists  of  different parts (Lk) cor-
responding to the different situations households face. Let $ and p be the
standard normal distribution and density function respectively. Let BA and
bp be the bivariate standard normal distribution  and  density  functions,
respectively  (with  correlation  e).  First we will derive the likelihood
function for the models described in Section 2.
- One-adult households
The following situations are distinguished
1) individual k is working (h >0)
,1  -  1  .f   5
1
(3A.1) k - dh'l  ch
2) individual  k is not working and not seeking a job and does not receive
an unemployment benefit   (hk.0,   seekk= '   bk=0)
4.,Imel
(3A.2)
3) individual k is not working but seeking a job and does not  receive  an
unemployment benefit (h =0, seek =l, bk= )
La.,I-t}
(3A.3)
4) individual  k  is  not  working  and  not seeking a job and receives an
unemployment benefit (h =0. seekk=0' bk>0)
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. , .-
 Ulk - UOk|
4,1- , [ 2 1,     ,                                   C».4)V
I                   -
5) individual k  is  not  working  but  seeking  a  job  and  receives  an
unemployment benefit (h =0, seek =1, bk>0
..
L5 .* f_ 1 * 'Ulk- Uok (3A.5)
k     l  ah J       i
- Two-adult households
We distinguish the following situations: (where i,j stands for  m(ale)  or
f(emale))
1) both spouses are working and neither receives an  unemployment  benefit
(hok >0, hjk >0, bik=0' bjk=0)
f O               0
L  =   1   bp hik - hik h.ik - 11jk e (3A.6)
di d j l
di  '     aj   '  J
2) spouse  i is not working and not seeking a job, and spouse j is working
and neither receives an unemployment benefit   (h'k   =0,   seekik=0'      hjk>0,
b      .0      b.-  =0)
ik  '  Jk
-h  fo  ]- r.2         ik  - Plhjk - hik  _1 plhllc - hjk'
Lk- * (3A.7)
t4l-9 a ./1-e2         aj    l       6j     J2 3
3) spouse  i  is  not  working  and  not  seeking  a  job  and receives an
unemployment benefit, and spouse   j is working   (hik   =0'    seekik=0'   hjk 0'
b  >0. b. =0)
ik  '  Jk
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-'                                                             11''     -   Uik} } 11L3 =   1-  | 1-0    ik Plhlk - hlk 
1 1k
*1
k         L   -di/1-e2 -
aj/1-e2 l avi J
(3A.8)
fho  -h  1
1  | jk    jk
5 "[   5  ]
4) spouse  i is not working but seeking a job, and spouse j is working and
neither receives an unemployment benefit      (h c     =0,      seek     =1       h:   >0,ik  '   Jk
b  =0  b  =0)
ik  '  jk
1        Fho -h l4    -     -b     p h k - hjk 1  Ilk    jk'ik
Lk = 1 1-0         -                  -P,
2           2        6j  l    aj  
(3A.9)
L diJl-P 5  1-9
5) spouse  i is not working but seeking a job and receives an unemployment




rf i     i 11
L5 =  -1-0  -hik   plhlk - h.lk' i Ulk - UOk |*l
k  L  -dijl-e2 - aj/l-e2 l   avi    J
(3A.10)
rho -h l
_1  1 jk    jk
csjt cis li
6) Both spouses are not working and not seeking a job and neither receives
an unemployment benefit   (hik  =0'   seekik=0'      hjk     =0'      seekjk-0,     bik=0'
bjk-0)
.                               I
-h      -h
6
(3A.11)
= B# ik      jk
6.
1 aj   -
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7) Both  spouses  are  not working and not seeking a job and only spouse i
receives an unemployment benefit   (h'k  =0,   seekik= '   hjk     =0'      seekjk=0'
b  >0. b. =0)
ik  '  Jk
1       di




8*   _hik_  --h:ik
.    -e       *I-luik«- I uok   .1
61    61 - Vl
  j
8) Both  spouses  are  not working, spouse i is seeking a job, spouse j is
not  seeking  a  job and neither receive an unemployment benefit   (h'k  =  0,
seekik=l, hjk = 0, seekjk-0, bik=0' bjk=0)
1.8 = 80 _hik ,  -h-k. -P (3A.13)
-61    61
9) Both spouses are not working but spouse i is seeking a job and receives
an unemployment benefit but spouse j is not seeking a job and does  not
receive an unemployment benefit   (h c =0' seekik=l .   h k  =  0.   seekjk=0 '
b  >0  b. =0)
ik  '  Jk
-   r rui  - ui 11
4  -  B*  31!L.   _-hlk,   -e    *1|   lk       Okl  
(3A.14)
1i      aj     -  l     vi
10) Both spouses are not  working,  not  seeking  a  job  and  receive  an
unemployment benefit (hik = 0. seek. =0  ho  = 0- seek. =0, b  >0. b. >0)ik ' jk
' Jk    ik  '  Jk
I   fi         i
10                 _-hik         -h,k,    p      .   B*         hik         -hils      -p   * -'Ulk   -   UOk   |    ,Lk  = 80
1     aj    -        di     ajvi    J-                                    -                          -
-79-
-      -r
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Uj  - Uj 11
8*   hik    hik, e *1- Ulk - U
lk Ok! 1
-  ai     aj    - l     avi Ok  J*I-    avj    J
11) Both  spouses are not working, spouse i is seeking a job and does not
receive an unemployment benefit, while  spouse  j  is  not  seeking  and
receives a benefit (h'k = 0. seekik=l, hjk = 0, seekjk=0' bik=0' bjk>0)
0                             -
h.            -h
Lll - 80 --ik-, --_lk. -e  +k
ai    61
(3A.16)
h            h             L [uj    -  uj  11ik  lk- 1 1k Okll80 -, ,e*
- ai
«.            L         «v j       j3      -
12) Both  spouses  are  not working and receiving an unemployment benefit,
spouse i is seeking a job and spouse j is not (h'k = 0. seekik=l.  hjk
= 0, seekjk=0, bik 0' bjk>0)
- ff i    „ill
42 = 80 _hik , _lk  -p * 'Ulk - uOkl  ,
ai
d. l     vi    J3
(3A,17)
f f  i             i  11      -44      -  uj   11hh
ik       ik      I lulk - Uok |*  I llc     Okll
80 -, -, P 01    0             6
- 6i      aj  -  l    vi        vj    
J
13) Both  spouses are not working but seeking a job and neither receive an
unemployment benefit   (h'k  =0'   seekik=l,   hjk =0, seekjk=1, bik=0,   bjk=0)
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hh
43= 80 _ik        p (3A.18) lk-
-ai     5    -
14) Both spouses are not working and both are seeking a job, and spouse  i
receives an unemployment benefit but spouse      j      does      not   (h c   -0,
0
seek. =1 h =0.  seek.  =1   b   >0   b.. =0)ik ' jk Jk'ik'Jk
.IIi
i - ni 11
L14= B*  hik lk vokll (3A.19)k         di       dj
15) Both spouses   are not working but seeking      a      job and receiving     an
unemployment benefit (h'k = 0, seekik=l, hjk = 0, seekjk=1, bik>0' bjk>0)
h                UOk'  i  lk
15     -hik  -'k. 9. '11':'•-, i '1,  U, '-'U:'}1
(3A.20)
Lk  = B#
- ai   aj   -
For  the likelihood contributions corresponding with the preferred
hours version of the model with a convex budget constraint, described in
Section 3 see Chapter 2, Section 2.5. One modification should be made with
respect to these formulas, namely the  endogenous  variable  actual  hours
worked  (h  ) must be substituted by preferred hours  (h  ) . By making this
same modification in equations (3A.1)-(3A.20) one  obtains the preferred
hours  model  with  a  nonconvex  budget constraint. Finally, if h. isik
substituted by hi  the likelihood function of the rationed version of  the
model is obtained.
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4. Preference interdependence and habit formation
4.1 Introduction
It has already been stated in Chapter 2 that most  likely  utility
functions  will  vary  across  households.  For  a  good  understanding of
household labour supply it is important  to  identify  systematic  factors
which  cause  this variation. We pay attention to two major causes of dif-
ferences in utility functions across households: preference formation  (in
this chapter) and differences in household composition (in Chapter 2).
Preference formation refers to the phenomenon that an individual's
preferences  are formed, at  least partly, by his past experiences and
perceptions. Within the context of consumption and labour supply it may be
assumed  that  somenone's  present  preferences will depend on how much he
used to consume in the past and how much leisure  he  used  to  enjoy.
Moreover,  his preferences will probably also depend on what others do. If
the individual comes from a social background where most  people  used  to
work hard one may assume that the individual's preference for leisure will
be less strongly developed than in the case where most of his friends  and
relatives are representatives of the "leisure class".
The notion that preferences may  be  endogenous  has  gained  some
foothold  in the literature on consumer demand equations (see e.g., Pollak
(1970· 1976),  Phlips  (1984),  Gaertner  (1974),  Blanciforti  and  Green
(1983),  Darrough, Pollak and Wales (1983), Alessie and Kapteyn (1985) and
the references given in these papers), but hardly any in the labour supply
literature.  Empirically, habit formation is usually the only component of
preference formation that is being  modelled  in  consumer  demand  models
(habit  formation  may  then  be either rational or myopic, cf. Muellbauer
(1988)). In a few working papers, Alessie and Kapteyn (1985) and  Kapteyn,
Van  de  Geer,  Van  de  Stadt  and Wansbeek (1985) have also incorporated
preference interdependence into empirical models of consumption  following
theoretical  notions  developed  by  Gaertner (1974) and Pollak (1976). In
this chapter, the framework developed in the two former papers is extended
to deal with household labour supply.
We will incorporate preference formation into  an  already  fairly
complex neoclassical model of household labour supply developed in Chapter
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3 (See also Kapteyn, Kooreman, Van Soest (1989)).  The  drawback  of  this
approach is of course its complexity.
In Section 4.2 it is extensively  discussed  how  preference  for-
mation  can  be  incorporated  into  the  model developed in Chapter 3. In
Section 4.3 we describe the estimation results. In Section 4.4 we will use
a  more  sophisticated, factor analysis, model to analyse the influence of
reference groups on labour supply. In Section 4.5 the  estimation  results
of  the model described in the previous section will be given. Section 4.6
concludes.
4.2 A labour supply model with preference formation
The main purpose of this  section  is  to  incorporate  preference
interdependence  and  habit  formation into the neoclassical labour supply
model described in Chapter 3. We allow for the fact that  individuals  may
get  used  to working a certain number of hours per week (habit formation)
and that the number of hours they prefer to work may depend on the  number
of  hours  other  people  worked  (interdependence  of preferences). Habit
formation and preference interdependence will be referred  to  jointly  as
preference  formation.  We will derive the model for two-adult households,
while the one-adult household  is  an  evident simplification. We model
preference  formation  by making the translation parameters 6k for singles
or 6 and 6 for households linearly  dependent  upon  hours  worked  bymk      fk
other  people  in society, one  period ago, and upon the number of hours
worked by the individual himself (or herself) one period ago.  Figure  4.1
gives  a simplified example of the structure of this part of the model. We
consider in this example a society with 5 individuals and  we  concentrate
on the way the preferences of individual 3 are formed. The story starts in
period 1. In that period we observe the numbers  actually  worked  by  all
five  individuals. Next we move to period 2 and see how the preferences of
individual 3 change. In principle 6  in period 2 is affected  by  all  the
3
values of the actual numbers of hours in the previous period. However, not
all of these exert the same amount of influence. The extent of the
influence of each individual's behaviour (i.e. the number of hours worked)
in the previous period is measured by the so-called reference weights  vkl
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h   (1)-32     -                     W32 -
h3(1)- 33-4 63(2) , "3(2) ) h (2)
114(1)-   34--- *                        I                  
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h5(1)-1,35 institutional
constraints
period 1 period 2
Figure 4.1  Formation of the preferences of individual 3
Thus  v33 indicates the influence of habit formation (the
effect of actual
numbers of hours worked in the previous period on the current delta),  v31
indicates  the influence of the behaviour of individual 1 on 63; v32 gives
the influence of individual 2, etc. Of course the  deltas  of  individuals
1,2,4,5  are  also influenced by what happened in the previous period, but
in order not to mess up the graph, these influences are not shown  in  the
figure.
Once 63 for this period is formed, the preferred number  of  hours
h   of  individual  3 in period 2 follows from the budget constraint, i.e.
from the wage rate  wk  and  from  nonlabour  income  Ik.  Generally,  the
preferred number  of  hours will not be realized. Rather the interplay of
the individual's preferences, institutional constraints, and the fiscal
and  social  security  system generates a new value for actual hours h  in
period 2.                         
                                  
   3
Now  in  reality  societies  are quite a bit larger than the five-
person society in the example of Figure 4.1. Thus in  principle  for  each
individual  we might distinguish millions of reference weights to describe
how his preferences are influenced by other people's behaviour. Obviously
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this  is  an  impractical  approach. Although we maintain the basic set-up
sketched above, we impose more structure by making a number of  additional
assumptions.  These assumptions are spelled out in detail below. First the
basic structure of what the assumptions imply is sketched, Fig.4.2.
all males male in male in male in
in society family k *Im family
k , j       family k            ' Im
I v3hmt<-1) hmk(-1) hmk(-1) hmk(-1)
LEPm
other own male males in own
males friends social group .1-xm








male friends males in social
of spouse group of spouse  " 1-Km
A OW(-1) .1-Am fit':,1:(-1)
fm
all males in




females own female females in own  1
in society friends social group 5 1-K e
,6.5,1 ( -1) hmfk'-1) E *fl(-1) 'Amf  Kraft:(-1)




11'Ilf society .> Kf
hf<-1)
female friends females in social
of spouse group of spouse  '1-xf





Figure 4.2  The partition of the reference group of the male in family k
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Let us consider a two-adult household and  more  specifically  the
male  in  this  household. Society is partitioned in a number of groups of
different individuals and these all exert some influence on the male in
the  household under consideration. These groups are represented in Figure
4.2. First of all a distinction is made between the influence  exerted  by
males and by females
mf
6mk = 6m0 + n__  I vCI hm,t<-1) + emf  I vk,t hfk(-1) (4.1)mm kpa              lef
fm
6fk = 6fo + eff 1 p v i hf't(-1) + efm   ,mvkl hmt(-1)       (4.2)f
where
P       = the set of all adult males in society
m
P       = the set all adult females in societyf
hmk(-1) = lagged  value  of  actual  hours  worked  by the male in
household k
hfk(-1) = lagged  value  of  actual  hours worked by the female in
household k
6 6 are parametersmO'  fO' nmm, nmf' nff, nfm
Ose                 51mm' nmf' nff' nfm
mm mf ff   fm
0 3 vkl, vkt' vkl' fkl 3 1, for all k, L
mm mf ff         fm
I    vld=l,    I    vkl-1,    I    vkl=l,     I    vkl=l,   for  all  k
41=                 11f 1Epf IEPm
mf
The      vld' s are called reference weights. For example,   vld represents   the
importance attached by the male in family k to labour supply behaviour  of
the      female in family     L.    If, for instance,    v =0 the female in family  L
does not belong   to the reference group   o f   the   male in family   k,       if vm 00
mm   ff      fm
she does. Similar interpretations   can be given   to  vk,t,   Vkl  and  vkl.   The
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parameters n measure  the  importance  of  preference formation. For
example,  nmf  represents the extent to which the preference parameter 6mk
is influenced by the labour supply behaviour of females in  the  reference
group  of  the  male in family k. A necessary but not sufficient condition
for the model is that the n's lie between zero and one.
By  inserting  equations  (4.1)  and (4.2) into (3.15) - (3.20) we
obtain a model which relates observables to observables, but with far  too
many  parameters to be estimated. To reduce the number of parameters a few
assumptions are made.
First  of  all it is assumed that va and v    do   not   vary   with   k,
say v =Im and v = If. This means that the relative influence of habit
formation  is  the same across households. The influence of the male's own
past behaviour (habit formation), is depicted at the top of the Figure 4.2
by the parameter Im.
Since  I v =l-Im and I v =l-If, the relative influence of preferenceles              lef
10k hk
interdependence  is also the same across households. The larger Im (or If)
the more important habit formation is relative to  preference  interdepen-
dence.   Next we introduce new parameters q defined  by




q=&20 for all k, 1,  I  q =l for all k
LEP
m
ff    ffSimilarly, we define    qla=    vkl/ (1-If)   for  k t L  and zero otherwise .   For
notational simplicity we also replace v  and v  by q  and q respec-
tively.
Also the parameters qkl will be  called  "reference  weights".  We
mf
refer to the set of females for which qkl>0 as the female social reference
group of the male in family k. Define
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ijh    =
ijk 6 :kthSt i,j = m,f (4.4)
3
The quantities h (i,j = m,f)  are  reference  group  means  of  workingijk
hours.  For  example, the quantity hmfk is the mean of female hours in the
reference group of the male in family k. This makes it possible to rewrite
(4.1) and (4.2) as
6mk = 6m0 + nmm[Imhmk(-1) + (1-Im)hmmk(-1)1 +
(4.5)
imf[hmfk(-1)]




Next consider h in somewhat more detail. It seems reasonable to supposeijk
that an individual will primarily assign  positive  reference  weights  to
people  whom  he or she knows personally. Within the family we distinguish
two channels through which one can get to know  other  people:  The  first
channel is that one meets someone directly; the second channel is that one
meets someone through his or her partner. Both these groups of people will
probably  influence  the  individuals' preferences, but possibly to a dif-
ferent degree. To formalize this idea, let us take hmmk (that is the  mean
of  male  hours  in  the  reference  group of the husband in family k) and
rewrite it as
hmt,k = ·1 p  ;3 hm't = .Js  "13 hmz .  I   q;3 hmi (4.7)LES
m             mm              fm
where S is the set of males that the husband in  family  k  has  metmm
directly  and S is the set of males he has met through his wife (malesfm
whom neither of the spouses have met are assumed to  receive  a  reference
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weight  equal  to zero; thus they can be assigned arbitrarily to either of
the two sets without loss of generality).
Let  A m  be  the  total reference weight assigned to the males in
Smm' i.e.
Ak- = I qn (4.8)
ILUU LES
mm
so that the total weight assigned to males in Sfm equals 1-A . We  assume
that X is a drawing from a distribution with mean X , i.e.mm mm
Ak  = A +6k (4.9)mm mm mm
f k  ,     1where Ele=lA=,1 =0· Next define r  = q3/Amm and "3 - q13/(1-Amm). As a
result (4.7) can be rewritten as
hmmk = A
mm / s 13 hm,t + (1-Amm)   s s;3 hm,t
+ error term  (4.10)
mm fm
Note that the r  and s are non-negative and "on average
" they add up to
one.  i.e. E I  r |Amm  =E  I  s: 'Amm  -1. We will also denote the r 
11€S ILES
L mm L   fm
and   s as "reference weights" . Expressions analogous      to      (4.10)      can     be
obtained for the other h i,j = m,f. The partitioning of the society in
ijk'
own male friends, male friends of  the spouse, own female friends and
female friends of the spouse with associated weights is shown in the third
column of Figure 4.2. The weights A and 1-A give the  relative  weight
mm mm
of  the  two groups of males distinguished. Similarly, the weights Xmf and
1-Xmf only tell us something about the relative weights of the two  groups
of females distinguished. The parameters n and n tell us how the groupmm mf
of all males and the group of all females  are  weighed  relative  to  one
another.  That  is,  how  much are the preferences of the male in family k
influenced by the behaviour of males and how  much  by  the  behaviour  of
females. Finally, the relative influences of habit formation and
preference interdependence are denoted  by  the  parameters  Im  and  1-Im
respectively.
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Having thus distinguished the total influences of four  groups  of
different individuals, there  remains the task of saying something about
the relative influence of the individuals within each of these groups.
Here  the  crucial  assumption made is that individuals primarily refer to
similar others. To be  more specific, we  distinguish  so-called  social
groups; these are groups of individuals who share certain characteristics,
like education, and age. On the basis of some further assumptions  it  can
be  shown  that  the  pattern  of influence within each of the four groups
distinguished can be approximated by a weighted sum of  the  influence  of
the people inside the social group and the influence of the people outside
the  social group. Finally, we have made assumptions on  the  distribution
of reference weights within each of the elements of the partition. Here we
closely follow Van de Stadt, Kapteyn, Van de Geer (1985), who  make  three
assumptions which lead  to the result that an expression like  I r· 11 1
lEs
mm
can be approximated as
I  r  hm,t = (1-Km) hmmk + *m hm + error term (4.11)ksmm
where the error terms has mean zero and is independent of the other  terms
on  the  right hand side of (4.11); Am is a parameter, 05 Am 51; fim is the
mean number of hours worked by all males in  society;  hmmk  is  the  mean
number  of  hours worked by all males in the social group of the male. The
parameter K is an indicator of how informative a social group  is  aboutm
the  reference group of an individual. For instance, if x =0 then equation
m
(4.11) implies that the social group mean  is  a  good  indicator  of  the
reference  group  mean.  On  the  other hand if Km=l the social group mean
conveys no information whatsoever about the reference group mean.
mm
Similar   to   (4.1 1) , we obtain   as an approximation   for   I      sla  hm,t
lES
fm
, s "3 hm't = (1-xm) hfmk + Km hm
+ error term (4.12)
fm
where fi is  the mean of male working hours in the social group of thefmk
female in family k (i.e. all  males  with  characteristics  equal  to  the
characteristics  of this female). Expressions similar to (4.11) and (4.12)
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are obtained for the various other reference group means that play a  role
in  (4.3)  and  (4.4). This final partition is shown in the last column of
Figure 4.2.
After  the incorporation of the effect of household size according
to (2.18) and (2.19). one obtains
6mk = 6mO + 6mlfk
+ 'Imm[Im(hmk(-1) - 6mlfmk(-1)) "habit formation"
+ (1-Im){xm(Aim(-1) - 6mlf<-1)) "all males in
society"
+ Amm(1-xm)(hmmk(-1) - 6mlfmk<(-1))
"males in own
social group"
+ (1-Amm)(1-xm)(h   (-1)-6mlffk(-1))}]   "males   in  socialfmk
group of spouse"
+  mf[*f (fif (-1) - 6mlf<-1) )
"all females in
society"
+ Amf(1-*f) (hmfk(-1) - 6mlfmk(-1) ) "females in own
social group
.




(Note that "own" refers to the male in family k)
6fk = 6 f'C) + 6flfk
+ eff[If(hfk(-1) - 6flfk(-1)) "habit formation"
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+ (1-If)'*f(Mf(-1) - 6fl (-1)) "all females in
society"
+ Aff(1-Kf)(hffk<-1) - 6flffk(-1)) "females in own
social group"
+ (1-Aff)(1-*f) (hmfk<-1)-6fl mk(-1))}]   "females  in social
group of spouse"
+ iZfm xm(Aim(-1) - 6flf(-1)) "all males in
society"
+ Afm(1-xm) (hfmk(-1)  - 6flfflc(-1)) "males in own
social group"
+  (1-Afm) (1-Xm) (fimmk(-1)-6flfmk<-1)) ] "males in social
group of spouse"
+Y (4.14)fk
(Note that "own" refers to the female in family k)
where
fk = logarithm of the size of household k
2           = mean of the logarithm of the size of the  householdsmk
in the social group of the male in family k
f           = mean of the logarithm of the size of the  householdsfk
in the social group of the female in family k
f           = mean of the logarithm of the size of the  households
in society as a whole
\11mk'   V fk are random variables with mean zero and independent of
the other variables on the right hand side of (4.13) -
(4.14).
In  Chapter  2  we  saw  already that the model without preference
formation is overidentified. Thus it is sufficient to examine the delta-
equations  (4.13)-(4.14)  for  identification of the model with preference
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formation. In Appendix 4B we will show that the delta-equations are  iden-
tified  up  to  two  parameters.  If  for example Km and xf are fixed, the
remaining parameters are identified.
Although in the exposition we have concentrated on the explanation
of the preferences of the male in a  two-adult  household,  it  should  be
clear  that  the  modelling  of preference formation for the female in the
household is  entirely analagous. The model for singles is a special  case
of  the  model  for  households.  The only difference is that for a single
there is only one channel through which he (or she) meets other people. We
do  not  have  to distinguish between people one meets directly and people
one meets through one's spouse. For a  single  male  the  parameter  6  is
therefore specified as follows
6mk = 6m0 + 6mlfk
+ nmm[Im(hmk<-1) - 6mlfmk(-1)) "habit formation"
+ (1-Im) Am(fim(-1) - 6m12(-1)) "all males in
society"
+ (1-Km)(fimmk(-1) - 6mlfmk(-1))}] "males in own
social group
.
+  mf[Kf(fif(-1) - 6mlf(-1)) "all females in
society"





For  single  females  all "m's" become "f's" and the other way around. See
Appendix 4B for a discussion of the identification of equation (4.15).
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4.3 Estimation results
Equations (3·1)-(3.6) and (4.15) summarize the complete
specification  of  the model for singles. The two-adult household model is
specified by equations (3.15)-(3·20) and (4.13)-(4.14). Preferred hours is
the  endogenous variable. The likelihood functions are given in Chapter 3.
For sample information about the main variables of interest, see  Appendix
4A  and  Chapter 2. As mentioned in Section 4.2 the samples of individuals
in the OSA and SEP survey have been partitioned in social groups in  which
the individuals have identical characteristics. The characteristics con-
sidered  are  age  and  education  level (four and five categories,
respectively).  In  Tables  4A.1 and 4A.2 (Appendix 4A) social group means
are presented of working hours and log-family sizes lagged one year. Since
we  have  no  data on lagged family size in the OSA sample, we use current
family size as a proxy. Generally, the numbers in  the  table  conform  to
what  one  might  expect; males work more hours per week than females, the
older one gets the less one works, and the higher one's education the more
hours  one  works (this holds especially for women). It is striking to see
the sharp drop in mean hours when one moves to the  older  age  categories
and  than  especially  for  the lower educated. This is mainly caused by a
corresponding drop of participation rates of these age categories.
The main results of the maximum likelihood estimation of the model
for singles are presented in Table 4.1 and  for  two-adult  households  in
Table 4.2.
A comparison of the log-likelihood  values  corresponding  to  the
extended  model  and  the standard model, introduced in Chapter 3 makes it
clear that preference formation is a highly significant factor  in  labour
supply. Yet, the estimation results for the extended model are not
uniformly satisfactory. In almost all cases the estimates for  Im  and  jf
are  close to one or had to be constrained by an upper limit (one), except
for single females in the OSA-data set. For both male and female the
importance  of  habit  formation relative to preference interdependence is
overwhelming. Also the estimates of n had to be constrained by the upperff
limit  one  in  most  cases, which implies that preference formation is an
important variable in female labour supply. Females  in  families  do  not
refer  to  males (nfm=0)' Male labour supply appears to be less influenced
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by preference formation than female labour supply (the sum of nmm and  nmf
is  much smaller than the sum of nff and nfm for all groups). Furthermore,
both men and women refer more to women (nmf' eff) than to men (nmm'  efm)-
A  value  of Xmf of about 0.5 implies that men refer to women of their own
age and education as well as to women of the same  age  and  education  as
their wives. A A and A of 1 mean that a (fe)male's social group onlyff      mm
consists of (wo)men of her/his own age and education, and not  of  (wo)men
of  the  same  age  and  education as the partner. Generally, social group
means of male hours seem to have little impact. One explanation  for  this
may  be that male hours in The Netherlands are pretty much institutionally
determined. The variation in social group means of male hours, shown in
Table  4A.1,  therefore  mainly  reflects variation across the life-cycle,
across education levels of school enrolment, involuntary unemployment, and
disability  (for  instance, in the age group 45-65, 37 percent of the male
population in The Netherlands is  on  disability).  The  households  whose
labour  supply  we  are  trying  to explain contain one or two able-bodied
spouses who are available for market work. These households' reference
groups may hardly contain the school-going, students, the disabled persons
or even the unemployed. If this is true, the use of social group means  to
approximate  reference  group  means  may be a poor practice. Without data
that contains more specific information about reference  groups  there  is
not too  much we can do. For females the situation is less bleak, because
their working hours are less affected  by  institutional  constraints  and
hence  the  observed  variation  in  social  group means are probably more
representative of variation in reference group means.
Table  4.4 summarizes the "total" influence, i.e. the reduced form
coefficients, of habit formation and  preference  interdependence  on  the
parameters  6mk  and  6fk (compare equations (4.5) and (4.6)). The numbers
are invariant to the arbitrary choice of the  unidentified  parameters  Km
and  *f which  we  fixed at 0.5 to identify the remaining parameters. The
small influence of preference interdependence is clear  from  this  table.
Yet, as  will  be seen below, preference interdependence does make a sig-
nificant contribution.  Only  for  single  females  in  the  OSA-data  set
preference interdependence has a larger influence than habit formation.
Turning now to the interpretation of the estimated values  of  the
other parameters, we  note  that  both columns of Table 4.1 and 4.2 show
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negative income effects, implying  leisure  to  be  a  normal  good,  and
positive  own  linear  wage effects. It  is striking to see that for all
different groups both the income effects and  the  own  wage  effects  are
smaller  in  absolute value than in the standard model (compare Tables 3.8
and 3.10 in Chapter 3). This could be explained by the fact that  part  of
the  influence  of preference formation is taken up by the wage and income
variables in the standard model. This would mean that in that case the
wage  and income effects are overestimated. The smaller wage effects are
confirmed by Table 4.3 (compare Table 3.11). Moreover,  we  see  that  for
single  females  in  the OSA-data family size has a negative effect on the
labour supply. The reduced form coefficient of log family size is -6.  The
value  of 6 (-623)  in the OSA two-adult household model is due to thef1
fact that Ef is close to 1 and eff is equal to one. In  fact  the  reduced
form coefficient for (log) family size is
6fl (l-nffIf)   +  Ff [6ml [l-emmKm  wm  +  6f1 [1-effif  wf    --12
(See Appendix  4B).
This  means that if a family of two is extended to three persons, the wife
works 4.9 hours less per week. A second child reduces the  wife's  working
hours by an additional 3.5 hours per week. In the standard model the first
child reduces the number of working hours of the wife by 19, the second
child  by  14  additional hours. Part of the explanation of the large dif-
ference between the two models could be the fact that the extended model
fails to capture the aspect that a woman who gets her first child will get
to know more women with children, so that the group average of hours
worked  will be reduced. On the other hand, in the standard model there is
no reference at all. Both for families and single females in the  SEP-data
6fl cannot be identified because Ef=l and nmf= .
In Figures 4.3 and 4.4 the short term  labour  supply  curves  are
drawn. Both  for  the  OSA- and the SEP-data the labour supply curves are
flatter than those in the standard model (see Figures  3.4  and  3.5)·  In
this  so-called  extended  model we have to distinguish between short term
and long term supply curves. The short term  supply  curve  describes  the
relation between one's wage rate and the number of hours a person wants to
work, assuming that nothing else (including the partner's actual number of
hours) changes. In  the  long run supply curve we account for habit for-
mation and for the fact that behaviour of one individual affects behaviour
of  others.  The  conditions under which long run stability of the dynamic
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model is guaranteed are investigated in Appendix 4c. We only present short
term  supply curves, for long term curves is referred to Kapteyn, Woittiez
and ten Hacken (1989).
In Figures 4.5 and 4.6 the simulated preferred hours distributions
are shown. The simulated hours distributions show a relatively  high  per-
centage  of  females  in  families  working  only  a  few  hours and a low
percentage of nonparticipants. As a result the  labour  supply  curves  of
females  in  families  lie  a  bit  higher than in the standard model. For
single females in the SEP the simulated hours distribution shows besides a
peak  at  0  also a small and thick peak around 36 hours. in contrast with
the standard model. For the rest the patterns of the figures are the  same
as in Chapter 3.
In Tables 4.5-4.10 more estimation results are presented  for  two
different  specifications  of  the  model.  Tables  4.5-4.7  show that the
hypothesis  Im=l  and/or  Ef=l  (no  preference  interdependence)  can  be
rejected at the 0.5% level for single females  but not for married females
in the OSA-data. For all other groups the parameters  Im  and  If  reached
their  upper  bound of one when left free. Consequently, the hypothesis of
no preference interdependence (Im=If=l) cannot be rejected. The hypothesis
of  no habit formation (Im=Ef=O) is rejected decisively (Tables 4.8-4.10).
Comparing the elasticities of the various versions, one can see  that  the
wage  elasticities in the model with only habit formation are smaller than
in the model with only preference interdependence.
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6         11 (14) -41 (17)0
B -0.01 (0.01) -0.02 (0.004)
61         5        (5)                          -10     (5)
y 0.1 (0.4) 1.0 (0.2)
8 -1650 (fixed) -355 (fixed)
jm         1        (u.b.)       If 0.29 (0.05)
Timm 0.23 (0.05) 4ff              1      (u.b.)
gtnf        0 (1.b.) Rfm 0.83 (0.39)
a 7.6 (0.5) 11.9 (0.8)
6 4437 (24816) 450 (307)V
log lik. -388.9 -538.1
SEP
males females
6         1 (9) -12     (3)0
B -0.007 (0.004) -O.014 (0.003)
61       -2          (8)                             -      -
y 0.1 (0.5) 0.7 (0.3)
e -1650 (fixed) -355 (fixed)
im         1        (u.b.)       If              1      (u.b.)
n 0.57 (0.06)       n               1      (u.b.)mm                                 ff
72mf
0.3 (0·3)        n                0      (1.b.)fm
ah 13.3 (0.8)
10.2 (O.4)
566 1.10 (1.10 ) 411 (194)V
log lik. -493.0 -345.4
a) u.b. = upper bound, 1.b. = lower bound
Standard errors in parentheses
It is not possible to identify the parameters Km' *f. We assume both to
be equal to 0.5.
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Table 4.2 Estimation results for the extended model,  two-adult
householdsa)
OSA SEP
a -0.0002 (0.003) -O.04 (0.04)
Bm      -0.0004 (0.0004) -0.009 (0.001)
B       -0.0002 (0.0001) -0.000001  (u.b.)f
Tm
0.01 (,t.b.) 1.4 (1.5)
Tf 0.8 (O.4) 1.1 (0.3)
6 1.9 (0.9) -22        (4)m1
6fl -623 (2402)                      -          -
6       30       (20)                      71         (148)m0
6      -18       (9)                       -21          (3)f0
8 7000 (4.105) 11373 (17202)
Im       1       (u.b.)                     1         (u.b.)
I 0.98 (0.05)                      1         (u.b.)f
emm 0.20 (0.01) 0.81 (0.02)
n 0.22 (0.09)                      1         (u.b.)mf
 ff      1       (u.b.)                     1         (u.b.)
efm    0     (t.b.)                 0       (t.b.)
X        1       (u.b.)                      1         (u.b.)mm
Amf 0.58 (0.30) 0.38 (0.18)
X        1       (u.b.)                     1         (u.b.)ff
X- -
fm                                                       -
am 6.0 (0.1) 8.5 (0.1)
6 12.7 (0.5) 12.4 (0.3)f
e -0.08 (0.04) 0.03 (0.06)
0 3.10 (1.10 ) 2044 (2141)
56
mv 67a 2.10 (3.10 ) 3803 (40000)fv
log lik. -4114.5 -4735.0
a) u.b. = upper bound, 1.b. = lower bound
Standard errors in parentheses
It is not possible to identify the parameters Am' xf. We assume both to
be equal to 0.5.
-99-
Table 4.3 Wage elasticities for the extended modela)
OSA SFP
one-adult two-adult one-adult two-adult households
3h  wm m
--- -- -0.03 -0.00 -0.01 0.02Aw  hm m
(0.13) (0.01) (0.22) (0.04)
3hf Wf--- -- 0.11 0.39 0.11 0.69
3Wf hf
(0.11) (0.51) (0.24) (0.63)
a) Standard errors in parentheses
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influence of                          6       6         6       6
mk      fk mk fk
habit formation, hmk(-1) 0.23
- 0.20     -
habit formation, hfk(-1)                  -      0.29       -      0.98
mean of hm in r.g. of male, hmmk(-1)    0        -        0        -
mean of hf in r.g. of male, hmfk<-1)    0        -        0.22     -
mean of hf in r.g. of female, h (-1) - 0.71       -      0.02ffk




influence of                            6       6         6       6
mk fk mk fk
habit formation, hmk(-1) 0.57
- 0.81     -
habit formation, hfk<-1)                 -      1          -      1
mean of hm in r.g. of male, hmmk<-1)    0        -        0        -
mean of hf in r.g. of male, hmfk<-1)    0.3      -        1        -
mean of hf in r.g. of female, h (-1)   -      0          -      0ffk
mean of hm in r.g. of female, hfmk<-1)   -      0          -      0
a) r.g.= reference group
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6         11 (14) -11 (15)
0
B -0.01 (0.01) -0.02 (O.004)
61         5        (5)                          -9      (4)
1 0.1 (0.4) 0.7 (0.1)
8 -1650 (fixed) -355 (fixed)
Jm         1         (fixed)      If              1      (fixed)
n 0.23 (0.05) Ttff 0.38 (0.06)mm
emf        0 (1.b.) 72fm
0.55 (0.31)
Gh 7.6 (0.5) 13·0 (
0.8)
6 4437 (24816)                      90      (43)V
log lik. -388.9 -541.4
SEP
males females
6         1         (9)                         -12     (3)0
B -0.007 (0.004) -O.014 (0.003)
61       -2         (8)                             -      -
7 0.1 (0.5) 0.7 (0.3)
8 -1650 (fixed) -355 (fixed)
Tm         1        (fixed)      If              1      (fixed)
0.57 (0.06) eff             1      (u.b.)mm
emf 0.3 (0.3) efm                                           0                     (t.b. )
Ch 13.3 (0.8)
10.2 (0.4)
566 1.10 (1.10 ) 411 (194)V
log lik. -493.0 -345.4
a) u.b. = upper bound, L.b. = lower bound
Standard errors in parentheses.
It is not possible to identify the parameters Am' xf. We assume both to
be equal to 0.5.
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Table 4.6  Estimation  results  for  the  extended  model, only habit for-
mation, two-adult householdsa)
OSA SEP
0  -0.0002 (0.003) -0.04 (0.04)
Bm      -0.0004 (0.0004) -0.009 (0.001)
Ff      -0.0002 (0.0001) -0.000001  (u.b.)
Tm 0.01 (1.b.) 1.4 (1.5)
Tf 0.6 (0.4) 1.1 (0.3)
6ml 1.9 (0.9) -22        (4)
6fl -980 (6821)                      -           -
6       30       (20)                      71         (148)m0
6 -17 (10) -21          (3)f0
8 6000 (4.105) 11373 (17202)
jm       1       (fixed)                     1          (fixed)
I        1       (fixed)                     1          (fixed)f
emm 0.20 (0.01 0.81 (0.02)
emf 0.22 (0.09)                      1          (u.b.)
eff 0.99 (0.05)                     1         (u.b.)
i2fm
0.01 (0.05)                  0        (1.b.)
X         -       -                         1         (u.b.)mm
X 0.58 (0.31) 0.38 (0.18)mf
A         -       -                        1          (u.b.)ff
X        1       (u.b.)                      -          -fm
am 6.0 (0.1) 8.5 (0.1)
af 12.7 (0.5) 12.4 (0.3)
e -0.08 (0.04) 0.03 (0.06)
66 3.10 (1.107) 2044 (2141)mv
6 1.10 (2.10 ) 3803 (40000)
78
fv
log lik. -4115.3 -4735.0
a) u.b. = upper bound, 1.b. = lower bound
Standard errors in parentheses
It is not possible to identify the parameters *m' *f. We assume both to
be equal to 0.5.
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Table 4.7 Wage elasticities for the extended model, only habit formationa)
OSA SEP
one-adult two-adult one-adult two-adult households
3hm Wm
aw h -0.03 -0.00 -0.01 0.02m m
(0.13) (0.01) (0.22) (0.04)
3hf wf
aw h 0.05 0.33 0.11 0.69f  f
(0.06) (0·53) (0.24) (0.63)
a) Standard errors in parentheses
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6         17 (18) -47 (12)0
B -0.01 (0.01) -0.03 (0.004)
6          4        (4)                          -10     (4)1
7 0.5 (0.3) 1.5 (0.2)
e -1650 (fixed) -355 (fixed)
Im         0        (fixed)      I               0      (fixed)f
num        0        (L. b.) Rff 0.73 (0.45)
emf            0            (t.b.)           9                       1          (u.b.)fm
ch 8.3 (0.6) 13·0 (0.9)
6 971 (1250) 236 (116)V
log lik. -400.3 -546.9
SEP
males females
6         19 (10) -66 (18)0
B -0.09 (0.003) -0.05 (0.01)
6         4         (3)                          -6      (9)1
r 0.3 (0.6) 2.3 (0.4)
8 -1650 (fixed) -355 (fixed)
jm         0        (fixed)      Ef              0      (fixed)
ilmm     0      (2.b.)     12           1    (u.b.)ff
72        0 (t.b.) efm             1      (u.b.)mf
ch 16.3 (0.9) 19.9 (1.6)566 5.10 (1.10 ) 154 (35)V
log lik. -518.8 -404.6
a) u.b. = upper bound, 1.b. = lower bound
Standard errors in parentheses
It is not possible to identify the parameters K , Kf. We assume both to
be equal to 0.5
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Table 4.9  Estimation  results  for  the  extended  model, only preference
interdependence, two-adult householdsa)
OSA SEP
a 0.7 (0.6) 1.2 (0.2)
 m
-0.001 (0.004) -0.020 (0.002)
Bf
-0.01 (0.005) -0.009 (0.004)
Ym 0.15 (0.19) 0.9 (0.2)
Tf
8.6 (6.6) 3.6 (0.6)
6ml 1.5 (0.9) -24         (4)
6      -45       (5)                        -50        (5)f1
6mO 103 (53) -12         (4)
6 682 (730) -24 (11)f0 568 7.10 (1.10 ) 435 (216)
Im       0       (fixed)                     0          (fixed)
If       0       (fixed)                     0          (fixed)
72      0     (L.b.)                0       (1.b.)mm
emf 0.19 (0.01)                      1          (u.b.)
4     1     (u.b.)               O      (1.b.)ff
efm          0            (,t.b. )                                   0               (t. b.)
X          -        -                             -          -
<: 0.42 (0.41) 0.60 (0.19)
Aff
A 0.14 (0.30)                      -           -fm
6 6.3 (0.1) 12.3 (0.2)m
ef 20.8 (1.3) 26.3 (1.1)
e -0.12 (0.05) -0.73 (0.02)





a) u.b. = upper bound, 1.b. = lower bound
Standard errors in parentheses
It is not possible to identify the parameters Km' *f. We assume both to
be equal to 0.5.
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one-adult two-adult one-adult two-adult households
3h  W
<< O.09 0.01 0.03 -0.03
(0.12) (0.03) (0.20) (0.06)
3hf Wf--- -- 0.22 0.53 1.86aw h 0.65f  f
(0.09) (O.64) (0.42) (3.09)
a) Standard errors in parentheses
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4.4 A factor analytic model of reference groups
In Section 2 of this chapter social reference group variables were
constructed  on  the basis of a set of assumptions. Given the assumptions,
the significance of reference group influences on  the  labour  supply  of
households is corroborated by the data. Since the SEP-data contain answers
to a number of direct questions about reference groups of individuals,  it
is possible to  have  a  more  sophisticated  look at the influence of
reference groups. In this section  the  direct  information  on  reference
groups is used to construct a so-called latent variables model of the
influence of reference groups on labour supply.
It is the goal of this section to employ the direct information on
reference groups within the formal structure of the  labour  supply  model
developed  in the preceding chapters. The basic idea is to use the answers
to the questions about reference groups  to  construct  a  number  of  in-
dicators  of  the  family size and number of hours worked in the reference
group of each respondent. These indicators are next used  in  a  so-called
confirmatory  factor  analysis  model  to estimate the relation of the in-
dicators   to   the   " true" family   size and number of hours worked      in      the
reference  group. These true variables can then be proxied on the basis of
the observed indicators. The proxies are  used  in  the  household  labour
supply  model instead of the original variables, which were constructed on
the basis of  education  and  age.  The  factor  analytic  model  will  be
explained  in this section and the results of its estimation will be given
in Section 4.5. In Section 4.5 we also present the results of reestimation
of the labour supply model with the new reference group variables.
For clarity of exposition we will first present the questions that
were  asked  in the survey about one's reference groups. The questionnaire
administered to the SEP-respondents included the following questions
1.    "The following questions are about your social environment, that  is
people  whom  you  meet frequently, like friends, neighbours, acquain-
tances or possibly people you meet at work. Thinking of the people  in
your  social environment, can  you  indicate to which age class they















[13] 71 and over
2 "People  in  your  social environment may live alone or live in a multi-
person household (e.g. with partner and children). What is the  typical
size of the number of persons in households in your social environment?
Check number one if most households in your social environment  consist
of  single  persons, check number two if most households in your social
environment have two persons, etc. 11
[1]    one person
[2] two persons
[3] three persons
[4]    four persons
[5] five persons
[6]    six persons or more
3  "What educational level do most people in your social environment have?
Check the number corresponding with the answer that comes  closest  to
reality."
[1] primary education
[2] lower vocational education
[3]    intermediate general education
[4]    high school
[5] intermediate vocational education
[6]    higher vocational education B.A. or B.SC.
-113-
[7] masters degree
The  purpose  of these questions was to collect some direct infor-
mation on the composition of the reference group of each  respondent.  The
decision  to  include these questions in the questionnaire was made in the
context of a research project on  subjective poverty, in which  it  was
hypothesized  that  the  incomes and family composition of one's reference
group are important determinants of one's subjective well-being.  For  the
purpose  of  explaining household labour supply on the basis of preference
interdependence the questions suffer from one serious defect,  because  no
questions have been asked about the number of hours worked in the
reference group. Although this certainly detracts from the  value  of  the
information, it still is a lot more direct than what we have used in the
previous chapters. Let us now describe the construction of the  indicators
and  then  explain  the  way  the  indicators  are  related  to the "true"
reference group variables. For singles we construct  four  indicators  for
hours worked in a respondent's reference group and five indicators for the
family size. The first two indicators for reference group hours are simply
the  ones  used  in  the  previous chapters, i.e. the mean number of hours
worked by all males or females in the sample who share the characteristics
educational level and age bracket with the respondent. The construction of
the third and fourth indicator is analogous, but now it is the mean number
of  hours  of  all males or females in the sample who have the educational
level and age indicated by the  respondent  as  typical  for  his  or  her
reference group.
For  family  size  the  first  four  indicators are constructed
analogously  to the variables for hours, namely as sample means for people
with certain characteristics. The fifth indicator for family size  is  the
answer to question 2 above. For two-adult households we have four more
indicators for hours worked as  well  as  for  family  size.  Besides  the
abovementioned  indicators  we  use also the mean family size and the mean
number of hours worked by all males or females in the sample who share the
characteristics  education  level  and age bracket with the partner of the
respondent. And we use the mean number of hours of all males or females in
the  sample  who have the education level and age indicated by the partner
of the respondent as typical for his or her reference group.
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Having  constructed  the  indicators,  how can we use them to find
reasonable operationalizations of the "true"  reference  group  variables?
First  we  restrict  our  attention  to  singles. Let x1 through x4 be the
indicators of hours worked in the reference group of some respondent, and
let  5hm  and Shf be the true value of the number of hours worked by males
and females respectively in the reference group. Then we assume  the  fol-
lowing relationship between these variables
*l = alihm+ '1 (4.16)
x2 = 0:2511:n+  2 (4.17)
x3 = 035hf+  3 (4.18)
x4 . =45hf+ '4
(4.19)
where   vl through 94 are random terms,  normally  distributed  with  mean
zero and mutually independent
xl = mean number of hours worked by all males who are in the  same
age and education bracket as the respondent
x2 = mean number of hours worked by all males who have the age and
education  level  indicated  by the respondent as typical for
his or her reference group
x3 = mean  number  of  hours  worked by all females who are in the
same age and education bracket as the respondent
x4 = mean  number  of hours worked by all females who have the age
and education level indicated by the  respondent  as  typical
for his or her reference group
Thus one sees that the indicators are assumed to be dependent on  the  two
true variables, but their coefficients may differ and the relations suffer
from errors,  vt  through  v4.  Technically,  (4.16)-(4.19)  is  a  factor
analysis model, where  Shm   and  5hf  are the factors,   01   through  04   are   the
factor loadings, x1 through x4 are the specific indicators.
For the five indicators of family size a similar model is assumed
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K5  =  a55 fs  +  5 (4.20)
X6    =   0 65 fs    +   v6 (4.21)
x7    =   0:75 fs    + D7
(4.22)
x8  =  0:85 fs  + v8 (4.23)
x9    -   095 fs    + '9 (4.24)
where   x5  through  x8  are  analogues of x1 through x4 with hours worked
replaced by family size and the error terms v5 to  p   are  random
terms, normally distributed and mutually independent.
x  = answer to question 2 above
For estimation of the two models we need the values of all nine in-
dicators, introduced in equations (4.16)-(4.24). This leaves  us  with  54
observations  for  single  males  and  153 for single females. We have es-
timated the two different models seperately for males and for females.
Obviously, estimation of the two models for two-adult households
with all the indicators included requires that all the questions have been
answered  by both spouses in the households. It turns out that the routing
in the questionnaire of the SEP has been such that the questions have only
been asked to individuals who have their own independent source of income.
As a result, many observations had to  be discarded, including  most
households  with nonworking housewives. For estimation only 318 households
remain.
For  families, we exploit the information provided by husbands and
wives simultaneously. We do this by estimation of two models. The first
model consists of four equations analagous to equations  (4.16)-(4.19) for
both husband and wife, so that we have eight  indicators  and  two  "true"
reference group variables
4=Ohm + pl (4.25)
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4 = 92;hm ' "2 (4.26)
f -6 +P (4.27)
xl    1-hm    3
f     f
x2 = 025hm + v4 (4.28)
m m
(4.29)x3 - 035hf + '5
m m
(4.30)x4 = 04ihf + v6
x  - 0 5   + 1, (4.31)
3    3 hf    7
f     f
x4 = 0 45hf + '8 (4.32)
m
For the definition of the  variables  x , we must substitute in  thef
definition    of x "respondent"  by  "male  in the household". Likewise  x    is
defined for the female in the household. The second model consists  of
analogues of (4.20)-(4.24) for both husband and wife jointly. Since in the
labour supply model there is no distinction between reference group family
size  for  male  and  female, it is a natural approach to take the ten in-
dicators as functions of the same underlying "true" reference group mean
x5 = a53fs .5 (4.33)
x6 - 065fs ' "10 (4.34)
"7 = "76fs ' "11 (4.35)
x8 = «85fs + "12 (4.36)
18=6 +11 (4.37)9    9 fs    13
f f
(4.38)x5 - 0 55fs + v14
f f
(4.39)x6 = 265fs +  15
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f f (4.40)+ P
v16x7  -  075 fs
f f (4.41)
x8   =   0 85 fs   +   v17
f
(4.42)
x9 - a95fs + v18
In Appendix 4D the correlation matrices of the indicators are given.
Table 4.11 presents the results of the factor  analyses  performed
for  family size and hours respectively. The estimation method employed is
maximum likelihood, using the well-known LISREL program.
Table 4.11. Estimation results for the confirmatory factor analyses
singles families
males females males females
Par. est. stand. est. stand. est. stand. est. stand.
error error error error
HOURS
01         4.38 1.25 2.75 0.52 1.69
0.21 1.87  0.25
02  3.84 0.60 5.10 0.63 3.57 0.44 1.82  0.27
0   1.62 0.61 5.08 0.77 2.35 0.20 4.35  0.22
3
04         4.74 0.79 5.12 0.53 3.23 0.
21 4.51  0.22
2
R 0.99 0.93 0.97
FAMILY SIZE
a5  0.15 0.02 0.20 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.11
0.01
06         0.06 0.03 0.09 0.02 0.10 0.0
1 0.14  0.01
07  0.19 0.03 0.17 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.10
0.01
a8  0.07 0.04 0.08 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.11 0.01
0 0.15 0.02 O.08 0.03 0.15 0.02 0.11 0.02
9
2
R 0.75 O.88 0.73
corr. between male and female ref. group hours 0.52
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The estimation results are satisfactory from a  statistical  view-
point. The R2's, indicating the extent of the multiple correlation between
the "true" reference group variables and the indicators range from 0.52 to
0.99. The signs  of the a' s are all positive, as one would hope, whereas
their magnitudes are comparable. The latter fact suggests that the  infor-
mational content  of the indicators about the true reference group
variables is of similar magnitude, but of course  not equal. (Otherwise,
the  indicators would have shown perfect correlation). The standard errors
are   small,    so   that   the   01' s   have been estimated with considerable accuracy.
Although  the estimation results for the factor analysis model are
promising, it of course remains to be seen whether the  constructed  "true
variables"  are capable of explaining family labour supply better than the
indicators used in the previous chapters. This is the topic  of  the  next
section.
4.5. The labour supply model reestimated
It  should be realized that the true reference group means defined
in the previous section cannot be observed directly. Hence, if  one  wants
to  use  these  variables  in  the  labour supply model it is necessary to
replace the true variables by  proxies.  It is well-known however that
replacing unobservable variables in a model by  proxies leads to inconsis-
tent parameter estimates. Furthermore, the number of observations for
which  all  indicators  used in the factor analysis model are available is
limited. We will explain in detail how these problems are  dealt  with  in
this section. Basically, the solution amounts to the following.
The  proxies  used  for  the unobservable true reference group
variables are weighted means of the indicators. Given the estimates of the
factor analysis model, one can construct these  means  optimally,  in  the
sense  that  a  proxy  gives the best prediction of the corresponding true
variable. Furthermore, the estimates of the variances of the  £'s  in  the
factor  analysis model can be used to compute the inconsistency that would
arise in estimation if the proxies were used in estimation of  the  labour
supply  model withour further precautions. As a result it is also possible
to introduce  a  correction  which  guarantees  consistent  (and  actually
efficient) estimates of all parameters. To be more precise:
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The basic model is given by (4.16)-(4.24) for singles and  (4.25)-
(4.42) for families. In matrix format the model can be written as
x - F# + P (4.43)
The variance covariance matrix of the error vector p will be denoted by 9.
In addition to what was mentioned in Section 4.4 we assume that the latent
vector 5 is  normally distributed with mean zero and variance-covariance
matrix Q. The latter assumption is rather harmless, as we  will  condition
on the values of 5 most of the time.
The vector 5 of latent variables  appears  in  the  labour  supply
equations  via  the deltas given by (4.1)-(4.2). Apart from the term which
contains individual k's own past number of hours, the right hand  side  of
these  equations  represents  the reference group variables of the husband
and wife in family k. The latent variables  in  &  represent  exactly  the
weighted averages that appear in these equations including reference group
family size, which in Section 4.3 was only introduced  later.  In  general
terms the delta-equations can be written in matrix format as follows
6k = Ck + B5k (4.44)
where
B=   w     w   l i s a matrix of parameters
omm   Wmf 1
fm ff 3
6hm<-1)- 6ml5fs(-1) 1
5k=   5hf(-1)- 6fljfs(-1) J
For families ck is defined as
6m0+ 6mlfk* rm[hmk(-1)-6mlfk<-1)]7 (4.45)
Ck = 6f0+ 6flfk+ rf[hfk(-1)-6flfk(-1)]J
For singles ck= 60+ 6lfk(-1)+ 1(hk(-1)-6lfk(-1)) (4.46)
It  should  be  noted  that  the  notation  has  changed  a little
relatively to the previous models, because the present model has a simpler
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specification of the reference group variables. It follows from the factor
analysis model that there are two different variables for reference  group
hours,  one for the male and one for the female, whereas there is only one
reference group variable for family size. This latter variable  is  shared
by both spouses in a family. The parameters w indicate the total influence
of reference group hours on the 6's of the male and female in a  household
respectively.  For  example,  emf indicates the influence of the reference
group mean of female working hours  on  6 .  The  t's  measure  the  totalm
influence  of  habit formation. For the rest the meaning of the parameters
is the same as before.
It  is  convenient  to  also  write the labour supply equations in
matrix format (ignoring rationing)
hk= Sk +Awk + BIk + sk (4.47)
*
Ik =I k+8+ 6kwk+ 1/2wkAwk (4.48)
where  the vector ek is supposed to be normally distributed with mean zero
and variance covariance matrix I. Notice that model (4.43)-(4.48)  applies
to both the one-and the two-adult household model.
Combining (4.43)-(4.48) leads to the following  equation  for  the
vector of household labour supplies
1 **
hk = (ID2+Bwk)ck + (ID2+Bw )Bik + Awk + BIk + Etc (4.49)
**
where Ik  -I k+8+ 1/2 wk'Awk
ID2 = (two by two) identity matrix. For simplicity of notation  we
write (4.49) as
hk = dk + Dk3ik + sk
(4.50)
in obvious notation.
The basic statistical model now is (4.43) and  (4.50)·  The  first
point  to  note  is that not all elements of the vector x are observed for
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all respondents, although in the estimation of (4.43) only households have
been used for whom all elements of x were known.
In the second place the vector of latent variables 5 is not obser-
vable,  so  that we cannot use (4.50) directly. Instead of 5 we observe x.
The way to get around the problem of not observing 5 is  to  construct  on
the  basis  of  (4.43)  and  (4.50) an expression of the expectation of h 
conditional on dk  and  x .  In  this  expression  normality  of  all  the
variables  involved  is used heavily. The variance covariance matrix of i
is denoted by A.
Let zk be the subvector of x  which is observable for household k.
There holds
zk - Fk5k + vk (4.51)
where Fk is the part of F corresponding with zk and vk corresponds with zk
as  well. The variance covariance matrix of pk is denoted by Wk. It is the
appropriate submatrix of T. The subscript k has only been added  to  5  to
indicate  that its value will vary across households. It is still the full
vector of latent variables.
Using  (4.50)  and (4.51) we can now write down the expectation of
hk given d  and z . We obtaink
E(hklzk'dk)=dk+DkE(ik|dk'zk)=dk+ Dk Q Fk' (FkQFk'+lk)-lzk    (4.52)
Var(hklzk'(llc)= A+Dk(Q-Q Fk'(FkQFk'+Wk)-1FkQ)Dk' (4.53)
Notice  that,  after the factor analysis model has been estimated,
most of the quantities appearing in (4.52) and (4.53)  are  known.  except
the parameters inherent  in  i  and  Dk.
As said before, for many observations not all  indicators  of  the
reference  group  means are available. One can still construct proxies for
the true variables, that are  optimal  given  the  amount  of  information
available. Thus, all observations can be used in estimation of the labour
supply model. Table 4.12 presents the results. Since the information  that
is needed for estimation of the factor analysis model is only found in the
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SEP questionnaire, we are not able to present  OSA-estimation  results  in
this section, unlike in the other chapters of this thesis.
To see whether the use of direct information on reference group
variables changes the characteristics of the model, we first compare Table
4.13 with the corresponding columns of Tables 4.1 and 4.2. The  values  of
ce' Bm' Bf for families and B and y for singles are basically the same. The
parameters rm and Yf are very different. From Table 4.13 can be  concluded
that  all  wage  elasticities  are lower than in the model with preference
formation in which no direct information on reference groups was used
(compare  Table  4.3).  Also  the 61's are different, but as has been seen
before this does not mean too much, as the reduced form  coefficients  for
the  influence  of  family  size  are  rather complicated functions of the
structural parameters so that the behaviour of the  model  is not neces-
sarily very different as a result of the different parameter estimates.
If we now turn to the preference formation parameters, we  observe
a  value  for  rf equal to one, and for Tm values equal to 0.54 for single
males and 0.69 for married males (rm and rf indicate the totale  influence
of  habit  formation).  Once again habit formation for females is stronger
than for males. Just as in the model described in section 4.2 females  are
much more referred  to  than males (w and w are smaller than w andmm      fm                   ff
wmf). It is a bit hard to compare both models, because  of  the  different
treatment of reference groups in the two versions. The total effects given
in Table 4.14 will shed light on this problem.
The similarities between the total effects of habit formation is
clear (compare Table 4.4). As in Section 4.3  we  have  to  conclude  that
there  is a strong effect of mean hours worked by females in the reference
group on the 6 in the equation. As before we see that preference formation
contributes  significantly  to the explanation of household labour supply,
with habit formation dominating the influence  of  preference  interdepen-
dence.
There is a striking similarity between the  labour  supply  curves
shown  in  Figures  4.7  and  4.4.  This implies that the total effects of
reference groups is estimated at about the same  magnitude  for  both  the
more  sophisticated  treatment of the reference groups in this chapter and
for the more simple specification. This  similarity  also  holds  for  the
hours  distributions  of  married males and females (Figures 4.8 and 4.6).
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But for single males and females the simulated hours distributions of  the
more sophisticated model appear to fit the actual distributions worse.
It should be noted here that  although  the  information  used  on
reference  groups  is  richer  than in the preceding chapters, we have not
been able to use direct questions on reference group hours, similarly  to
the  questions on reference group family size. The reason for this is that
the questionnaire was designed for a  project  in  which  hours  were  not
important.  The  direct  questions  on reference group incomes, which were
included, could not be used. It seems safe to say that direct questions on
hours  worked  in  one's  reference group would improve the quality of the
estimates.
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6          6        (7) -0.05 (0.04)0
B -0.006 (0.004)      Bm -0.006 (0.001)
61        -0        (1)          Bf            -0.000001 (u.b.)
T 0.1 (0.3)        im 3.9 (4.2)
8 -1650 (fixed)      Yf 0.7 (0.2)
1 0.54 (0.06)       6ml -1.7 (0.3)
W 0.4 (1.0)        6 -0.8 (0.5)mm                                fl
wmf        1        (u.b.)       6 560 (600)m0
'h 12.7 (0.6)        6 -17.0 (2.3)f0566 1.10 (1.10 )      e 89027 (97587)V
log lik. -492.1             rm                0.69  (0.02)
1            1    (u.b.)f
females
wmm 0    (1.b.)
w                1     (u.b.)mf
6        -12        (3)          w                 1     (u.b.)0                                ff
B -0.014 (0.003)     w             o    (1.b.)fm
61 -0.5 (1.1)        am               7.7   (0.1)
Y 0.7 (0.3)        6 11.3 (0.3)f
8 -355 (fixed)      e                0.1   (0.1)
1          1         (u.b.)       6 1238 (1183)mv
w          1 (u.b.) 662 (1562)
ff                                 Cfvw       0      (1.b.)fm
ah 9.9 (0·5)
6 438 (223)V
log lik. -344.2 -4722.6
a) u.b. = upper bound, 1.b. = lower bound
Standard errors in parentheses
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a) Standard errors in parentheses





influence of                            6       6         6       6
mk      fk        mk      fk
habit formation, hmk(-1) 0.54
- 0.69     -
habit formation, hfk(-1)                 -      1          -      1
mean of hm in r.g., 5hm 0.4     1         0       1
mean of hf in r.g., Shf 1 0 1 0
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4.6 Conclusion
The  modelling  of  preference formation is the major point of em-
phasis in this chapter. To that end we constructed reference  group  means
of  hours  worked  and family size in Section 4.3 on the basis of a set of
assumptions. In Section 4.5 we have employed different  pieces  of  infor-
mation available in the SEP-data set to construct latent variables which
may be thought to be a more accurate reflection of the notion of reference
group means than the ones used in Section 4.3
The latent variables model strenghtens the conclusions obtained in
Section  4.3  about  the  determinants  of  shifts in preferences. For all
different groups (single males, single females, families)  the  estimation
results  indicate  that the incorporation of preference formation leads to
different conclusions than would otherwise be obtained. One  of  the  most
interesting  features  of  the model is that incorporating preference for-
mation leads to a decrease in the wage elasticities. The statistical
significance of preference formation is clearly shown (see Section 4.4 and
4.5)
Since the model is dynamic we are able to distinguish between long
term and short term wage effects. Here we have concentrated only on  short
run effects. For long run effects is referred to Kapteyn, Woittiez and ten
Hacken (1989).
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Appendix 4A Social group means
Table 4A.1  Social group means, OSAa)
male female
education level education levelb)
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
age 18-30
log(family size) 0.82 0.84 0.70 0.50 0.92 0.95 0.78  0.57
hours worked,
lagged 1 year 32.44 35.06  34.22  29.98 12.74 16.23 20.21 24.83
number of indiv.  43    88    134     58     74 112 235    65
age 30-40
log(family size) 1.18 1.11 1.16 1.08 1.26 1.28 1.20  0.94
hours worked,
lagged 1 year 40.80 38.69  40.50 38.69 7.43 4.90 11.35 18.63
number of indiv.  71    96 281 160 136 146 234    92
age 40-50
log(family size) 1.28 1.25 1.26 1.28 1.26 1.34 1.28 1.17
hours worked,
lagged 1 year 34.11 37.78  39.35 39.69 6.01 4.66 9.90 17.98
number of indiv.  74    85 161 107 112 118 135    50
age 50-65
log(family size) 0.90 1.02 1.05 0.96 0.96 0.87 0.83  0.64
hours worked,
lagged 1 year 20.99 29.56  31.89 34.15 2.95 7.36 9.86 13.08
number of indiv. 136    69    159     93    166      92      84    24
a) 3690 individuals in households and single persons were used to form the
social group means.
b) Education has been coded in 4 levels ranging from  1  (lowest)  till  4
(highest).
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Table 4A.2  Social group means, SEPa)
male female
education level education levelb)
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
age 18-30
log(family size).  0.97 1.09 0.95 0.73 1.02 1.05 0.77  0.57
hours worked, 24.65 27·08  28.45  32.41 13.47 22.53 23·04 25.19
both lagged one year
number of indiv. 43 101 152     51     34      72     140    31
age 30-40
log(family size), 1.18 1.21 1.21 1.23 1.26 1.16 1.13  0.97
hours worked, 28.19 37.78  40.47 40.41 9.21 14.84 17·65 23.61
both lagged one year
number of indiv.  53    99 243 116     24      62      69    36
age 40-50
log(family size),  1.20 1.30 1.30 1.32 1.12 1.43 0.92  1.11
hours worked, 29.46 33.80  40.04 40.97 8.50 9.34 22.95 21.45
both lagged one year
number of indiv.  48    41    147     68     26      32      38    20
age 50-65
log(family size),  0.83 0.99 0.96 0.95 0.61 0.76 0.79  0.45
hours worked, 17·01 21.96  26.82 34.35 5.97 6.52 9.26 10.71
both lagged one year
number of indiv.  82    47    106     55     70      33      38    14
a) 2196 individuals in households and single persons were used to form the
social group means.




The  model  without preference formation is (over)identified. Thus
it is sufficient to examine the delta-equations  (4.13)-(4.14)  for  iden-
tification of the  model  with  preference formation for families and
equation (4.15) for singles.
In  Table  4B.1  we  have  rewritten the delta-equation for single
males. As one can see, there are 8 reduced  form  parameters  (al-a8)  and
7  structural parameters (nmm' emf, Im' Km' Af' 6ml' 6mO)' From 82 6m1 can
be identified. Since a5, a6 and a7 can be written as functions of al,  a2,
a3  and  a4  they  do not yield independent information. In fact we have 5
equations (al, a2, a3, a4 and a8) to identify 7 parameters.  By  fixing  2
parameters , e.g. Am and *f the remaining parameters are identified.
Table 4B.2 presents equations (4.13)-(4.14)  in  a  slightly  dif-
ferent form. From this table we infer that there are 20 reduced form
parameters (al-a20) and 16 structural parameters, namely: emm' eff'  nmf'
efm' Amm' Aff' Amf' Afm' Km' If' Am' *f' 6ml, 6fl, 6m , 6fQ· It is easy to
see that 6ml is identified from a2, and likewise 6fl from a12. From a3 and
a5 we identify Amm' from 84 and 86 Xmf' from 813 and 815 A and from a14fm'
and 816 A The equations a7, a8 and a9 do not  yield  independent  iden-
ff'
tifying  information,  and  neither do the equations a17, a18 and a19. For








In  fact  we  have  only  14  independent  equations  (al, a2, a3, a4, a5,
a6, a10, all, a12, a13, a14, a15, a16, a20) to identify 16 parameters.  If
2  parameters  are fixed, the remaining 14 parameters are identified (some
combinations of fixed parameters still cause problems, e.g. fixed nmm  and
Im)'
Table 4B.1 The delta-equation for singles
dependent variable 6m
structural parameter reduced form parameter
hok<-1)     emmjm                                                  al
f                    6                                                                                                   a2
k           ml
hmmk(-1) nmm(1-LIn)(1-Km)                                          a3
fimfk(-1) emf (l-*f)                                                 84
fk(-1) _6mlizmmim                                                85
fmk(-1) -umm(1-Im)(1-Km)6ml                                      a6
 fk(-1) - mf (1-Kf )6ml                                            87
constant
6mQ+nmm(1-Im)Am(Aim(-1)-6mlf)+nmfxf (Af (-1)-6mlf)        88
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Table 4B.2 The delta-equations for families
dependent variable 6m
structural parameter reduced form parameter
hmk(-1)     emmjm                                                     al
fk          6ml                                                       a2
hmmk(-1) emm(1-Im)(1-Km)Amm                                       83
fiffk(-1) emf(1-xf)(1-Xmf)                                         84
hfmk<-1) nmm(1-Im)(1-Am)(1-Amm)       85
hmfk(-1) nmf(1-*f)Xmf                                           86
fk(-1) _6mlemmIm                                                87
 mk(-1) -nmm(1-Im)(1-Am)Amm6ml-nmf(1-*f)Amf6ml                  a8




structural parameter reduced form parameter
hfk<-1) allilffif








constant 6fo+nff (1-If) Af (fif(-1 )-6flr) +nfmxm (fim (-1 )-6flf) a20
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Appendix 4c Stability
To  investigate  the stability of the two-adult household model we
write the equations (3.7)-(3·12) and (4.13)-(4.14) in matrix notation
7
h  i   IB g  W  +  ID2K] 6  +    I  [Yj  Q x.1   + 6 (4c.1)3J
j=1
6=6 91 + fE Z @IDlh(-1)
.   {[El [IZ-Z}   8  IDK]Q,   +
0    K    ll        KJ
(4C.2)
.   [E2  0  IDK]Q21  h(-1)
where    h=  lhml  ' ' '  hmKhfl  ' ' ' hfK  '
K = total number of households
  =  m1
lBfj
fwmli  0   wf 1   0 1
W    =     L   0     6' wmK          O   '''wf'Kj
6 =   6ml  - ' '  6mK 6fl  - ' '  6fK   
[rm] [Bmrml fo: 1 Pmrf]
11 = t• J   12 - 1 [Brrm]   13 . trrj   14 - ,  Bf,f]
Pmal [P-1 [pmel
15 - LBfal  r6 ' [Bd  '.7 - [Brel
xl =  lwml  - ' ' wmK  '
f 2            21'
x2 =  Lwml  '0 0  wmKJ
"3 =   wfl  "·  wrK  '
f 2           21'
x4 =  lwfl  ' " wfKJ
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x5 =   wmlwr 1   - '  wmKwg  '
"6 -   Il  "0  IK} '
x7 = (1 ... 1)' 4 tA
''   I    I:.01fOJ
fnmm O 1 fnmf 0 1
El = 10    eff] i   2= [0   'f.j
Z=Ifrmol
10  I Il f 
-                                           -
ii ii
0-··  12    ''--'  lK                qij           qij




ii          ij
ii          11 ·ij ...ij
·9K-1,K   .Q   =     :
- Kl''''''' ' K,K-1
..0                         q                     .q
Ki' ''  '  ' '    KK
Q= Q2 = 1 fm  I
fQmm 0 1 6 Qmfl
1 to offj lQ 0 J
where i,j = m,f
IDK   = (K by K) identity matrix.
It is assumed that in the long run preferred number of hours, actual  num-
ber  of  hours  and  actual  number  of hours one period lagged are equal.
Substituting (4C.2) into (4C.1) then yields
h   =   {I»2K-G [El*  8  IDK  +   [El [I2-9   0  IDK]   Ql   +   [E2  0  IDK]   QJ } -'
(4c.3)
1      7
 GI6     9   1    1    +     I   fr.   A  x.1    +   El0   NJ   i=ll  1    4  J
where  G=B O W+I D2K
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Define  H   -   G  E,Z  0   IDK   +    [El 0»2-Z     8   IDK]    Ql   +    [E2   0   IDK]    QJ                (4 0.4)
Stability of the model is guaranteed when it can be shown that the  eigen-
values  of  H  lie  within  the  unit circle. By Gershgorin's Theorem (see
Marcus and Minc (1964)) we are able to specify an upper  and  lower  bound
for the eigenvalues.
Gershgorin's Theorem. Each eigenvalue of the K x K matrix
A = [aij] lies in some interval Ii = [aii - sai' aii + sai],
i=1,...,K where sa. =  I  a..
1   j 0i  1J
The  investigation  of  the  stability of the one-adult-households is done





L 1 O TfJ
r w    0  7
[El [I»2-Z}  8 IDK]  Q,   b,    t O==   wrrj
rwe   0
[5 8 IDK] QZ] by  [ 0 '  w ]
fm
By applying Gershgorin's Theorem to the 2K x 2K matrix H and taking sample
means for the wage rates, we obtain the union of all 2K intervals for  the
estimated parameters, presented in Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.12
OSA SEP SEP(latent var.)
single males (0.20, 0.20) (0.25. 0.79) (-0.29, 1.3)
single females (-0.79. 1.42) (0.84, 0.84) (O.84, 0.84)
males in families (-0.02, 0.41) (-0.07· 1.49) (0.40, O.84)
females in families (0.95. 0.99) (0.99, 0.99) (0.99, 0.99)
Thus, for  single  females in the OSA sample and for males in families in
the SEP sample stability is not guaranteed in the  model  with  preference
formation, described  in  Section 4.2. In the latent variable model
stability cannot be guaranteed for single males. For all other groups  the
sufficient conditions for stability are guaranteed.
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Appendix 4D Correlation matrices of indicators
Table 4D.1  Correlation matrices of indicators
HOURS
single males single females
xi   x2   x3 x4 xi   x2   x3   x4
x1             1    0.46 0.36 0.31           1    0.41 0.53 0.26
X2                  1    0.22 0.63                1    0.30 0.58
x                        1    0.33                     1    0.52
3
X4                              1                              1
males in families females in families
xi   x2   x3 x4 xi   x2   x3   x4
xi             1    0.30 0.52 0.37 0.06 0.02 0.13 0.22
x2                   1    0.30 0.57 0.02 0.33 0.11 0.32
x                        1 0.38 O.10 0.09 0.04 0.09
3
X4                            1              0.06 0.47 0.09 0.44
xl                                           1    0.37 0.49 0.38
x2                                                1    0.33 0.35
x                                                      1    0.87
3
X4                                                             1
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Table 4D.1  Correlation matrices of indicators, continued
FAMILY SIZE
single males single females
xi   x2   x3   X4 x5 xl   x2   x3   x4   x5
xl              1    0.210.880.230.05      1    0.290.890.470.18
X2                   1    0.15 0.05 0.39           1    0.31 0.74 0.20
x                         1    0.21 0.05 1    0.48 0.18
3
X4                             1    -0.18                     1    0.21
x                                    1                               1
5
males in families females in families
xl   x2   x3   x4    5        xi   x2   x3   x4   x5
X
xl              1    0.30 0.54 0.38 0.35 0.56 0.26 0.79 0.27 0.28
X2                   1    0.33 0.55 0.38 0.27 0.41 0.38 0.39 0.23
x                         1    0.44 0.27 0.74 0.28 0.47 0.29 0.26
3
x4                             1 0.23 0.42 0.69 0.43 0.68 0.22
x                                    1         0.25 0.10 0.36 0.13 0.54
5
xl                                             1    0.35 0.58 0.36 0.25
X2                                                   1    0.35 0.90 0.07
x                                                      1    0.36 0.25
3






The major objective of this chapter is to develop a model  of  job
choice,  wages  and  labour  supply, and to use this model to estimate the
magnitude of the compensating  wage  differentials  for  qualitative  dif-
ferences  in  jobs (such as pleasantness, riskiness, dirtiness etc.). Like
in the preceding chapters, we will maintain a utility maximizing framework
as  the  starting point of the analysis. But we abstain from the idea that
the household is a joint decision unit. Neither do we  take  into  account
preference formation. Both extensions would complicate the model too much.
In this chapter it is assumed that the individual maximizes  a
utility  function  with leisure, nonpecuniary job characteristics and con-
sumption as its arguments. Nonpecuniary job characteristics are defined as
nonmonetary  benefits  accruing  to  individuals as a consequence of their
particular occupation (e.g. working conditions).
Moreover  one's  wage  is  assumed  to  depend  on  human  capital
variables and the characteristics of the job  actually  chosen.  The  idea
behind this relation is that the rewards for working can be both pecuniary
(money wage) and nonpecuniary (compensation by  means  of  the  supply  of
desirable job characteristics).
Most empirical work on compensating wage  differentials  has  been
based  on  the estimation of a single wage equation (cf. Hamermesh (1977),
Barron and Loewenstein (1986), Antos and Rosen (1975). Duncan (1976)). One
major  disadvantage  of these studies is that information on labour supply
is neglected. Since we believe that the labour supply  decision  is  taken
jointly with the choice of a particular job with its associated wage, it
is essential that  this  information  is  incorporated  in  the  analysis.
Moreover analyses that ignore      the   ( self) selection of individuals   into
different occupations, may produce  misleading results. Only  in  a  few
papers  a  model  is  developed in which labour supply, job choice and the
determination of wages are analysed jointly. Examples are Atrostic  (1982)
and Killingsworth (1984). Killingsworth developed a model of labour supply
and discrete job choice, and used it in an empirical analysis of the  com-
pensating wage differential between white and blue collar work.
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Jobs with qualitative differences can be interpreted as  differen-
tiated products, described   by   a  vector  of  objectively  measured
characteristics. The observed product price (this is the wage rate  if  we
are  dealing  with  the labour market) and the specific amounts of charac-
teristics define a set of implicit or hedonic prices (in  our  case  the
prices  of job characteristics). Some theoretical papers on hedonic prices
are by Rosen (1974). Brown and Rosen (1982).
By  including  job  characteristics in the wage equation, the wage
rate becomes an endogenous variable and this leads to a  nonlinear  budget
constraint.
In Section 5.2 a simultaneous model of job choice, labour  supply
and  wages  is developed. In  Section 5.3 the estimation results are
presented. Finally, in Section 5.4 some concluding remarks are made.
5.2 The model
We adopt the home  production  approach  to  the  theory  of  con-
sumption, which takes goods and services as inputs in a production process
that generates utility bearing outputs  usually  called commodities (cf.
Becker (1965), Lancaster (1966), Gronau (1986)). Let Zi be the quantity of
commodity i and let the production of each commodity require a combination
of time inputs T (j=l...,p) and goods X1(1=l...,n)
iiii
Zi = fi(Xl'..'Xn'Tl ''.,Tp), i=l,...m (5.1)
Here  X  is the amount of the L-th good used in the production of the i-th
commodity and T  is the amount of the j-th time input used in the  produc-
tion  of  the  i-th  commodity;  fi is the production function of the i-th
commodity. The utility function is
*(Zl,,,,Zm) (5.2)
The total number of goods and the total number of time inputs used in  the
production of all commodities jointly are respectively
i
Xt.I X . 1-1,..,n (5.3)1
i
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T  = I T  ,
j-1,..,p (5.4)
i
In accordance with previous chapters let unearned income of the individual
(or household) be equal to I and assume for simplicity that the individual
can hold only one paid job; the amount of time spent on  the  job  is  T .
P
Restrictions on behaviour are
i plxl =I+ w(q)Tp (5.5)
where w(q) is the wage rate and
I T =T (5.6)
j j
where T is the total time endowment.
The wage rate corresponding to a job depends on a vector q of job  charac-
teristics.
In principle, behaviour follows from maximization of (5.2) subject
to (5.1), (5.3). (5.4),  (5·5)  and (5.6). It has been noted by various
authors (e.g. Pollak and Wachter (1975)) that without further  assumptions
and  without  information  about commodities, this model cannot be distin-
guished from a model in which utility is  defined  directly  in  terms  of
goods  and  time inputs. Examples of papers with specific implications are
Gronau (1977,1980) and Graham and Green (1984).
In  this paper we consider a static model in which relative prices
of consumption goods  are  constant  across consumers. Furthermore, the
structure of the production functions fi is as follows
Zi    =    fi (Xl...,Xi,Tl,..,Ti, 9), i=1,..,m (5.7)
The  vector  q appears in the production function because we want to allow
for the possibility that at least some commodities are being influenced by
the  type  of  the  job  one is holding. This means that q is not taken as
given, but it is modelled as a choice variable. An example might be that a
commodity  is  the  amenity of a job and that q describes the occupational
status of the job.
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Given  that relative prices of consumption goods are assumed to be
constant across consumers, perfect aggregation  over  goods  is  possible.
Similarly,  we  can aggregate the time inputs T1'..,Tp-1 perfectly. Denote
the aggregate of the consumer goods by c, the aggregate of the  first  p-1
time  inputs  by L and let h=T.I f w e are only interested in three com-P
modities, namely leisure   (Zl) • the amenity  of  a  job   (Z2)  . and consumption
(Z3),   we can then, without loss of generality, restrict our attention to




s.t. pcc = w(q)(T-L) + I (5.9)
Zi = fi(L,q,c), i=l,2,3 (5.10)
It is important to keep in mind the distinction between goods (inputs  in
the  production process) and commodities (utility bearing outputs). During
the following discussion commodities are denoted by Z's and goods  by  the




(We write utility as a  function  of  h  (hours  of  work)  instead  of  L
(leisure) to keep in line with the specification used in Chapter 2.)
Z3=
C (5.12)
For f2 we have examined two different specifications, namely
Z2 =
hq (5.13)
Z2 -  (5.14)
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Discussion of the interpretation of both specifications  is  postponed  to
the  appropriate subsections. For the function w(q) we adopt the following
linear specification
w = a'k + bq (5.15)
where k = vector of individual characteristics
a, b  are parameters
The variable q is assumed to be a continuous (latent)  variable.  Equation
(5.15) reflects the fact that the wage rate depends on individual charac-
teristics, such as age and education, as well as  on  job  characteristics
such as working conditions. If q is defined as a "good", the expected sign
of the compensating wage differential b is negative. For jobs that offer
desirable  job  characteristics can attract labour at a lower than average
wage rate, while jobs that offer undesirable job characteristics must  pay
a  premium to attract labour. In fact employees sell the services of their
labour, but simultaneously purchase utility bearing  job  characteristics.
Employers  purchase the services of labour, and jointly sell job charac-
teristics. The observed relation between wages, human  capital  of  the
employee and job characteristics is determined by the market in such a way
that employees and employers are matched correctly. For example, assume
that individuals have homogeneous preferences for different kinds of work,
say all individuals dislike dirty work. Furthermore assume there is a con-
tinuum  of jobs, then if there is no wage differential between dirty and
clean jobs, nobody will be working in dirty jobs. So  individuals  working
in jobs with undesirable characteristics have to be paid extra. This is in
short the idea of compensating wage differentials.
So  far  we  have  assumed that q is a choice variable, but we can
also take q as given, which is common practice  in  empirical  studies  on
wage differentials. Then we obtain a model to which we will refer as stan-
dard model, resulting from the following maximization problem
max   U(Zl'Z2)




The  standard  model  is  comparable  to  the one-adult household model in
Chapter 2. In this chapter we focus, however, on  the  extended  model  in
which job  choice  is endogenous. In  the  following  subsections  the
implications  of  the  two  different  specifications  of  the  production
function of Z2 in the extended model will be made explicit.
Specification Z2 = hq










p c = wh + I (5.20)C
w   = a'k + bq (5.21)
The output level for commodity Z2 (job amenity) does not  only  depend  on
the  type  of  job one is working in with associated characteristic q, but
also on the number of hours one is working. The interpretation of this
specification  is  the  following: The disutility bearing output resulting
from working only a few hours in a tedious job is less than the disutility
bearing  output of working many hours on that same job, and vice versa for
utility bearing outputs. In this interpretation both Z2 and q are  closely
connected  with  time  spent  on  the  job. If one doesn't work, then q no
longer affects utility. As we will see, this is different  in  the  second
specification. Hours of work affect utility through two channels. Assuming
that both Z2 and q are valued positively, more hours of  work  yield  more
utility,  if  one is working in a pleasant job (i.e. if q>0). On the other
hand, more hours of work means less leisure time and thus less utility. If
q  is  less  than zero, that is, one is working in an unpleasant job, both
effects work in the same direction.
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Following  the  approach  taken  by  Pollak and Wachter (1975), we
define a cost function C(P,Z) as the cost of the least  expensive  collec-
tion of goods, capable of producing the commodity vector Z=(Zl'Z2'Z3) when
good prices are P
C(P,Z) = min (PcZ3 - a'kZl - bZ2)
(5.22)
Implicit commodity prices H=(01'"2'"3) are defined as the  marginal  costs
of producing commodities:
"1(P.Z) = DC P,Z) =
-a'k (5.23)
1
"2(P.Z) = BC<P,Z) =
-b (5.24)
2
11 (P,Z) = =P (5.25)3C(P,Z)
3          3z       c
3
Further, implicit  income (IC) is  defined as the cost of the commodity
bundle Z, evaluated at the implicit commodity prices
IC (= "1Zl + "2Z2 + "3Z3) =
I (5.26)





n zl + "2Z2 + "3Z3
- IC
Since the commodity prices are independent of the commodity bundle, chosen
by the individual, an analogy with traditional demand theory is preserved.
Thus, we can proceed  with  the  specification  of  the  indirect  utility
function.
For our specification of the indirect utility function we adopt  a
variant of the Hausman-Ruud model (cf. Hausman and Ruud (1984))
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*






Application of Roy's Identity yields demand functions for the  commodities
Z
*
Zl = BlI  + 61 + 11"1/"3
(5.30)
*
Z2 = -BZI  - 62 - T2"2 "3
(5.31)
ZJ = (Bl"1/"3+B2"2/Ir3+1) I  -8 + 1/271"2/NJ + 1/212"2/rr    (5.32)
The  price  of  consumption  "3 is used as a numeraire. Translating system
(5.30)-(5·32) back  into  the goods-space, the  following  goods  demand
functions are derived
h = Bli + 61 + Fla'k
(5·33)
hq = -BZI - 62 + T2b (
5.34)
c = (Bla'k- b +1)I -8 + 1/211(a'k)2
+
1/232b2 (5.35)
where   i = I+8+6la'k-62b+1/271(a'k)2+1/272b2
(5.36)
Equation (5.33) corresponds with the demand equations, derived in  Chapter
2  (equation  (2.1)). One difference with the model in Chapter 2, however,
is that in this chapter the wage rate is modelled jointly with the  labour
supply  decision,  while  in  Chapter  2  it  was  modelled seperately and
implemented afterwards into the labour supply equation. Equation (5.34) is
the demand equation for job amenities, while equation (5.35) is the demand
equation for consumption.
The price of commodity Zl (hours of work) is parameterized as follows




832 age  + a41edsecl + a42edsec2 + a5supvis + a6private
where edsecl = 1 if one's education is technical
=  0 if it is not
edsec2 = 1 if one's education is in economics
0 if it is not
supvis =  1 if one is a supervisor of more than 10 persons
0 if one is not
private = 1 if one is working in a private sector
0 if one is not
Different  educational sectors are included in the wage equation to inves-
tigate whether the sector one is educated in influences one's wage rate.
To deal with demographic variation we have parameterized 61 as
6  =6    +6 f (5.38)1    10    11
where f = log of family size.
The parameter 62 is parameterized as follows
62 = 621age + 622educ2 + 623educ3 + 6 (5·39)24educ4
We would expect that the higher one's age and the higher one's  education,
the  stronger  one's  preferences for job amenities. For definition of the
variables is referred to Chapter 2. Notice that the system of goods demand
functions  described above is nonlinear; the nonlinearity comes in through
equation (5.34). In estimation we will use the reduced form of the  model,
which  is easy to derive (see Appendix 5A). Before turning to the stochas-
tic version of the model, we will first describe the implications  of  the
second specification of the production function.
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Specification Z2 =  




s.t.   Zl  =
h (5.41)




p c = wh + I (5.44)C
w   = a'k + bq (5.45)
Following the same procedure as described for the previous  specification.
a cost function is specified
C(P,Z) = min (PcZ3 - a'kZl - bZlz2)
(5.46)
with good prices P.
From this cost function implicit prices of the commodities are derived
3((P,Z) (5.47)
"1(P,z) =   DZ                2
= -a'k - bZ
1
3C(P,Z) (5.48)
"2(P,Z) =   DZ2        1
= -bZ
"3(P.z) = ac  ,z) =
pc (5.49)
3
Price N3 is used as a numeraire. And implicit income (IC) is defined as
IC(P,Z) (= "1Zl + "2Z2 + "3Z3) =I- bZ1ZZ
(5.50)
Since both implicit prices and implicit income  depend  on  the  commodity
bundle consumed, the  application  of  traditional  demand theory is not
straightforward. In fact, Pollak and Wachter (1975) argue that in  this
case  the  link between the household production approach and neoclassical
theory is broken. In a comment on this paper, Barnett (1977) shows this
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s.t.  "1Zl + "2Z2 + "3Z3 = IC(P,Z)
where "1'"2'I3 and IC are  defined  above.  Assume  that  the  household's* *
solution  value  for Z is Z , where Z  is a function of goods prices P and
*       **            *         **
nonlabour income I. Define a  by  n (P,Z )  and IC by  IC (P,Z ).  Then





s.t.  Nlzl + r'2Z2 + "3Z3 = IC (P,Z)
*
The  H 's can be interpreted as shadow prices. constructed at the solution
* *
point. Since I  and IC  do not depend on  Z,  we  can  now  derive  demand
functions with the known neoclassical properties.
Before we are turning to the indirect  utility  function,  let  us
first have a closer look at the maximization problem. The utility function
U(h,q,c) is maximized subject to the budget constraint pcc =  I  +  w(q)h.
The necessary conditions for a maximum are
w/Pc         gh   BcI _211 /
.Il (5.53)
aw      au   Bu
h/Pc (aq ) = -aq / ac
(5.54)
where, by (5.45). (5.54) can be written as
hb /Pc = -  / 8 (5.55)
The left hand side of (5.55) is the derivative of  the  earnings  function
with  respect to a job characteristic, and the right hand side is the mar-
ginal rate  of  substitution  between  a  job  characteristic  and  money.
Furthermore,  if  q  is  defined  as a "good", it follows from (5·55) that
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under reasonable conditions b must be negative.  One  can  also  see  im-
mediately  that  for  the corner solution h=0 the existence of a satiation
point of q is required. This can also be seen in the Figures 5.1  to  5.3,
in  which  the shape of the budget set is shown for different values of b,
in respectively the (c,L)-plane,  the  (c,q)-plane  and  the  (q,L)-plane,
where a'k>0 and pc=l.
According to (5.44) the budget constraint is a  straight  line  in
the  (c,L)-plane (see Figure 5.1). If b is less than zero, then more of q
leads to a lower wage rate (cf.  5.45),  and  consequently  to  less  con-
sumption.      For q large enough   (q>- 52') individuals   have   to  pay  to  work
(w<0) (See Figure 5.1, the case b<0). This can only lead to a well defined
optimum if more leisure leads to less utility, since the optimum point now
has to be on the rising part of the indifference curve. That is,
3U
dL  =  -2/2,0.  If we assume that £>0, which is always the case in the3u
specification we use, then j <0. If we assume that there are  also  points
for     which      >0,   then this implies the existence  of a satiation point   for
BU            'kleisure,i.e.   R=0.    For   q=-    the budget   line is horizontal.so      that
(given q) the optimal point is the satiation point. Notice that the corner
solution h=0 need not be treated as a special case. If b>0, more q  yields
a  higher  wage rate and thus a higher budget. For the rest, the figure is
similar to the figure corresponding with b<0. For b=0, for  all  different
values of q the same budget line holds.
In the (c,q)-plane the budget line is also a straight line (cf. 5-
.45),  but the slope depends on the sign of b (see Figure 5.2). If b<0 the
slope of the budget line is negative, and increases (in absolute value) if
h increases. For h=0 or b=0 the budget line is horizontal and hence an op-
timum can only arise in a point of complete satiation with respect  to  q.
If  b>0  the  existence of an optimum also implies satiation in some point
(but not in the optimum point).
In the (q,L)-plane the budget line is a hyperbola, of which one of
the asymptotes is L=T and the other one q= - %h (See Figure 5.3). We dis-
tinguish  two different situations, namely c>I and c=I. If c>I and b<0 the
budget line has the form as shown in the top figure. Given the  number  of
hours  someone  works, he can consume less q if he consumes more c. Notice
that in this case the budget set  is convex. For c-*I the budget line
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coincides  with the asymptotes. Three different situations are possible in
that case:  1) h-0 and q. - %!S (point A),  then no restrictions   are   re-
quired on preferences.      2)   h.0   and   qt   -   %ls   .i n   this case there   must   be
satiation of q (point C), 3) h#0 and q= - th. in this case there must  be
satiation of L (point B). If b>0 (middle figure) then for an optimum it is
necessary that in some point there is complete satiation  of  q.  And  the
same holds for the case b=0.
Summarizing, we can say that for b<0 only in special cases, namely
'kwhen the wage rate is less than zero or when q= - t-, it is required that
there exists a point of satiation in leisure. For b>0, there  always  must
be a point of satiation in q, just as in the case of b=0. A rather special
case is the corner solution h=0. Then there must exist a  satiation  point
of q (for any value of b).
Like in the standard model in which the  budget  constraint  is  a
straight line, the  necessary condition for utility maximization is that
the slope of the  indifference  curve  equals  the  slope  of  the  budget
constraint. But, unlike in the standard model, it is not sufficient for a
utility maximum that the indifference curves are convex. Rather, the  more
stringent assumption is required that the indifference curve is 'more con-
vex' than the budget curve (in Appendix  5A  the  requirements  are  given
explicitly.).  From Figures 5.1 to 5.3 it is clear that the budget line is
concave in the (q,L)-plane and a straight line in the two other planes. So
we  expect that the requirement that the indifference curve is more convex
than the budget  line  is fulfilled. In estimation this condition  is
checked.
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We now turn to the specification of the indirect utility  function
which is the same as the one used in the previous specification
* *
V(Tr'.IC ) = exp((Blrrl +
B2172)/"3)I
(5.56)
* ** **** * *2 *  *2
I  = IC/N3+8+61"1/"3+62"2/93+1/211("1/"3) +1/212("2/"3)
(5.57)
Application of Roy's Identity and translating the  system  back  into  the
goods-space yields demand functions for c,h and q
h = Bli  + 61 + 'lw
(5.58)
q = -B2/  - 62- '2Pq (5.59)
c = (Blw +B2pq+1)f-8+1/2119,2 + 1/212P2 (5.60)
where   I = M+8+6lw+62Pq+1/231w2+1/212P2 (5.61)
w  = a'k + bq (5.62)
p  = -hb (5.63)q
M  =I- hbq (5.64)
61 and 62 are parameterized as in equations (5.38)-(5·39)·
This is a nonlinear system of simultaneous equations which  could  be  es-
timated  in  principle . However, we have to deal with the fact that the q
variable, describing the job characteristics, is  a  qualitative  variable
and that no information on q is available for nonworkers. Our strategy has
been to obtain the reduced form of the system (see Appendix 5A).
Stochastic specification of the two models
We specify stochastic versions of the reduced form systems of both
models by adding a disturbance term to each equation. Due to the adding-up
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restriction one of the equations may be dropped in the estimation. We drop
the equation for consumption and obtain all the parameter  estimates  from
the other equations.
Summarizing we specify the following model
-
ho=h + th if h + sh 2 0
(5.65)
=0 i f h+E <0h
-0
W =W+ € i f h+E >0
w           h-
(5.66)




0   if q S O and h + Eh 2.0
-- --- 2     -
6              0       ah   Phwah dw   Phqh
Ew    -N     0   ,            6 ewqaw (5.69)
6                 0                                 1
q
-                                           -
Carets (-) denote reduced form solutions (equations (5A.1)-(5A.3) or
(5A.15)  in  Appendix  5A),  q' is the observed dichotomously measured job
characteristic and w' is the observed wage rate. The random terms can only
represent  stochastic measurement errors. They cannot represent stochastic
preferences, since a normally distributed stochastic preference term would
lead  to  a  nonnormally  and  nonadditive random term in the reduced form
equation. In Appendix 5B the likelihood function is presented.
The  model,  developed above, is referred to as the "extended"
model. We will contrast the extended model with a "standard"  model,
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describing  the case where q is excluded from the direct utility function,
i.e. q is no longer a choice variable. In that case the  following  demand
functions for h and c can be derived (see Section 5.2 and Chapter 2)
c= (Blw + 1)I' -8+ 1/211w2 (5·70)
*
h = BlI  +61 +Tlw
(5.71)
w = a'k + bq (5.72)
I =I+8+6lw + 1/21172 (5·73)
5.3 Empirical results
We  have  considered  working conditions as the appropriate objec-
tively measurable job characteristic. Working conditions are "bad" if  the
work  is  dirty, physically strenuous or smells unpleasantly. A problem is
the measurement of job characteristics. In most  studies  a single, com-
posite, measure of job characteristics is constructed from responses to a
series of questions (cf. Atrostic  (1982)).  This  approach  assumes  that
those  responses are commensurable. The job characteristic in our data set
is measured as a dichotomous variable. This variable is used as an in-
dicator for the latent variable working conditions. To be able to estimate
a model in which endogenous variables are measured dichotomously, it  is
necessary  to obtain the reduced form, because we need an explicit expres-
sion for the joint probability that the  appropriate  dependent  variables
are  one or zero. In Appendix 5A the derivation of the reduced form of the
model is given. As in the previous two chapters  we  have used preferred
hours  as  the  appropriate endogenous hours variable. One main difference
with the previous chapters is that the wage equation is  estimated  simul-
taneous with the hours (and job characteristic) equation.
Only the OSA-sample contains information on  job  characteristics,
therefore  we  cannot  present estimates for the SEP-sample, unlike in the
previous chapters. Sample information is given in  Table 5.1. From this
table  it  can  be  seen  that about 62% of the males and about 75% of the
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females report to work in jobs with good working conditions. One would ex-
pect individuals working in jobs with good working conditions to work more
hours  per  week  than  individuals  working in jobs with bad working con-
ditions. This is true for all groups, except  for  single  males.  All
different  types  of individuals, except single females, earn more if they
work in nice jobs than if they work in jobs with bad  working  conditions.
This  is  probably  due to the fact that workers in nice jobs are also the
higher educated ones. One should  note  that  the  number  of  individuals
working  in jobs with bad working conditions is very small, especially for
single males and females, and to a lesser extent for females in  families.
Therefore, we should be careful with the interpretation of the estimation
results. Nevertheless, we present all estimation results in order to  keep
in  line with the previous chapters of this thesis. But main emphasis will
be put on the estimation results of the males in two-adult households.
The  first  columns  of  Tables  5.2  to  5.5  show results for an
Ordinary Least Squares Regression of wages on a vector  of  human  capital
variables  and  on a dummy variable for good working conditions. The dummy
equals one if the working conditions are good and  zero  otherwise,  which
means that the job characteristic is defined to be a "good". Following the
usual estimated wage differential literature, this equation  is  not  cor-
rected  for  selection  bias  (contrary  to the wage equation estimated in
Chapter 2). The results of the maximum likelihood estimation of the  stan-
dard  and  the extended models are presented in the other three columns of
the tables. As was discussed in Section 2, job choice was  assumed  to  be
exogenous in the standard model. This model consists of two equations, an
hours equation and a wage equation. In this way possible selection bias in
the  wage equation due to the selection of workers only, is taken care of.
In the extended model job choice was made endogenous, thus  extending  the
model  with a job choice equation and hence deleting selection bias due to
the self selection of individuals into different occupations.
Let US first turn to the estimation results of the males in
families. All coefficients in the first two columns have the usual signs
- the higher nonlabour income is the more leisure is prefered (Pl<0)
- the higher the family size the more the male works (611 0)
- the  linear wage effect on male hours is very small (71 is on its lower
bound 0.01)
-159-
- the higher one's education the higher one's wage rate (822<823<824)
- up to 50 years the higher one's age the higher one's wage rate. if one
gets older than fifty the wage rate starts decreasing (a31>0, 832<0)
- a technical education doesn't increase one's  wage  (a41<0)  but  an
economic one does (a42>0)
- Supervisors earn more than others (a5> ) and so do  individuals  working
in  private  firms, compared to individuals working in the civil service
(86 
Turning  to  the  interpretation  of  the  results in the last two
columns one should bear in mind that in  the  extended  model  the  budget
constraint  is  nonlinear  and that the estimated parameters are just par-
ticular parameters of the utility function and of the  budget  constraint.
For simplicity we will nevertheless mainly use conventional terminology to
describe the parameters. With respect  to  the  parameters  in  the  hours
equation  and  the wage equation the parameter estimates resemble those in
the first two columns. As expected there is a positive  income  effect  on
the demand for the job characteristic, B2<0, (this result is also found in
Atrostic (1982)). Individuals with a high  income  can  best  afford  non-
pecuniary  job  characteristics.  Age doesn't have a significant effect on
the demand for the commodity Z2 (i.e. the  amenity  of  a  job).  But  the
higher  one's  education  the higher the demand for Z2 (0<-622<-623<-624)'
This holds for both extended models, although the coefficients are  insig-
nificant in the Z2=q version.
For the other groups roughly the same results hold. Of course  for
females  the  coefficient for family size is negative in the labour supply
equation. On average the significant coefficients  are  relatively  stable
accross the different models, except the coefficient for education and the
estimated wage differential. It is striking to see that for all  different
groups of individuals the effect  of education on the demand for Z2 is
strongly positive and significant if Z2=hq, and insignificant if Z2=q. One
explanation  could be that it is not the job characteristic q but hours of
work (and thus also hq) that depends on the level of education.
Both  Atrostic (1982) and Killingsworth (1984) found that wage ef-
fects on male labour supply increased, when one went from  a  conventional
labour  supply  model that ignored differences in job characteristics to a
model in which such characteristics were treated as choice variables in  a
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demand  system.  There  is  a  slight  increase in the wage effects in our
models for males, and a large increase for married  females  in  the  Z2-q
version (see Table 5.6). This can also be concluded from the labour supply
curves in the Figures 5.4. 5.6 and 5.8.
For married males the estimated compensating wage differential (b)
in the OLS-regression and in the standard model is positive, but  insig-
nificant. In  much  empirical  research  on  wage differentials this same
phenomenon is found. According to the theory  of  compensating  wage  dif-
ferentials, one would expect a negative sign for this coefficient. However
it could be argued that the coefficient should not  be  interpreted  as  a
compensating  wage differential, but as a measure of the impact of omitted
variables, such as ability and motivation.  Whatever  the  interpretation,
the two estimates of this coefficient are biased if one believes that the
job characteristic is an endogenous variable. In the extended  model  with
Z2=hq  the  estimated  wage differential is also insignificant. In the ex-
tended model  with  Z2=q  however,  the  estimated  wage  differential  is
negative  and  significant.  Note that the interpretation of the wage dif-
ferential is slightly different in the extended model from the one in  the
standard model, since  b is the coefficient of the latent variable q and
not of the observed variable q. All other coefficients in the first column
have  the  usual  sign.  What  are  the implications of the estimates with
respect to the reservation wage differential? The  reservation  wage  dif-
ferential  is  the  amount of money that makes a representative individual
(someone with sample mean values for all variables and zero values for all
unobservables) indifferent  between work with good working conditions and
work with bad working conditions. The slope of the budget line in the  op-
timum  point  is  a usefull approximation. Married males are willing to
accept a pay cut of 6.6% in order to take a job with better  working  con-
ditions, according to the Z2=q specification.
For single males and females the coefficient b is insignificant in
all four models. This could be due to the small number of individuals
working in different types of jobs. For females in families, the estimated
wage  differential  is  positive  and  significant  implying  that females
working in jobs with good working conditions are better  paid  than  those
working  in  jobs with bad working conditions. The positive value of b can
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be more reasonably interpreted as the measurement of the impact of omitted
variables, such as motivation.
With respect to the simulated male hours distribution there is
hardly any difference between the three models (compare Figures  5.5,  5.7
and  5.9).  All  models  underpredict  the degree of nonparticipation. For
single females the same phenomenon can be seen. For  married  females  the
first  two  models  simulate the number of nonparticipants better than the
models described in earlier chapters. The Z2-q version,  however,  largely
overpredicts the number of nonparticipants. Adding the random term spreads
out the hours distribution, just as we have seen in the previous chapters.
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Table 5.1 Means of some main variables
males
single families
total q=0 q=1 total q=0 q=1
q           0.71      0         1         0.60      0         1
hp 35.8 38.3 34.8 38.7 38.4 38.9
w 15.7 13.5 16.5 16.0 14.7 16.8
N         111        32        79 799 316 483
females
single families
total q=0 q=1 total q=0 q=1
q           0.79      0         1         0.74      0         1
hp
32.8 30.7 33.4 24.5 24.4 24.6
w 13.5 14.3 13.3 12.5 11.6 12.8
N         127        27 100 318        84       234
where   q = 1 if the working conditions are good
= 0 if the working conditions are bad
N = number of working individuals
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Table 5.2 Estimation results for single malesa)
OLS Regression  Standard Model Extended Model
Z =hq Z2= 2
8 -1650(fixed) -1650(fixed) -1650(fixed)
6
10 35.0(0.8) 35.0(0.9) 32.5(4.2)
Bl -0.0002(0.0002) -0.0001(0.0002) -0.000001(1.b.)
6 3.7(3·5) 3.8(3.7) O.6(4.1)11
11 0.01(L.b.) 0.01(L.b.) 0.2(0·3)
5.9(0.4) 6.0(0.4) 6.0(0.3)







al -10.9(12.3) -11.1(21.5) -66.6(74.8) -9.4(19.9)
a22 -2.7(3.0) -2.7(5·3) 22.2(44.1) -3.0(6.4)
a23 1.
2(2.7) 1.2(3·5) 57.8(72.1) -4.9(3·8)
824
831
1.1(0.6) 1.1(1.1) 2.2(1.8) 1.3(1.0)
a32 -0·01(0.01) -0.01(0.01) -0.01(0.02) -0.01(0.02)
a41 1.0(1.6) 1.0(2.8) 1.0(2.6) 1.5(2.1)
a42 4.7(1.8) 4.6(2.4) 4.4(2.4) 5.2(1.9)
a
5
86 0.4(1.4) 0.4(1.7) 0.8(1.8) 0.8(1.8)
b 1.6(1.6) 1.5(2.8) -42.5(57·1) -0.5(3.7)
a 6.9(0.2) 6.6(0.3) 6.5(0.3) 6.0(0.3)W




log lik -360.5 -507·4 -563.2 -565.6
a) Standard errors in parentheses
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Table 5.3 Estimation results for single femalesa)
OLS Regression  Standard Model Extended Model
Z2=hq Z2= 
8 -355(fixed) -355(fixed) -355(fixed)
6
10 18.7(10.2) 34.2(6.1) 18.3(10.3)
Bl                        -0.0003(0.0001) -0.0004(0.0001) -0.000001(u.b.)
6 -5.6(2.8) -3.5(2.7) -9.4(2.9)11
11 1.2(0.8) 0.04(0.2) 1.2(0.7)
7.5(0.7) 7.7(0.7) 7.7(0.7)







al 6.8(7.2) 5.3(11.0) 0.7(12.0) 3.4(8.0)
a 1.3(2.3) 0.4(4.0) 7.4(10.4) 0.5(1.5)22
823 1.9(1.8) 0.6(3.5) 11.6(13.5) -1.8(3.7)
a24
a31
0.2(0.4) O.4(0.5) 0.6(0.5) 0.7(0.4)
a32 -0·002(0.01) -0.005(0.006) -0.005(0.006) -0.009(0.005)
841 2.2(2.9) 1.1(3.9) 2.1(3.8) 2.3(2.5)
a42 -0·5(1.4) -0.8(1.9) -0.5(1.9) -0.2(1.1)
a
5
a6 0.4(1.2) 0.3(1.9) 0.6(1.8) 0.02(1.1)
b -1.1(1.3) -O.4(1.9) -13.3(15.9) -1.3(1.4)
0 6.1(0.2) 5.9(0.3) 5.8(0.3) 6.1(0.3)W
e -0.24(0.13) -0.2(0.2) -0.3(0.1)hw
Phq 0.2(0.2) 0.2(0.2)
e -0.1(0.2) -0.1(0.2)wq
log lik -345.9 -588.5 -651.3 -657.2
a) Standard errors in parentheses
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Table 5.4 Estimation results for males in familiesa)
OLS Regression  Standard Model Extended Model
Z2=hq Z2= 
8 -1650(fixed) -1650(fixed) -1650(fixed)
6 34.7(2.0) 34.7(2.0) 43.9(5.8)10
Bl -0.002(0.001) -0.001(0.001) -0.0001(0.0001)
6                         2.0(0.7)11 2.1(0.7) -0.3(0.5)
11 0.01(L.b.) 0.01(1.b.) 0.2(0.3)









ai -1.9(3.0) -2.0(3.6) -0.5(4.2) -1.6(5.0)
a22 0.6(0.6) 0.6(0.8) 0.2(1.3) 4.3(2.2)
823 1.6(0.6) 1.7(0.7) 1.0(1.7) 7.0(2.8)
a24 4.9(0.6) 4.8(0.7) 3.5(3.0) 15·5(5.3)
a31
0.5(0.1) 0.5(0.2) 0.5(0.2) 0.4(0.2)
832 -0·005(0.002) -0.005(0.002) -0.005(0.002)  -0.003(0·003)
841 -0·1(0.4) -0.1(0.4) -0.2(0.4) -0.3(0.5)
a42 1.7(0.5) 1.7(0.5) 1.9(0.5) 2.3(0.7)
a 1.1(0.3) 1.2(0.3) 1.2(0.3) 1.3(0.3)5
a6 1.0(0.4) 1.1(0.4) 0.9(0.4) 1.0(0.4)
b 0.2(0.4) 0.2(0.5) 0.8(1.8) -6.6(3·2)
0 5.0(0.02) 5.0(0.1) 5.0(0.1) 5.0(0.1)W
 hw -0.1(0.04) -0.1(0.04) -0.1(0.04)
e 0.1(0.05) 0.1(0.05)hq
pwq 0.01(0.05) 0.02(0.05)
log lik -2150.5 -3396.6 -3865.8 -3861.6
a) Standard errors in parentheses
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Table 5.5 Estimation results for females in familiesa)
OLS Regression  Standard Model Extended Model
Z2=hq Z2= 
8 -355(fixed) -355(fixed) -355(fixed)
6 0.0(fixed) 0.0(fixed) 0.0(fixed)10
Bi -0.016(0.003) -0.000001(u.b.) -0.000001(u.b.)
6 -25.4(2.8) -11.3(1.2) -13.5(3.1)11
11 3.4(0.2) 4.1(0.3) 3.1(0.3)










al -6.4(3.2) -5.3(2.5) -1.8(1.6) -2.9(5·6)
a 1.0(0.7) 0.0(0.5) 0.3(0.2) -0.3(1.4)22
a23
1.5(0.6) 1.2(0.4) 1.1(0.2) 1.7(1.4)
a24 4.7(0.8) 3.6(0.5) 2.6(0.4) 5.7(2.1)
a31
0·9(0·2) 0.5(0.1) 0.2(0.1) -0.1(0.3)
832
-0·01(0.002) -0.01(0.002) -0.003(0.001) -0.003(0.003)
a41 -1.5(1.4) 0.1(1.3) -0.1(0.6) 0.3(4.7)
a42 0.8(0.7) -0.3(0.6) -0.0(0.5) -1.1(0.6)
a 0.0(0.5) 1.2(0.4) 0.9(0.3) 1.9(1.7)
5
86 -0.5(0.5) 4.0(0.4) 4.2(0.4) 7.5(1.8)
b 0.8(0.5) 2.5(0.4) 8.1(1.3) 11.6(3.6)
6 3.8(0.2) 4.6(0.2) 4.2(0.1) 4.5(0.1)W




log lik -770.6 -1157.8 -1349.1 -1215.7
a) Standard errors in parentheses
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Table 5.6 Wage elasticitiesa)
standard extended (Z2=hq) extended (Z2= )
singles families singles families singles families
3hm wm
Sw     h-              0
·00 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.00
m m
(0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.03) (0.13) (0.00)
3hf Wf
SiI  h;
0.51 1.64 0.01 1.64 0.51 2.37
(0.32) (0.34) (0.11) (0.08) (0.34) (1.59)
a) Standard errors in parentheses
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Figure 5.4 Labour supply curves, standard model (OSA)
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In  this  chapter  a structural model of job choice, labour supply
and wages has been developed. The household production  approach  provides
the theoretical background. An individual is assumed to maximize a utility
function with leisure, a nonpecuniary job characteristic  and  consumption
as arguments. Moreover  it  is  assumed that one's wage depends on human
capital variables and the characteristics of the job actually chosen. As a
result the wage rate is endogenous and the budget constraint is nonlinear.
The estimation results are not uniformly satisfactory. Except  for
the  married  males  the  number  of  individuals working in jobs with bad
working conditions is small. No strong conclusions can be drawn for  these
groups. According to the extended model with specification Z2=q the reser-
vation wage differential is 6.6 for married males. This implies  that  the
individual  is  prepared  to loose 6.6% of his real income to obtain a job
with better working conditions. This model yields estimation results  that
differ  in  sign and in magnitude from results obtained for models that do
not take into account the endogeneity of job choice. Therefore, analyses
of labour supply and wages that ignore the (self) selection of individuals
into different occupations, may produce misleading results.
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Appendix 5A Derivation of the reduced form
Specification Z2=hq
Starting from equations (5.33)-(5·36) the reduced form  of  this
model  is  very  easily  derived  by  dividing the expression of hq by the
expression of h. We then obtain the reduced form model we have estimated
h = Bli + 61 + Fla'k (
5A.1)
  =  -B2i - 62
+
Y29) / (Bli + 61 + Yla'k) (5A.2)
w = a'k + b(-B2I - 62 + 12b)/(Bli + 61 + Tla'k) (5A.3)
where   I= I+8+6la'k-62b+1/211(a'k)2+1/212b2 (5A.4)
Specification Z2=  
We start from the demand equations  in  the  goods  space  (5·58)-
(5.64). First we shall derive a reduced form quadratic equation in h only.
Given a solution for h, (5.59) immediately yields a solution  for  q,  and
thus for w. From (5·59) it follows that
bq = -bBZI  - b62+ hb212 (5A.5)
Rewriting (5·58) yields
(h - 61- 11(a'k + bq))  = i (5A.6)
B1
Substitution of equation (5A.6) into (5A.5) gives
bq=c +c (5A.7)2
b B2- B,b272








Substitution of equation (5A.7) into (5.58) yields a quadratic equation in
h
2d h  +d h+d =0 (5A.10)1 2 3





The two solutions of equation (5A.10) are
-d2 1 JDh = (5A.14)
2dl
where   D = d2 -
4dld3
(5A. 15)
Substitution of (5A.14) into (5.59) yields two solutions for the vector q,
corresponding  with  the  two  solutions for h, given in (5A.14). Equation
(5A.10) has a real solution if and only  if  the  discriminant  DZO.  This
restriction is imposed in estimation.
Some theoretical implications of utility  maximization  with  a  nonlinear
budget constraint
One condition that should hold for both specifications is that the
budget  curve is more convex than the indifference curve. Convexity of the
indifference curve is equivalent with concavity of the cost function. The
cost function corresponding to the indirect utility function given in
(5.28)-(5.29) or in (5.56)-(5.57) is
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C(I) = u.exp(-I'p) -8- 6'N - 1/2N'An (5A.16)
where u denotes the individual 's utility level and N is the price  vector.
Concavity of the cost function requires that
E= (I+8+ 6'n + 1/2N'AN)BB' -A (5A.17)
is  negative semi-definite. Assuming that A is positive definite, a neces-
sary condition for concavity is
(I    +   8   +    6 ' N    +    1/2TT'Arr )B'A-1 0   -    1    5 0 (5A.18)
Condition (5A.18), rewritten in terms of h, is checked in estimation.
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Appendix 5B The likelihood function
Standard model
The likelihood contribution of a working individual is:




'haw           h        w
The likelihood contribution of a nonworking, seeking individual is
h
LZ = * (5B.2)6
h
The likelihood contribution of a nonworking, nonseeking individual is
'3. ,I -2 2 1 (58.3)
Extended model
The likelihood contribution for working individuals with q' = 1 is
fl(h.w)0  fc(q| h.w
)dq (58.4)
where   fl is the marginal density of h and w
f  is the conditional density of q, given h and w
C
and for working individuals with q' = 0
fl(h,w)«  f(q| h.w)dq (58.5)
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Equation (5B.4) can be written explicitly as
t.3 = Ll , [ -2  j                                            (58.6)
-
, ho_                   0r w -wl
where   Aq= 6+[  --8r  (phq-ehwewq)+  -3   J(pwq-phwphq)1/(1-e w)   (58.7)
W
6 = 1- ( e q+ e q-2phwphqpwq)/(1-p w) (58.8)
Likewise we can write equation (5B.5) as
-K




The likelihood contribution of a nonworking, seeking individual is
h
L5 = * (58.10)C
h
The likelihood contribution of a nonworking, nonseeking individual is
-h





In the preceding chapters various models  of  labour  supply  were
presented. In this chapter we will in addition model demand side restric-
tions, although in a simple way. Our starting point is an  individual  (no
household) utility function that leads to a linear labour supply equation.
Neither preference  formation  nor  job  characteristics  nor  the  social
security and welfare system are taken into account.
As  we  have  seen  in  the  preceding chapters the simulated
distribution of hours in general fits the actual data on hours poorly. One
reason for the bad fit of the hours distribution could be the invalid as-
sumption  of a fixed wage rate. Moffitt (1984), among others, extended the
standard neoclassical labour supply model by  making  the  wage  rate  en-
dogenous  and found significant effects of hours of work on the wage rate,
leading to an S-shaped budget constraint.  This  was  in  support  of  the
hypothesis  put forward by Barzel (1973). namely that the marginal produc-
tivity (and thus the marginal wage rate)  eventually  declines  at  higher
number  of  working  hours.  Rosen  (1976) argued that the wage rate might
depend on the number of working hours, due to the fact  that  there  exist
different  markets for jobs with varying numbers of hours. And there is no
reason that the market for full time jobs will clear at the same wage rate
as  the  market  for  part time jobs. Especially in The Netherlands, where
there is a growing interest in part time jobs. mainly by women, this might
be an important consideration. Another reason for making the net wage rate
dependent on hours of work is the progressive tax system.
Although  the  model  with  hours dependent wages fitted the hours
distribution better than the standard Tobit model (Moffitt (1984), Tummers
and  Woittiez (1989)), the assumption of fixed wage rates does not seem to
be the only invalid assumption. More important in this respect is the  as-
sumption  that  individuals  can  freely  choose  the number of hours they
prefer to work. If the diversity of the offered  hour  packages  is  large
enough. if workers have complete information about job opportunities, and
if they are mobile between jobs, they will choose the job with exactly the
number  of  hours they prefer. If workers are not perfectly mobile, for
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example, they may not be able to work their preferred number  of  hours.
From  the available job opportunities they will choose the number of hours
yielding highest utility. To our knowledge the first study to  estimate  a
model  with hours restrictions on micro data is by Moffitt (1982). The way
we have incorporated hours restrictions is largely based on an article  by
Dickens and Lundberg (1985). They present a model in which individuals may
face constraints on their number of working hours. Their model is  set  up
as a discrete choice model, in which each worker can choose from a limited
number of job offers, with fixed numbers of hours. However, they  assumed
the  wage  rate to be fixed. In this chapter we build a model which incor-
porates both  hours restrictions and hours dependent wages. By taking into
account the availability of jobs with different numbers of hours and hours
dependent wages we take a first step in the direction  of  modelling  both
the supply side and the demand side of the labour market.
In Section 6.2 we present a model with both hours restrictions and
hours  dependent wages. Hours  restrictions are incorporated by assuming
that employers offer jobs with a fixed number of hours. Workers  face  the
market distribution of these  employment opportunities. An individual
chooses the  number  of  hours  corresponding  with  that  one  among  the
available  job  offers  that  yields  highest utility. Notice that the in-
dividual is still a  utility  maximising person, although  he  maximises
utility  on a subset of all possible numbers of hours. This subset can be
empty, because the number of job offers is a random variable of which zero
is  one  of  the  possible outcomes. Consequently, the model distinguishes
between voluntary and involuntary unemployment. Wages are made  endogenous
by  specifying  a wage equation in which the wage rate depends on hours of
work and squared hours of work. In Section 6.3 estimation results will  be
presented  and  we  discuss the improvement of fit of the model extension.
Section 6.4 concludes.
6.2 The model
In this section we will first point out in what way hours restric-
tions  can  be  incorporated in a standard labour supply model and then we
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discuss the implications of dropping the assumption  that  wages  are  in-
dependent of hours  of work. For notational ease subscripts referring to
individuals are omitted.
- Incorporation of hours restrictions
In contrast with the previous chapters  we  use  a  labour  supply
equation  that  is  linear  in  wages.  The  main  advantage of the linear
specification is its computational simplicity. The obvious disadvantage is
that the specification is less flexible. Starting point of the analysis is
the following direct utility function (see Hausman (1980). Moffitt (1984))
B(h-X&-Eh-BY)
log(U(h,y)) = -log(r-Bh) - (6.1)
(1-Bh)
where
h = working hours
y = disposable income
X = vector of individual characteristics such as age and family
size
sh= random variable, representing unobserved tastes for work
7, B and 6 are parameters
3->0, 8<0
The restrictions y>O and B<0 are sufficient conditions for quasi-concavity
of the utility function.
Maximizing the utility function (6.1) subject to a  linear  budget
constraint yields a linear labour supply function
h=BI+Tw + X6+Eh (6.2)
where
I = nonlabour income
w = wage rate
The error term Eh is a parameter of the utility function and hence is  as-
sumed to represent unobserved tastes for work.  It  cannot represent
measurement errors. The wage equation is specified as
-183-
2
w = Zy + bh + ch  + E (6.3)W
where
Z = vector of individual characteristics relevant for one's
productivity, such as age and education
E  = error term
W
7, b, and c are parameters
The error term E can be interpreted as a measurement error or as unob-
W
served wage determinants such as ability.
We assume
. .   . . .          I.
2
6                0             6
h                     h     ehwah6w
- N                          2                          (6.4)
6  0 Phw h w  w- W- -- --
In  estimation net wages are used, since individual labour supply is based
on net wages rather than gross wages. By using net wages we implicitly es-
timate  the tax system in the wage equation. In other words the wage-hours
curvature may be due to tax-related nonlinearities. On the other hand
gross wages should be used in estimating the demand side wage equation and
then the hours-wage curvature is only due to non-tax  related  things.  In
modelling labour supply adjusting for both income taxes and hours restric-
tions, we refer to Van Soest, Woittiez, Kapteyn (1989).
If  b  and  c are equal to zero, the wage rate is fixed and we are
dealing with a linear budget constraint. Then the labour  supply  function
given  in  (6.2)  follows from maximizing the utility function (6.1). When
the wage equation (6.3) is substituted into the budget constraint
y = wh + I (6.5)
a nonlinear budget constraint results
y = hZY + bh  + ch3 + I + hE (6.6)W
Maximizing the utility function (6.1) subject  to  the  budget  constraint
(6.6)  yields a nonlinear first order condition in the form of a third or-
der polynomial in h. Estimation of this model would require analytical  or
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numerical  solutions to this cubic equation in h. But as will be explained
presently we reformulate the model as a discrete choice problem  in  which
utility  is  compared  between  a  finite  number  of points of the budget
constraint ( 0, hl' h2'...' hm). Therefore it suffices to know  the  exact
specification of the utility function.
We suppose an individual is restricted in his  choice  of  working
hours,  due  to  a lack of information or a lack of mobility. If it is as-
sumed that employers offer jobs with fixed  numbers  of hours, then the
worker  has to choose from a finite set of jobs, offering fixed numbers of
hours. Since working zero hours is always possible, it will be treated  as
a  special  case. Let us assume that the market distribution of job offers
is the same for all workers, such that the probability  of  a job offer,
which involves h (00) working hours is:
Pr(job offer h=hl) = P • 1-1,...,m (6.7)
So  we assume that there are m different values of working hours hl>0. And
there is always the option of working zero hours. Then the  labour  supply
decision becomes a discrete choice out of, let us say, N job offers, drawn
from this market distribution of offers, and not working. If the number of
job  offers, N, approaches  infinity, this model becomes a model without
hours restrictions, see Appendix 6A. In that case the  worker's  behaviour
can  be  described by a discrete choice model in which all possible values
of hours are available:
h = h    iff U(h ,y ) > U(h 'yk)   k=0....,m  and ktj (6.8)
where U is specified by equations (6.1) and (6.6)
The  index  k covers the whole range of possible values of hours. However,
if individuals  face a limited choice of all job offers, then the index  k
only  covers  the  range of job offers received and zero. One way to model
this restricted choice problem is to write down all possible sets  of  job
offers,  with corresponding probabilities that an individual will get such
a set of offers. Then the probability of observing h. hours of work is the
3
sum over all sets of the probability that h. hours is preferred to all job
3
offers in a specific set, times the probability of occurence of that  set.
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Although this way of modelling is appealing for its conceptual simplicity,
it is computationally cumbersome. We will therefore use a different, al-
though equivalent approach. In Appendix 6A the two methods are written out
explicitly. The idea of the approach we use is that an individual is  only
observed  to work h. hours if he received at least one job offer h. and if
3                                                                             3
he preferred this job  offer  to  all  the other, different, offers he
received  and to not working. The individual is observed as a nonworker if
he preferred zero hours to all job offers he received.
Given the values of the two random variables E and € it is pos-h      w
sible to construct a  set  J.  consisting  of  all job offers  preferred
3




Notice once more that h=0 is not treated as a job
offer. The set J  u {h }
contains  all  possible job offers an individual.could have received if h.
3
is observed. If this individual would have received an offer that does not
belong  to J  u {h }, he would
have preferred that offer, and he would not
have been observed to work h  hours. Define Q  as the probability that one
draw  out  of  the  market  distribution of job offers will yield an offer
which is less
preferred than the h  chosen, i.e.
the offer is in  the  set
3.
3
Qi=  I Pl (6.10)
"  ht€Jj
Then  the  probability  of observing h.h. (h.00) if N job offers have been3     3
received can be written as
N    N
Rj = (Qj + pj)  - Qj    if U(hj.y(hj);eh'Ew)>U(0.7(0) ;Sh'Ew)
(6.11)
=0 otherwise
The first line in equation (6.11) describes the probability that  the  in-
dividual only received offers which he preferred less than h. and that at
3
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least one job offer was h=h . This is equivalent to saying that  this  in-
dividual  drew  N times a job offer out of J  u  h } (i.e. (Q  + p )N) but
that he did not draw offers only out  of  J.  (Q.).  The  second  line  in
3      3
equation  (6.11) says that if zero is preferred to h  then the probability
of observing hj is zero, since zero is always available.






Q  is the probability that the N job offers are preferred less  than  h-0.
In this model there are four sources of randomness, namely:
- Sh, representing stochastic preferences
- Ew, representing measurement errors in the wage equation
- N, the number of job offers
- the number of hours offered.
Recall that so far all formulas have  been derived, conditional on the
values  of  Gh  and  s .  Removing the conditioning on Ew is equivalent toW
taking into account the wage equation, and formulating a joint  hours-wage
probability. This is postponed to the next subsection.
The way  to  remove  the  conditioning  on  the  unobserved  taste
parameter  £h'  is  to  integrate it out. In doing so, one should remember
that the probability R  is also conditional on the value of sh.  Then  the
likelihood of observing h=hj hours given sw' can be written as
L(h=hj|Ew) = 7 9(Eh ew)Rj(eh) dEh (6.13)
-=
where p is the normal density function of sh given ew.
It is clear that J., the set of job offers less preferred than h.,3                                                                      3
is  a  step function in Eh' because only discrete values of hours are con-
sidered. Step changes occur  at Eh=ejk' i.e. when Eh takes on such a value
that working hj hours yields the same utility as working h c hours. See the
Appendix  for the exact formula of e.. . For values of Eh between e andJk                            jk
ejk-1           J
the set J.(k) remains the same. J.(k) is defined as J. (equation 6-
.9) for ejk-1<Eh< ejk. Switching from integrals to sums,  we  can  rewrite
(6.13) as follows
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R (0) = Pr( h=hj| sh< e.  E )JO' W
Rj(k) = Pr( h=hj| ejk-1<Eh< ejk'ew)' k=l....,m
R (rest) = Pr( h=hj| sh> ejm'Ew)
For details on (6.14), the reader is referred to Appendix 6A.
Until now, we have taken the number of job offers, N, to be fixed.
But  as  mentioned in the introduction, in order to be able to capture the
possibility of involuntary unemployment, we make N  stochastic.  The  only
difference  with  the  formulas above is that we have to take expectations
with respect to the number of job offers
Nmax
L'(h=hj|sw) =   I L(h=hj|ew'N)-p(N) (6.15)
N=0
where
L' is the likelihood when N is a random variable
L is given in equation (6.14)
Nmax is the maximum number of job offers
p is a discrete probability distribution.
Because L(h=0|Ew·N-0)=1 (see formula (6.12)), equation (6.15) turns into
Nmax
L'(h=0|sw) = P(0) +  I L(h=0|sw•N)·p(N) (6.16)
N=1
for nonworkers. So not working is either explained by the fact that an in-
dividual didn't receive any job offers  at  all  (p(0))  or  because  he
preferred not working while he received N>0 job offers (second term).




L'(h=hj|ew) =  I L(h=hj|sw'N)·p(N) (6.17)
N=1
for workers.
With respect to identification of the model the following comments
are  in order. In  the case of no hours restrictions, the parameters are
known to be identifiable if the Z-vector in equation  (6.3)  contains  one
variable  not  in  the X-vector in equation (6.1) (Moffitt (1984)). Adding
hours restrictions makes it much more complex. We observe the joint sample
of hourly wages and actual hours of work. This joint observed distribution
is assumed to be generated by the distribution of budget constraints, the
distribution  of  preferences and the distribution of job offers. Clearly,
if we do not assume  functional  forms  for  the  budget  constraint,  the
utility  function  and  the job offer distribution, we cannot identify the
parameters in the model. The main identifying assumption is that  the  as-
sumed  functional form of the job offer distribution is different from the
functional form of the preferred hours distribution. Moreover the job  of-
fer  distribution does not depend on individual characteristics, while the
preferred hours distribution does. Although  we  realize  that  the  iden-
tifying  assumptions  are  strong,  we  believe  that  the  model as it is
provides one sensible, among  many possible, interpretation of labour
market behaviour. The economics behind the hours restrictions model can be
seen as follows. For many individuals in The Netherlands preferred hours
seem  to  be lower than actual hours worked (Kapteyn and Woittiez (1989)).
Part of the explanation of this fact can be found in  mandatory  overtime.
But  surely  part of it is due to the fact that full time jobs are largely
overrepresented and part time jobs are  relatively scarce. This may be
caused  by  fixed  costs  that  may make employers favourable to full time
jobs. And it might be impossible for the employer  to  lower  the  offered
wage  for  part  time jobs, since wages are tied to a certain type of job.
Other interpretations of the job offer distributions could  be  unobserved
wage  variation,  measurement error, fixed costs at the supply side of the
labour market or unobserved preference variation. If unobserved preference
variation  is  the explanation for the peaked hours distribution, then the
random error term must be multinomial distributed. But it seems realistic
to  assume  that unobserved preference variation is smooth and not peaked.
And this would make the unobserved preference variation implausible. Fixed
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costs  for  the  individual  could  explain the small portion of part-time
jobs, since it generates a horizontal budget constraint at  low  hours  of
work (Moffitt (1984)). But it provides no explanation for the other spikes
in the hours distribution at 20 and 32 hours per week. It  could  be  just
measurement  error that makes actual hours differ from preferred hours. If
the estimated job offer distribution would have been smooth, this might be
a  plausible interpretation. But we don't think that a peaked distribution
could be  sensibly  explained  as  measurement error. Unobserved  fringe
benefits that are greater for full time jobs than for part time jobs could
lead to few people working part time. But once again it cannot provide  an
explanation for the spikes at 20 and 32 hours per week. Finally one remark
with respect to the identification of the parameter Nmax, the maximum num-
ber  of job offers an individual receives. If Nmax=1 the model describes a
take-it-or-leave-it decision. For large  values  of  Nmax  the job offer
distribution  (p's)  and  the  number of job offers (N) introduce the same
kind of flexibilty and identification becomes troublesome.
- Formulation of the joint wage-hours model
As yet the model has been derived conditional on Ew.  The  removal
of  this conditioning amounts to adding the wage equation to the model and
formulating the joint probability of observing h. hours of  work  and  the
3
corresponding  wage  rate w. For  workers  the  joint probability can be
defined as
L'(h=h .w) = L'(h=h |sw) L.'(Ew=w - Zy - bhj - chj) (6.18)
The first term of this probability is given in equation (6.15).  For  non-
workers  equation  (6.18) has to be adapted, since for nonworkers the wage
rate is not observed. Therefore, the unobservable wage rate  must  be  in-
tegrated out, which results in a similar likelihood of observing h=0 as in
equations (6.14) and (6.16)
Nmax
L'(h=0) = p(0) +   I[ Pr( u< uol) RO(1) +
N=1
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I {Pr( uOk-1<u< uok) RO(k)}
+ (6.19)
k=2
Pr( u> ulm) RO(rest)]·p(N)
where uok = eok + Yew is the new limit of integration similar to e SeeOk'
Appendix 6A for further details.
6.3 Estimation Results
The model is described by equations (6.1). (6.3). (6.5) and (6.8);
the exact specification of the likelihood function is  found  in  Appendix
6A. The number of hours in this model is assumed to be a discrete variable
with 4-hour intervals, i.e. 0, 4, 8 etc. Naturally the  actual  number  of
hours  worked  and  not  the  preferred number of hours is used as the en-
dogenous hours variable. For the hours  variable  is  interpreted  as  the
outcome  of the interplay between preferred hours and demand side restric-
tions. In estimating the model net wages are used.
In  Tables  6.1-6.4 estimation results are presented for males and
females in the OSA-sample and in the SEP-sample, respectively. The first
and third columns show results for the model without hours restrictions
and with fixed wages (i.e. in the wage equation the wage is not  dependent
on  hours of work). In principle, this is a standard hours-wage model with
a linear budget constraint. The second and fourth columns of  Tables  6.1-
6.4  correspond  with  the  model sketched above. We have classified hours
into eight groups, with different  probabilities  of  being  drawn.  These
probabilities  are  indicated  in  the  tables  by p's. For example, the
probability of receiving a job offer of 4 hours a week equals P4. The num-
ber  of  job  offers  N  is  a  random variable and is assumed to follow a
binomial distribution B(PN'Nmax), where Nmax has  been  fixed  at  15.  In
Tummers  and  Woittiez  (1989)  the model has been estimated for different
values of Nmax. Their results show that the expected number of job offers
(P Nmax)  remains the same, and that the values of the log likelihoods are
close for Nmax=10 and 15. The log likelihood value for  Nmax=3  is  lower.
Apparently Nmax must be large enough to provide enough flexibility.
Let US now turn to the estimation results. Comparing the
likelihoods  of  column  one and two with each other, and of columns three
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and four, we can conclude that the joint hypothesis of the  wage  indepen-
dence  of  hours of work and no hours restrictions can be rejected. In the
model with hours restrictions the hours coefficients  b  and c are in
general  insignificant, but in Tummers and Woittiez it is shown that their
joint effect is significant, although less so than in  the  model  without
hours restrictions.
One should bear in mind that in the case of the  nonlinear  budget
constraint  the labour supply equation is a cubic equation in h. Therefore
we have to be very careful when we compare the  values  of  the  estimated
parameters in this case with the values in the linear case. We can see
that for all versions of the model, the female labour supply curve is for-
ward bending (7>0) and the male labour supply curve is inelastic. This can
also be seen from Tables 6.5 and 6.6 which present wage  elasticities.  It
is  most  interesting  to note that all wage elasticities are lower in the
extended model than in the standard model. See also Figures  6.1  to  6.4.
Nonlabour income has a negative effect on hours of work for both males and
females. Family size has a positive effect on the male labour supply and
a  negative  effect  on  the  female  labour  supply.  Turning to the wage
equation, we notice that education has a positive effect on wages and that
wages increase with age until about 50 to 60 years.
The estimated  value  of  PN'  the  parameter  in  the job offer
distribution, is  higher for males than for females. Males in families in
the OSA-sample and single males in the SEP-sample all receive the  assumed
maximum of 15 job offers, while single males in the OSA-sample and married
males in the SEP-sample receive around 3 job offers. The  reason  for  the
big  difference  in  the number of job offers received between the various
groups can only  be  explained  by  an  identification  problem.  This  is
probably  due to the lack of variation in hours worked. Females receive on
average about 3 or 4 job offers. Like for males, most job offers involve
40 hours per week or more. However, preferences are such that these offers
will be rarely accepted. In Figures 6.5 through  6.8  hours  distributions
are  drawn  for each version of the model. From Figures 6.5 and 6.6 we ob-
serve that the models without hours restrictions do not predict the actual
hours distribution very well (see also previous chapters). The models miss
the peaks at 20, 32 and 40 hours. By including more flexibility through  a
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nonlinear  budget constraint and hours restrictions, both the underpredic-
tion of the nonworking and the overprediction of the inviduals working low
hours are reduced.
It is interesting to take a  closer  look  at  how  the  simulated
degree  of  nonparticipation  has  been achieved. Let us concentrate on
married females in the OSA-sample. In Table 6.7 the actual, simulated, and
preferred hours distribution generated by the model are presented as well
as the job offer distribution. The third column suggests that only 7. 7% of
the females prefer not working to any other number of hours. The remaining
51.2% of the predicted nonparticipation must be due to restrictions on the
demand  side. A large number of women. 75.1%, prefer to work between 4 and
20 hours per week. But jobs requiring such low number of hours are  rarely
offered. This  could  for  example be explained by the existence of fixed
costs to the employer for each seperate employee.
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Table 6.1 Estimation results for males, OSAa)
single males males in families
Standard Extended Standard Extended Model
6 38.7(1.7) 35·3(1.1) 41.8(0.9) 39.2(1.6)10
B    -0.0001(0.0001) -0.0002(0.0001) -0.004(0.001) -0.000001(1.b.)
1
6 4.9(3.1) 10.5(2.0) 0.9(0.7) 1.8(1.2)
11
Yl 0.01(0.11












0.6(0.4) 0.6(0.2) 0.7(0.1) 0.8(0.1)
a32
-0·005(0.005) -0.005(0.003) -0.007(0.002)  -0.009(0.002)
b 0(fixed) 0.3(0.1) 0(fixed) -0.2(0.2)
c 0(fixed) -0.003(0.002) 0(fixed) 0.0002(0.002)
6 4.7(0.3) 4.3(0.3) 4.8(0.1) 4.6(0.1)
W












log lik -603·0 -544.0 -3977.8 -3646.4
a) Standard errors in parentheses
u.b. = upper bound, t.b. = lower bound
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Table 6.2 Estimation results for females, OSAa)
single females females in families
Standard Extended Standard Extended Model
6 25(fixed) 25(fixed) 8.6(9.7) 21.3(3.7)10
Bl      -0.0010(0.0001)  -0.0008(0.0002) -0.012(0.004)  -0.007(0.002)
6 -2.9(3.2) -2.5(3.9) -48.6(3·2) -23.9(4.6)11
T1 1.1(0.1) 1.0(0.4) 4.6(0.7) 2.3(0.6)
ah 13.2(0.9) 7.0(3.3) 28.3(2.5) 10.0(2.5)
al -2.6(4.5) -0.6(5.4) -4.2(2.8) 2.6(3.3)
a22 0.3(1.4) 1.5(1.5) 0.2(0.5) 0.2(0.5)
a23
0.7(1.1) 1.5(1.2) 1.7(0.4) 2.0(0.5)
a24 2.2(1.2) 3.0(1.3) 4.4(0.6) 5.4(0.7)
831
0.8(0.2) 0.6(0.3) 0.9(0.1) 0.7(0.2)
832
-0·009(0·003) -0.007(0.003) -0.012(0.002) -0.010(0.002)
b 0(fixed) 0.2(0.2) 0(fixed) -0.1(0.1)
c 0(fixed) -0.005(0.002) 0(fixed) 0.000(0.001)
6 4.3(0.3) 4.0(0.3) 3.9(0.2) 3.9(0.2)W









log lik -710.0 -633.1 -2109.9 -1961.2
a) Standard errors in parentheses
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Table 6.3 Estimation results for males, SEP  
single males males in families
Standard Extended Standard Extended Model
6 36.1(1.6) 31.3(1.7) 39.0(1.2) 34,1(1.3)10
Bl -0.012(0.006) -0.000001(u.b) -0.011(0.001) -0.005(0.001)
6 4.7(3.7) 3.5(2.7) 2.3(0.9) 2.9(0.9)11
11 0.01(1.b.) 0.01(1.b.) O.08(0.03) 0.01(1.b.)
ah 13.5(0.9) 10.6(1.0) 8.7(0.2) 3.2(0.5)
al 3.0(4.3) 6.4(5·3) 1.8(2.5) 1.1(4.2)
822 1.9(1.0) 2.0(1.0) 1.1(0.5) 1.0(0.5)
823
3.1(0.9) 3.2(0.9) 2.3(0.4) 2.2(0.4)
a24 4.7(1.0) 4.7(1.0) 6.5(0.5) 6.0(0.5)
831
0.4(0.2) 0.4(0.2) 0.4(0.1) 0.4(0.1)
a32
-0·004(0.003) -0.004(0.003) -0.004(0.001)  -0.003(0.001)
b 0(fixed) O.04(0.19) 0 ( fixe.d) 0.1(0.1)
c 0(fixed) -0.004(0.003) 0(fixed) -0.002(0.002)
6 3.4(0.3) 3.4(0.3) 4.1(0.1) 4.1(0.1)
W









log lik -622.3 -502.4 -4496.8 -3732.9
a) Standard errors in parentheses
u.b. = upper bound, 1.b. = lower bound
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Table 6.4 Estimation results for females, SEP
a)
single females females in families
Standard Extended Standard Extended Model
6 -64.4(44.2) -28.8(22.1) -27.5(18.6) 5.0(3.8)10
B -0.05(0.01) -0.01(0.01) -0.005(0.004)  -0.00001(0.002)
1
6 -4.1(4.6) -3.4(2.8) -46.4(3.4) -15.7(2.5)11
11 7.9(3.4) 4.3(1.7) 5.9(1.
3) 2.2(0.1)
ch 29.7(10.8) 15'3(5.8) 40.4(
5.9) 12.3(1.0)
a 1.8(4.6) 2.4(6.0) -3.2(3.8) 4.0(2.6)
1
822 O.4(0.5) -0.1(0.4) -0.3(0.4)
-0.1(0.4)
823




0·6(0.2) O.4(0.3) 0.9(0.2) 0.6(0.1)
832
-0·007(0·003) -0.005(0.004) -0.012(0.003)  -0.008(0.002)
b 0(fixed) 0.11(0.05) 0(fixed) -0.18(0.05)
c 0(fixed) -0.0008(0.0007) 0(fixed) 0.003(0.001)
6 3.0(0.3) 3.0(0.3) 4.8(0.2) 4.6(0.2)
W










log lik -447.6 -376.5 -2138.4 -2021.9
a) Standard errors in parentheses
-197-
Table 6.5 Wage elasticities, standard modela)
OSA SEP
singles families singles families
Bh  w
e hm 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03m m
(0.19) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02)
ahf wr
S  4 0.43 3.35 3.48 7.09
(0.04) (1.74) (3.15) (7.08)
a) Standard errors in parentheses
Table 6.6 Wage elasticities, extended modela)
OSA SEP
singles families singles families
3hm wm
Sw     h- 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00m m
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ahf we
Sw; 4
0.27 1.85 2.76 1.84
(0.17) (0.85) (2.32) (0.34)
a) Standard errors in parentheses
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Figure 6.1 Labour supply curves, standard model (OSA)
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Table 6.7 Actual, simulated and preferred hours distributions,
probabilities x 100, married females, OSA
hours actual simulated preferred offered
0 59·75 59.12 7.73
4 1.64 2.40 10.19 0.85
8 3.27 2.56 16.00 0.85
12 2.39 2.58 18.51 0.85
16 2.52 2.47 16.85 0.85
20 5.16 5.29 13·48 2.20
24 3.40 2.47 9.45 1.10
28 1.01 2.03 5.15 1.10
32 5.16 5.19 2.00 3.76
36 2.64 2.66 0.54 2.76
40 10.57 10.57 0.09 25·36
44 1.51 1.47 0.01 11.92
48 0.38 0.50 0.00 9.72
52 0.50 0.21 0.00 9.72
56 0.00 0.08 0.00 9.72
60 0.13 0.03 0.00 9.72
64 0.00 0.00 0.00 9.72
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6.4 Conclusion
A full simultaneous model of labour supply and wage  determination
with hours restrictions is estimated. That is, the possibility that an in-
dividual is faced with the limited availability of  jobs  with  different,
distinct,  numbers  of  hours has been incorporated. Moreover, it has been
taken into account that the wage rate may be  dependent on the  number  of
working hours. This leads to a nonlinear budget constraint.
Incorporating hours restrictions and hours  dependent  wages  into
the  standard  labour supply-wage model produces a better approximation of
the actual hours distribution. This model may  be  a  natural  first  step
towards confronting labour supply with the demand side.
One of the limitations of this model is that it is static. In the
future the model  could  be  extended  with job offers that  arrive
consecutively. Another drawback of this study is that the  hours  restric-
tions  are  imposed  by  a  distribution  of  job offers, common to all
individuals. Further research requires a more structural specification  in
this respect, to  account  for  differences  in employment opportunities
across individuals. Furthermore, the social security  and  welfare  system
could be considered explicitly in describing the budget constraint.
-208-
Appendix 6A The expression for e and the likelihood function
jk
Let  us  first give the exact specification of the ejk's, i.e. the
value of 611 for which utility in h  equals utility in h c.  After  that  we
will  give  an  alternative and probably less efficient formulation of our
model. Then the entire model we have estimated will be given, and we  will
show that the standard model is a special case of the extended model.
The values ejk follow from equating utility between points h   and
hk,    satisfying the budget constraint.
U(hj,yj) = U(hk'Vk) (6A.1)
Using equation (6.1) and substituting equation (6.6) gives
B(h.-X6-e'k-BYj) B(hk-X&-e  -By )




where   y. = h.Zy + bh: + ch .+I+h.E
33 33 J w
yk=hkzy + bh  + ch +I+hk£w
Simple calculations give the solution for ejk
Cy-Bhj )(r-Bhk)
-                                    log( (3  -  Bhk)/(7  -  Bhj))   +
ejk -   B2(hk-hj)
2   9(Bh.-r)(bh +ch )  -  (Bhk-r)(bhj+chi)
+ (6A.3)
(hk-hj)
r/B - X6 - BI - TZY - Yew
- ujk - rEw (6A.4)
In Moffitt (1984) a general rule is derived for which h=h  is preferred to
all other, discrete, numbers of hours
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max e. <E < min eik  v
k0j (6A.5)
k<j  Jk  h  k>j  v
Rule  (6A.5)  expresses a choice h=h. in an appropriate range of values of
3
the unobserved tastes for work, Eh. A higher value of eh corresponds to  a
greater  taste for work and a lower value of sh to a lesser taste for work
(see equation (6.2)). Then the rule says that the value of eh  has to be
higher  than  all  those values ejk equating utility between the choice h 
and lower number of working hours (h cl<h ) and has to be  lower  than  all
those  values ejk equating utility between the choice h  and higher number
of working hours (h ch>h ). This means  that  the  indifference  curve  for
which  the  choice (h ,y ) results needs to be flatter (i.e. higher £11) in
point (h ,y ) than those indifference curves connecting point (h ,y ) with
points  (hkl'ykl)  (lower number of working hours) and needs to be steeper
(i.e. lower eh in point (h ,y ) than those indifference curves  connecting
point    (h ,y ) with points    (h h' Ykh (higher number of working hours) .   This
is illustrated in Figure 6A.1.
YT
IC= ejkl
Ykh -  -
Yj - -    -      1   -       -
7kl- -    ----    - -    r - - - -    -        I
 
c . ejkh
hkh             h                 h                  +hj                 kl
Figure 6A.1 The choice hj if max ejk<Eh< min ejk
k<j k>j
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Having  this  rule  for eh and eh being normally distributed we can define
probabilities for choice h. if the choice set  consists  of  all  possible
3
numbers of working hours h c'  k=0,... *m.
But if there is a limited number of job offers, so  that  individuals
cannot  choose freely their optimum number of hours, we have to write down
all possible sets of job offers, and their probability  of  occurring.  In
writing down the probability of observing h. hours, we are only interested3 N-1 r
I
m-1 1
in the sets with at least one
offer h . There are S=I  '  i  J+1  num-i=l L
ber  of  these  sets, to be called V.(s). Remember that N is the number of
3
job offers and m is the number of possible positive distinct  hours.  Then
the  probability of observing h. hours in the set V.(s) is the probability
3                              3
of occurence of the set V.(s) times the probability that h. is preferred3                                                  3
to  all  other numbers of hours in the set V.(s). The likelihood of obser-
3
ving h=h  hours, given Ew' is the sum of the probability of  observing  h 
in the set V.(s) over all s
3
S
L(h=hj|sw)= I Pr[max ejk<sh< min ejklhk€Vj(s).ew]Pr[Vj=Vj(s)]  (6A.6)
S=1 k<j k>j
We can see that in this way of modelling, determination of the probability
of observing h. is the same as looking for the appropriate range of values3
of €h, for all possible sets containing the offer h=h .
Instead of this formulation, we could also look for an appropriate
set, for all possible values of eh. This is nothing else than changing the
order  of integration. We have now come to the formulation of the model we
have estimated, except for the fact that the number of job offers is still
fixed
L(h=hj|ew) = Pr(h=hj|sh< ejo,Ew) Pr(eh< ejolew) +
m
I Pr(h=hj lejk-1<sh< ejk'Ew)Pr(ejk-1<6h< ejklew) (6A.7)
k=1
+ Pr(h=hj | Eh> ejm,Ew)Pr(Eh>ejm|Ew)
Remember that
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Pr(h=h |e <E < e E ) = R.(k)
j  jk-1 h jk' w     J
N    N
where  R (k) = (Q  + p )  - Qj     if U(hj,y(hj);Eh,Ew)>U(O,y(0);Gh'ew)
=0 otherwise
Implicit  in  this  probability  is  the assumption that the individual is
still a utility maximising person, because the set Jj (6.9) generating the
probability  Q.  only encloses job offers less preferred than the revealed3
choice hj. Equation (6A.7) can be written explicitly as
For all h00 and h#hm
j-1
L(h=hj|ew) = I {[*(ejk) - *(e   )] R.(k)} +
k=1
jk-1    J
[*(e ) - $(e.. .)] R.(j+1) +
jj+1 J J-1    J
(6A.8)
I  {[*(ejk) - *(ejk-1)] Rj(k)} +
k=j+2
[1 - *(e. )] R.Crest)
Jm    J
For h=0:
L(h=0|ew)  =  *(eO1) RO(1) +
I  {[*(eOk) - *(eOk-1)] RO(k)}
+ (6A.9)
k=2








[1 - 0(emm-1)] Rm(m)
where $ is the cumulative normal distribution function of  eh  conditional
on Ew and Rj(rest) is defined as in equation (6.13) where eh takes a value
larger than e. .
Jm
A  few  remarks  have  to  be  made with respect to equations (6A.8)-
(6A.10). First, the values ejk have to be monotonically increasing  in  k.
This  will  be  the  case if the budget constraint is linear, but if it is
nonlinear this need not be the case. Then they have to be  sorted,  before
the  summing in equation (6A.8)-(6A.10) takes place. Second, the summation
is split into two parts by the third term. The reason for this is that e..
JJ
is not defined. The ranges ejj-1<sh< ejj and ejj<Eh< ejj+1 are combined in
ejj-1<Sh< e The  last  term in equation  (6A.8)  (E. >e . ) takes into ac-jj+1. n  Jm
count the right tail of the distribution of the unobserved £h. For workers
the left tail (Eh<e  ) is not included in the summing because not  working
always belongs to the choice set and therefore working zero hours needs to
be less preferred for a worker. So by rule (6A.5) the unobserved sh has to
be greater than e. .
JO
Furthermore, in the joint hours-wage model  we  have  the  difficulty
that  we  do  not  observe  the wage rate for nonworkers. In practice this
means that the only term that  we  can  use  to  define  probabilities  is
uok = eok + rew  (see  also  equation  (6A.3)). But given this joint unob-
served effect, we are not able to evaluate utility. For  in  the  utility
function  we  find the expression ec)k - Bhkew' and we only know eok + rew.
We have solved this problem by using  the  fact  that  we  need  not  know
utility at
h '
but we only have to compare it with utility at h=0. We made
use of the aforementioned rule
h=h. iff max e. <E < min e. (6A.11)
J       k<j  Jk  h  k>j  Jk
Using ujk = ejk + rew this is equivalent with




k<j  JK  h             jkk>j
For nonworkers this turns into
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h=0 iff u< min 11 (6A.13)Ok
k>0
From rule (6A.10) we know that if u is less  than  u )k'  then  h   is  not
preferred to 0 and therefore belongs to the set J 
JO = { ht: u<uot· 1=1,...,m } (6A.14)
So  instead  of comparing utilities to determine the set J, we compare the
value u = sh + rew with values uol.
To  prove that the model without hours restrictions is a special case
of the extended model if N is fixed, it is sufficient to show that the
probability  of  observing h=hj is equal to one for a particular range of
eh, if the number of job offers tends to infinity. The crucial  expression
is the probability of observing h=hj (see equation (6.10))
Rj = (Qj + pj)N -
Q 
(6A.15)
Because  Q.  is always smaller than one, R. tends to one, for N tending to
3                                                3
infinity, if Q + p  equals one. The probability Q + p  will only be  equal
to one for the workers if eh falls in a particular range. In all the other
cases Q + p  will be less than one and R   will  go  to  zero.  Similarly,
there  is  a  range  for u such that Q  will equal one. We know those par-
ticular ranges for sh and u from equation (6A.5) and (6A.13). These values
for  Eh  and  u, which are such that working h  hours is more preferred to
working h  hours, v ktj show up in equations (6A.8) and (6.18)
[*(e    ) - *(e )] R.(j+1)
jj+1 jj-1    J
and
*(u l) RO(1)
So the model with fixed N converges to the model without hours constraints
in  Moffitt  (1984).  If N is a random variable, it must have a degenerate
limiting distribution in infinity in order to attain an equivalent result.
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7 Comparison of several models
7.1 Introduction
In Chapters 2 through 6 several models  have  been  developed  and
estimated. The estimation results are based on two different datasets: the
OSA- and the SEP-sample. In this chapter we will  compare  the  estimation
results  in  several  ways.  The  comparison  will  not only deal with the
various models but also with the two different datasets. With respect to
the  data  it  should  be noted that both samples are supposed to be drawn
from the same subset  of  the  Dutch  population  in  1985,  namely  those
individuals  who are between 18 and 65 years old and who are able to work.
We start with a test  of  this  hypothesis  (concentrating  on  the  hours
2
variables only). To that end we use a Pearson x  test and two distribution
free tests (Wilcoxon's test and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test). The last two
tests  are  nonparametric  in  the  sense  that  they do not depend on the
functional form of distribution functions. That is we test whether two
distributions are equal, without  specifying  these distributions. In
Section 7.2 the three two-sample tests are discussed and the test  results
are  presented.  We will also present some sample statistics such as means
and standard deviations. Keeping the conclusions from Section 7.2 in  mind
we  will  in  Section  7.3  compare  the  labour  supply wage elasticities
generated by one specific model that was estimated on the two data sets.
Besides  looking at differences between elasticities corresponding
with one specific model estimated on different data sets, we also  compare
different models estimated on the same data set. In each chapter we have
presented a standard model and a so-called extended model, which  is  some
generalization  of  the  standard  model. If the models are nested, we can
test by means of a likelihood ratio test whether the restrictions  imposed
in the standard model hold.
We are also interested in how well the model simulations fit the
actual  data.  To  be  able  to say something about the fit of the various
2
models we use x goodness-of-fit tests. When the parameters  of  the
hypothesized  distribution  have been estimated by maximum likelihood, the
conventional  goodness-of-fit  statistic  no  longer  has a chi-squared
distribution.  In  Heckman  (1984)  a  new  goodness-of-fit  statistic  is
-215-
proposed which has a well defined chi-squared distribution. This statistic
as well as the likelihood ratio statistic can be used to check for model
misspecification. In Section 7.3  the  various  models  estimated  on  two
different data  sets  are  evaluated  by  means  of  the  aforementioned
statistics. Finally in Section 7.4 conclusions will be drawn.
7.2 Two-sample tests
In this section we will perform various tests of the  equality  of
the two populations from which the OSA- and SEP-samples were drawn. The
problem we consider is the following
Let  the scalars Xl'...,Xm denote a random sample of size m from a
cumulative density function  (c.d.f.)  Fx(·)  with  corresponding  density
function  fx(·)  and  let  the scalars Yl'...'Yn denote a random sample of
size n from a cumulative density function F (.) with corresponding density
function  f (.).  Further  assume  that  the  observations  from Fx(·) are
independent of the observations from FY(.). We want to test  HO:  FX(z)  =
FY(z)  for  all  z  versus  Hl: FX(z) 0 F (z) for at least one value of z.
Several tests are available. We first concentrate on two distribution free
tests,  namely  Wilcoxon's test (also called the Mann-Whitney test or rank
sum test) and the two-sample Kolmogorov Smirnov test.
- Wilcoxon's Test
Given two random samples Xl'...' Xm and Yl,···,  Yn  one  arranges
the  m+n  observations  in  ascending order and then replaces the smallest
observation by 1, the next by 2 and the largest by m+n. These integers are
called  the ranks of the observations. The test is based on Tx' the sum ofm+n
the ranks of the m X-values. (Since TX+Ty=  I   j  is  constant  the  test
j=1
could  as  well  be  based on Ty.) Mann and Whitney (1947) have shown that
under H  TX is approximately normally distributed for large m and n  (i.e.
if  m  and  n  are  greater than about 8). Thus for our samples with large
sample sizes, we  can use the normal approximation. If we test the
hypothesis  H : F (z) = F (z) for all z against the alternative hypothesis
Hl:  FX(z) 0 FY(z) for one z the test would be the following
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Reject HO if | TX' 2 k (7.1)
where k is determined by fixing  the  size  of  the  test  and  using  the
asymptotic  normal distribution of Tx. If the size of the test is fixed at
0.05 the critical value k equals 1.96. The mean and variance of TX  are  (
see Mood, Graybill and Boes (1974))






If TX is large the values of X tend to be larger than the values of Y  and
this  suggests  that  Fx(·) i F (.). On the other hand a small value of TX
suggests that  Fx(·) 2 FY(.).
- Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
The second test for HQ: FX(z) = F (z) for all z is the  Kolmogorov
Smirnov  test  which  makes  use of the fact that the sample c.d.f. can be
used to estimate the population c.d.f. The sample c.d.f. is defined by
1
Fxm(x) =  .(number of Xi less than or equal to x) (7.4)
It can be shown that for fixed x FXm(x) is an  unbiased  and  mean-squared
error  consistent estimator of FX(x), regardless of the form of FX(x). The
Glivenko-Cantelli-theorem
P(      sup      I    FXm (z)-FX (z)    1 40)=1 (7.5)
-CO<Z<CO El- co
states that the estimating function FXm(x) of the c.d.f.  FX(x)  converges
to FX(x) uniformly for all x with probability one.
So in the case that H  is true we have two independent  estimators
of  the  common population c.d.f., one using the c.d.f. of the X's and one
using the sample c.d.f. of the Y's. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test  uses  the
closeness  of  the  two sample c.d.f.'s to each other as a test criterion.
The test statistic is
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D    =   sup  | FXm(z)-Fyn(z) 1 (7.6)
m,n -00<Z<00
Kolmogorov showed that the statistic Dm =  sup  I FXm(z)-Fx(z) I    is
-00<Z<00
asymptotically distribution free if H  holds. The hypothesis is rejected
if Dm is large. The critical value of the asymptotic test statistic Dm can
be  approximated by 1.3581//m. Smirnov showed that Dm,n / /1/m+1/n has the
same limiting distribution  as  D //m.  See  Kendall  and  Stuart  (1979),m
volume 2, pages 476-487.
2
- Two-sample Pearson x  test
The strength of the two aforementioned statistics is that they are
2
distribution free. The x test statistic we describe below makes use of
the  multinomial distribution. The reason for presenting this test is that
2we will also use x  tests in the next section. Let us partition  the  real
line into J mutually disjoint sets Al'...' AJ. Define
Pjl = P(x € Aj), j=l..... J (7.7)
pj2          J
=P(YEA.), j=l,..., J (7.8)
If FX(z) = FY(z) for all z then pjl=Pj2' j=l...., J. Thus  the  hypothesis
Fx(z) = FY(z) for all z can be replaced by the hypothesis
HO: Pjl = pj2 ' j=l...., J (7·9)
In  fact  we  then  test  the  equality  of  two  independent  multinomial
distributions.
Let  us  consider  two  independent multinomial distributions with
parameters nt, pil'   ' pJl ' 1=1, 2 respectively. Let  Xjl,  j=l,...,  J,
1=1,2  represent  the  corresponding  frequencies.  It  follows  from  the
multivariate form of the Central Limit Theorem that the observed numbers
Xjl      in      the     J      groups      will      tend.      for     n,r",      to a multivariate normal
distribution. Making use of the assumption of independence between Xjl and
Xj2 the quadratic form
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   Cxjrnip,il)2 1=l, 2 (7.10)
j=1 nlpjl
2is distributed approximately as x (k-1). The random variable
                 Cx.41-•lpit) 2
(7.11)
1=l j=l ntpjt
which  is  the  sum  of two stochastically independent random variables is
2
approximately X (2k-2).
Since  the  pjl's  are  unspecified,  we  need  estimates of these
parameters. It can be shown (Kendall and Stuart (1979),  volume  2,  pages
448-490) that the random  variable
I
L
   (X,il-ntpj) (7.12)
1=l j=l ntpi
2
has an approximate x -distribution with 2k-2-(k-1)=k-1 degrees of freedom,
where p   is the maximum likelihood estimator of pjl=pj2  based  upon  the
frequencies X  
X  +X
pi = il.42 1.1..... J (7.13)
Hypothesis  H   is rejected when the computed value of the random variable
in equation (7.13) is at least as great as some critical value.
- Test results
The two samples we use, OSA and SEP, are supposed to be drawn from
the  same  subset of the Dutch population. In this section we want to find
out whether this hypothesis can be maintained. The means and standard
deviations  of  some  important  variables  may  shed  some  light on this
problem. See also Tables 2.2 and 2.5 in Chapter 2.
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Table 7.1 Sample means and standard deviations
actual hours preferred hours  pred. wage rate
single males OSA 30.75(17.83) 28.08(15.76) 12.94(1.63)
single males SEP 26.47(19.46) 32.85(14.91) 12.48(2.37)
married males OSA 39.70(11.70) 36.49(10.69) 13·61(1.64)
married males SEP 39.41(12.54) 38.23(10.39) 13·60(3.03)
single females OSA 23·63(19.61) 21.58(17.08) 11.31(1.75)
single females SEP 13·58(18.35) 17.04(17.97) 11.19(2.85)
married females OSA 10.64(15.44) 9.60(13.65) 11.13(1.52)
married females SEP 7.31(12.98) 10.00(13.32) 11.17(1.80)
We  have  performed  the  two-sample  tests  only on the two hours
variables, actual and preferred, seperately. Of course it could very  well
be  that  the  OSA  and  the SEP sample do not differ with respect  to the
hours variables but that they do differ with respect to one or more of the
exogenous variables in our models. Only in the case of some kind of
selection on the endogenous variables  sample  selection  bias  becomes  a
problem. Selection on the exogenous variables doesn't lead to biased
estimates. In Table 7.2 the test results are presented. In some cases  the
various  tests  lead  to  conflicting  conclusions. For all tests the null
hypothesis is the  equality  of  two samples. But  the  "implicit  null"
differs. In  fact  by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov is tested how well two given
sets of observations fit each others sample c.d.f.. By the Pearson test is
tested whether two independent  multinomially  distributed  sets  of
observations are equal. And by the Wilcoxon we test whether the values  of
a  variable  in  one sample tend to be larger than the values of that same
variable in the other sample.
For  single  males the null hypothesis of equality is not rejected
in most cases. This is in accordance with the conclusions that could be
drawn if we  look  at  the  means  in  Table  7.1, which differ, but not
significantly. For married males the sample  means  of  actual  hours  are
almost the same. Also according to the Wilcoxon test the null cannot be
rejected. Both the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and  the  Pearson  test  reject  the
null. Rejection  by  the  Pearson  test  occurs because the assumption of
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equality  between  the  multinomial  distributions  is not true. The
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests  indicate  that  the  sample  c.d.f.'s  differ,
although the sample means are close and although the values of  the  hours
variable  in one sample are not systematically lower or higher than in the
other sample (see Wilcoxon test statistic). For equality between preferred
hours  in the two samples, it is the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test that does not
reject and the other two tests that do reject the  null  hypothesis.  Both
for  single  and  married  females  all  tests  point  in the direction of
inequality between the two samples.
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Table 7.2 Two-sample tests, OSA against SEP  
Complete samples, actual hours
single married single married critical
males males females females value
*
Wilcoxon 1.78 0.35 5.51 3.99 1.96
*                                     *                                     *
Kolm.-Smirnov 1.08 2.27 2.73 2.30 1.36
5         *4          .5     43.88.3                b)Pearson 22.60 55.19 44.33 21.0-26.3
Samples without recipients of benefits, actual hours
single married single married critical
males males females females value
* *
Wilcoxon 0.95 0.63 4.61 4.08 1.96
* *
Kolm.-Smirnov 0.80 2.28 2.23 2.38 1.36
Pearson 25·295 56.75.4 38,66*4 46.30*3 21.0-26.3b)
Complete samples, preferred hours
single married single married critical
males males females females value
*          *             *             *
Wilcoxon -2.22 -3.67 2.78 -2.10 1.96
*             *
Kolm.-Smirnov 1.10 0.99 1.47 2.02 1.36
*4          *3          *1               b)Pearson 23·84*2 35.53 23·45 61.54 21.0-26.3
Samples without recipients of benefits, preferred hours
single married single married critical
males males females females value
* *
Wilcoxon -0.11 -2.39 -3.38 -1.66 1.96
*
Kolm.-Smirnov 0.66 0.90 1.97 1.84 1.36
1         *4          *2     60.48.3                b)Pearson 12.37 34.81 33.60 21.0-26.3
a) A * denotes that the null is rejected at the 95% confidence interval.
b) The critical value corresponding with 1 is 21.0, 2: 22.4, 3: 23.7,
4: 25.0, 5: 26.3.
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27.3 x  diagnostic tests
2
In  this section we use a *  goodness-of-fit statistic to test the
null hypothesis that a model is correctly specified.  The  models  we  use
consist  of  parametric  families of conditional distributions of response
variables (i.e.  hours  of  work)  given  regressor  variables.  The  test
statistic  has  been  derived  by  Heckman  (1984).  It  is  based  on the
differences  between  the  sample distribution and the hypothesized
distribution, generated  by  the model. First, the region in which the
response variable lies is partitioned into disjoint cells in  a  nonrandom
way. (In  Andrews (1988) several methods of constructing random cells are
discussed.) Then a quadratic form is calculated, based on  the  difference
between  the  observed  number  of  outcomes in each cell and the expected
number according to the model. If  the  model  is correct, the observed
2
differences are small and the test statistic converges to a x random
variable. If the model  is incorrect, the  quadratic  form  diverges  to
infinity as the sample size increases.
The test statistic is an adjustment of Pearson's  chi-square  test
which makes use of the  multinomial ML estimator. When the ordinary ML
estimator is used, the distribution of Pearson's test statistic is bounded
between two  %2  variables  (see  Kendall and Stuart (1979)). In the test
statistic proposed by Heckman the generalized inverse  of  the  asymptotic
covariance  matrix  of  the  aforementioned  quadratic  form  is used as a
weighing matrix. Therefore, this statistic has necessarily  an  asymptotic
2
x -distribution under the null hypothesis.
The following exposition closely follows Heckman (1984). The  test
statistic  is based on the difference between the conditional c.d.f. of
hours of work according to the model, Fh(h|x,8), and  the  sample  c.d.f..
The  x is a vector of regressors and 8 is estimated by maximum likelihood.
Then
/K(8-8) A N(0.4) (7.14)
where K  = number of observations
8  = ML estimator of 8
fe = covariance matrix of the parameter vector 8
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The region in which h lies is partitioned into J intervals
C. = [c   c   )                                             (7.15)J     j'  j+1
An indicator function for observation k is defined by
dkj    =    1    i f   hk€Cj
(7.16)
0 otherwise
The conditional expectation of observing h c in C. is
3
E(dkjlxk,8) = Fh(cj+11xk'8) - Fh(cjlxk'e) (7.17)
Then
clkj = E(dkjlxk,8) + Ekj' k=l.....K, j=l....,J (7.18)
Since we do not know the true value of 8, we use the ML estimator of 8, 8.
Then
dkj  = E(dkjlxk'e)  + ukj (7.19)
where     ukj  = E(dkjlxk.e)  -  E(ijlxk'e)    + 6 (7.20)kj
From Heckman (1984) we know that
1 K
7ii Z  (dk
-
E(dk'xk'6)) A N(o,I) (7.21)k=1
where   d  is a Jxl vector of d j's
E(d Ixk'8)) is a vector consisting of the elements E(d cjlxkj'e))
From (7.21) it follows that
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K
G= 7  I  (dk - E(dklxk,6))' I-1 7  I  (dk - E(dklxk,e))  (7.22)
k=1 k=1
with   I-1   defined   as   the   Moore-Penrose   generalized  inverse  is
2
asymptotically x  distributed with J-1 degrees of freedom.
Replacing 8 by 8 in I yields a statistic based on I that converges
to the same asymptotic distribution as  the  statistic  based  on  I.  For
computation  of  G  we  need  to  compute  I-1.  Andrews  (1988) derives a
-1
consistent estimator of I which leads to a test statistic that is much
simpler  to  compute. In this chapter we will use this estimator, although
the small sample properties are not as good as the estimator  proposed  by
Heckman (see Andrews (1988)).
Test results
Table  7.3  provides an overall evaluation of the results obtained
in this thesis. The estimated wage elasticities presented are reduced form
elasticities.  For  all  models  we  have  calculated  the goodness-of-fit
statistic described  in  the previous section. All specifications are
rejected  at  the  5 percent significance level. A reason for this is that
there are almost certainly specification errors in these types  of  models
due to the static instead of dynamic specification. To be able to estimate
dynamic labour supply models we need panel data. Only recently such  panel
data have become available for The Netherlands. Given that we had to focus
on static models it is interesting to compare the values of the statistics
with  each  other to get an idea how much a certain extension improves the
model specification. In the calculation of  the  test  statistic  we  have
selected  8  hours  intervals: [0,1], (1,9], (9.17]. (17,25], (25,33],
(33.41], (41.49], (49.57], (57.64] for all groups. In some cases we had to
combine  two  or  more  intervals  to  prevent  zero probabilities in some
intervals. In Appendix 7A we present the intervals used.
For  nested models the values of the log likelihood ratio are also
presented.
Let  us  first concentrate on the comparison of the results of one
specific model estimated on two different data sets. According to the test
reults  presented  in Table 7.2 the hypothesis of equality between the OSA
and the SEP is not rejected for single males: Both samples are supposed to
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be  drawn  from  the  same population. In  that  case the estimated wage
elasticity should be stable across samples. For both samples we  find  low
elasticities  not  differing  significantly  from 0. For married males the
two-sample tests do not lead to a uniform conclusion. Some reject and some
do  not  reject  the  null  hypothesis. Therefore, we cannot draw strong
conclusions about the stability of parameters across samples. Looking  at
Table  7.3 suggests that for the group of married males the estimated wage
elasticities are very low, but for the SEP  they  appear  to  be  slightly
higher  than  for  the OSA. For  married  and  single females the null
hypothesis of equality between the two samples is rejected. For females
the  SEP  sample  yields  higher estimated wage elasticities than the OSA.
Apparently, selection bias is a serious problem here. The samples  are  no
random drawings from the same subset of the Dutch population.
If we compare the labour supply wage elasticities of the different
groups  it strikes that the estimated elasticities of males are very small
and in almost all cases not significantly different from 0. Single females
have  estimated  wage  elasticities of around 0.5. Married females respond
more  than  single  females  to  wage differences: the estimated wage
elasticities vary around 2 with quite large differences across models.
Finally let us examine the differences between models estimated on
one  data  set  for  one type of individual. In the first two rows of each
panel in Table 7.3  the  results  are  presented  corresponding with  our
standard  model  with  actual hours (a) as the dependent variable (Chapter
2). In the model of row 1 recipients of benefits are not included (nb), in
row 2 they are (b). For males the differences in the wage elasticities are
2
small. The x  specification test suggests that adding  the  recipients  of
benefits doesn't improve the fit of the model. For females in the OSA
sample  the  wage  elasticity  falls  if recipients of benefits are
2
included. But here too the x test points in the direction of a better fit
if recipients are excluded. The same conclusions hold for  the  third  and
fourth row which corresponds with the same standard model except that now
preferred hours (p) is the endogenous  variable  (Chapter  3).  Apparently
behaviour of individuals  receiving  unemployment  benefits  have  not
been modelled in a satisfactory way. Row 5 in the  lower  panels  presents
the  results  of the rationed versions (r) of the model corresponding with
row 4.
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Adding  preference  formation  (pf)  reduces  the  estimated  wage
coefficients in all cases (Chapter 4).  The  likelihood  ratio  statistics
support  the  statistical  significance  of preference formation as do the
values of the x2 statistic. These same statistics in rows 7 and  8  reveal
once  more  that  the  separate  influence  of  habit  formation  (hf)  is
overwhelming relative to preference interdependence (pi). It also  becomes
clear that it is the inclusion  of habit formation that lowers the
estimated wage elasticity. Measuring the influence of preference formation
through  a  factor  analysis  model  (row  9, fpf) yields results that are
comparable to those presented in row 6.
Row  10  shows the OSA results corresponding with a model in which
preferred hours and wages are simultaneously modelled, while recipients of
benefits  are  excluded (p,w.nb) (Chapter 5). The value of the estimated
wage  elasticity  hardly  changes  for males. For married females the
elasticity  has increased with a much lower standard error. Extending this
model with the modelling of job choice leads to the results shown in  rows
11  and  12. Two specifications were tried out for the production function
of the amenity of a job, namely Z2=hq (rowll, p.w,hq,nb) and Z2=q (row 12,
p,w,q,nb). The elasticities corresponding with the Z2=q specification have
increased compared to the standard model. For married males and females
incorporating  job  choice  improves  the fit significantly. For the other
specification, Z2=hq, the elasticities have remained the same, except  for
single females.
In row 13 results of the discrete choice model of actual hours and
wages are given (Chapter 6). For the sake of simplicity, hours are assumed
to be linear in wages and  no recipients of benefits are included
(a,lw,nb).  Using  a  linear  specification of hours in wages instead of a
quadratic one, appears to increase the estimated wage elasticity
considerably, especially for females. Apparently the quadratic wage effect
is much more  significant  for  females  than  for  males.  This  is  also
borne  out by the difference in the x2 statistics. Finally in row 14 hours
restrictions are incorporated in the  aforementioned model (a,lw,hr,nb).
This  reduces the wage elasticities for females, but they remain larger in
size than in other, quadratic, specifications. Incorporating hours
restrictions significantly improves the fit.
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Table 7.3 Comparison of labour supply wage elasticities
single males OSA SEP
elas.(st.err.)  *2   log Lik.  elas.(st.err.)  %2   log Lik.
1) a,nb O.04(0.16) 94.0 - 0.20(0.21) 93.1    -
2) a,b 0.08(0.16) 124.1 - 0.20(0.21) 141.5    -
3) p,nb 0.09(0.12) 87.4 - -0.04(0.20) 91.9    _
4) p,b 0.09(0.12) 56.8 -400.3 0.03(0.20) 122.5 -518.8
6) p.b,pf -0.03(0.13) 48.7 -388.9 -0.01(0.22) 126.0 -493.0
7) p,b,hf -0.03(0.10) 48.7 -388.9 -0.01(0.22) 126.0 -493.0
8) p,b,pi 0.09(0.12) 56.8 -400.3 0.03(0.20) 122.5 -518.8




13)a.lw.nb 0.01(0.19) 52.8 0.00(0.00) 88.6
14)a,lw,hr,nb 0.01(0.01) 46.4 0.00(0.00) 67·1
married males OSA SEP
elas.(st.err.)  *2   log Lik.  elas.(st.err.)  X2   log Lik.
1) a,nb -0.00(0.06) 311.2 - 0.14(0.04) 535.2
2) a,b 0.02(0.06) 337.2 - 0.11(0.03) 671.7
3) p,nb -0.02(0.06) 427.6 - 0.08(0.04) 482.5
4) p.b -0.01(0.06) 501.5 - 0.01(0.00) 538.1
5) p,b.r 0.02(0.03) 502.8 -4386.7 0.03(0.08) 646.7  -5220.4
6) p.b,r,pf -0.00(0.01) 498.9 -4114.5 0.02(0.04) 679·3  -4735.0
7) p.b,r,hf -0.00(0.01) 498.6 -4115.3 0.02(0.04) 679·3  -4735.0
8) p,b,r,pi 0.01(0.03) 502.5 -4380.6 -0.03(0.06) 632.6  -5196.4
9) p.b,r,fpf      -            -     - -0.03(0.06) 592.6  -4722.6
10)p,w,nb -0.02(0.02) 431.5    -
11)p,w,hq,nb -0.02(0.03) 449.4    -
12)p,w,q,nb 0.00(0.00) 394.i    _
13)a,lw,nb 0.00(0.00) 388.8 - 0.03(0.02) 216.4
14)a,lw,hr,nb 0.00(0.00) 52.5 - 0.00(0.00) 141.6
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Table 7.3 Comparison of labour supply wage elasticities, continued
single females OSA SEP
2                                   2
elas.(st.err.) x log Lik.  elas.(st.err.) x log Lik.
1) a,nb 0.43(0.24) 93.8 0.91(0.31) 88.5
2) a,b 0.23(0.08) 129.4 0.94(0.50) 174.4
3) p,nb 0.34(0.21) 91.2 0.82(0.31) 77.0
4) p,b 0.23(0.08) 141.2 -568.1 0.89(0.50) 128.2 -409.9
6) p,b,pf 0.11(0.11) 122.5 -538.1 0.11(0.24) 148.9 -345.4
7) p,b,hf 0.05(0.06) 121.7 -541.4 0.11(0.24) 148.9 -345.4
8) p,b,pi 0.22(0.09) 124.3 -546.9 0.65(0.42) 130.5 -404.6




13)a,lw,nb 0.43(0.04) 74.8 3.48(3.15) 71.0
14)a,lw,hr,nb 0.27(0.17) 41.6 2.76(2.32) 60.3
married females OSA SEP
2                                   2
elas.(st.err.) x log Lik.  elas.(st.err.) x log Lik.
1) a.nb 2.04(3.92) 508.9 4.72(4.22) 583.7
2) a,b 1.83(1.28) 522.3 5.02(5.15) 628.2
3) p.nb 2.00(2.66) 413.2 4.95(4.81) 276.9
4) p.b 1.83(1.38) 441.3 5.05(2.89) 308.1
5) p.b,r 1.74(5·28) 440.4 -4386.7 2.17(4.21) 406.2  -5220.4
6) p.b,r.pf 0.39(0.51) 480.3 -4114.5 0.69(0.63) 224.6  -4735.0
7) p,b,r,hf 0.33(0.53) 479.9 -4115.3 0.69(0.63) 224.6  -4735.0
8) p,b,r,pi 0.53(0.64) 451.8 -4380.6 1.86(3.09) 465.6  -5196.4




13)a.lw,nb 3.36(1.74) 187.4 7.09(7.08) 137.5
14)a,lw,hr,nb 1.85(0.58) 118.6 1.84(0.34) 215.5
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In Table 7.3 the following abbreviations are used
a,nb = actual hours, no recipients of benefits included
a,b = actual hours, recipients of benefits included
p,nb = Ereferred hours, no recipients of benefits included
P,b = preferred hours, recipients of penefits included
p,b,pf - preferred hours, recipients of 4enefits  included,  preference
formation
p,b,hf = preferred hours,  recipients  of  2enefits included, habit
formation
p,b,pi = preferred hours, recipients of penefits  included,  Rreference
interdependence
p,b,fpf = preferred hours,  recipients  of  benefits  included,  factor
analysis model on preference formation
p,w,nb = simultaneous preferred hours, wage  model,  no  recipients  of
benefits included
p,w,hq,nb = simultaneous Ereferred hours, wage, job choice   model
(specification Z2=lls), no recipients of benefits included
p,w,q,nb  = simultaneous preferred hours, wage, job choice model
(specification Z2=9)' no recipients of 4enefits included
a,lw,b = simultaneous actual hours, linear wage model, no recipients of
2enefits included
a,lw,hr,b = simultaneous  actual  hours,  linear  wage  model  with  hours
restrictions, no recipients of benefits included
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7.4 Concluding remarks
The  two-sample  tests  discussed  in  Section  7.2  point  in the
direction of equality between the OSA and the SEP sample only  for  single
males and to a lesser extent for married males. With respect to single and
married females the tests unambiguously reject the hypothesis that the OSA
and  the  SEP  samples  have  been drawn from the same subset of the Dutch
population.
In  Section  7.3  an overall evaluation of the results obtained in
this thesis has been provided. Single and married  males  appear  to  have
very  low  wage  elasticities,  close  to  0.  Female  labour  supply wage
elasticities are estimated to be around 0.5 for singles and around  2  for
married females, varying from model to model. Extending the standard model
with  preference  formation  or  hours  restrictions improves the fit
significantly. Both  lead  to  lower  wage elasticities. Modelling hours,
wages and job choice simultaneously leads  to  less  obvious  conclusions.
Much depends on the exact specification of job choice. Little variation in
the data is probably a major problem. Overall the direction in which
the results change as a consequence of a certain extension of the model is
fairly stable across samples. Unfortunately, the estimated values  of  the
elasticities  corresponding  to one particular version of the model vary a
lot over the samples.
-231-
Appendix 7A Partitioning of the endogenous variable
actual hours worked, recipients of benefits not included
single males, OSA [0.1], (1.9]. (9,17]. (17.25]. (25.33],
(33.41], (41.49]. (49.57]. (57.64]
single females, OSA [0,1], (1,9], (9,17], (17,25], (25.33].
(33.41], (41.49]. (49.57]. (57.64]
married males, OSA [0,1], (1.9]. (9,17]. (17.25]. (25.33],
(33.4i], (41.49]. (49.57]. (57.64]
married females, OSA [0,1], (1.9], (9,17]. (17,25]. (25.33],
(33.41], (41.49]. (49.57], (57.64]
single males, SEP [0.25]. (25.33].  (33.41].  (41.49].  (49,57].
(57.64]
single females, SEP [0,1], (1.9]. (9.17]. (17,25]. (25.33].
(33.41]. (41.49], (49,64]
married males. SEP [0.33]. (33.41]. (41.49]. (49.57]. (57,64]
married females, SEP [0,1], (1.9]. (9,17]. (17.25]. (25.33],
(33.41], (41.64]
actual hours worked, recipients of benefits included
single males, OSA [0.1], (1.9]. (9,17]. (17,25]. (25.33].
(33.41]. (41,49], (49,57]. (57.64]
single females, OSA [0,1], (1,9], (9,17], (17.25]. (25.33],
(33.41], (41.49]. (49,57], (57.64]
married males, OSA [0,1], (1.9], (9.17]. (17.25]. (25.33],
(33.41]. (41.49], (49,57]. (57.64]
married females, OSA [0,1]. (1.9]. (9.17]. (17.25], (25.33],
(33,41], (41.49]. (49.57]. (57,64]
single males, SEP [0,17], (17,25]. (25.33]. (33,41],  (41.49].
(49.57]. (57.64]
single females, SEP [0,1], (1,9]. (9.17]. (17,25]. (25,33].
(33.41], (41.49], (49,64]
married males, SEP [0,25]. (25.33].  (33.41],  (41,49],  (49.57],
(57.64]
married females, SEP [0,1], (1.9]. (9.17], (17.25]. (25,33].
(33.41], (41.64]
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preferred hours worked, recipients of benefits not included
single males, OSA [0.25]. (25.33], (33.41]. (41.64]
single females, OSA [0,1]. (1.9]. (9.17]. (17,25]. (25.33].
(33.41]. (41.64]
married males, OSA [0.33].  (33.41]. (41.49]. (49,57], (57.64]
married females, OSA [0.1], (1.9], (9,17]. (17.25]. (25.33].
(33.64]
single males, SEP [0,1], (1.9]. (9,17]. (17,25], (25.33].
(33.41], (41.49], (49.57]. (57.64]
single females, SEP [0,1]. (1.9]. (9.17]. (17,25], (25.33].
(33.41]. (41,49]. (49.57]. (57.64]
married males, SEP [0.33]. (33.41], (41.49]. (49.57]. (57.64]
married females, SEP [0,1], (1.9]. (9.17]. (17.25]. (25.33].
(33.41], (41.64]
preferred hours worked, recipients of benefits included
single males, OSA [0.1]. (1.25]. (25.33]. (33.41], (41.64]
single females, OSA [0.1], (1,9]. (9.17]. (17.25]. (25.33].
(33.64]
married males, OSA [0.17]. (17.25]· (25.33]. (33.64]
married females, OSA [0,1]. (1.9]. (9.17]. (17.25]' (25.33].
(33.64]
single males, SEP [0,1], (1.9]. (9.17], (17.25]. (25.33].
(33,41]. (41,49], (49.57]. (57,64]
single females, SEP [0,1], (1.9]. (9,17]. (17,25]. (25.33],
(33.41], (41,49]. (49.57]. (57.64]
married males, SEP [0,17],  (17.25].  (25.33],  (33.41], (41,49],
(49.57], (57.64]




The  main  point  of emphasis in this thesis is the modelling of a
neoclassical labour supply model for one-adult and  two-adult  households.
The  number  of  hours  an individual prefers to work is assumed to follow
from maximization of a utility function subject to  a  budget  constraint.
Throughout  this  thesis we have adopted the Hausman-Ruud specification of
the utility function which leads to a labour supply equation quadratic  in
wages  with  the exception of Chapter 6 where we have opted for the linear
Hausman specification. This was dictated by the complexity of the model in
Chapter  6.  The  models  developed  in  Chapters  2  through  6 have been
estimated for four different groups of individuals: single males, single
females, married males and married females. We distinguished between these
four groups because we expected labour supply behaviour of these groups to
be different. The  estimation  results confirm these expectations. Where
possible, the models have been  estimated  on  two  different  data  sets,
namely  the  SEP  and  the  OSA  Survey. This opened up the possibility of
testing the stability of the parameter estimates across samples.
Estimation  of  the standard model in Chapter 2 yields male labour
supply wage elasticities close to 0. Female elasticities  vary  from  0.01
for  single females in the OSA to 7.09 for married females in the SEP. The
simulated hours distributions fit the actual hours  distributions  poorly.
This is commonly encountered in the literature on Tobit models. A possible
reason for this could be that all nonworkers are implicitly assumed not to
want  to work. While in reality, however, there are unemployed workers who
want to work but cannot find a job.  Blundell  et al. (1987) (following
Cragg  (1971))  developed  a double hurdle model in which a standard Tobit
model was modified to allow for this. In the participation decision demand
side  factors  such  as  the unemployment rate and the vacancy rate play a
large role. In Chapter 6 we allow for similar demand side restictions in a
somewhat different way.
The largest part of the thesis however, is  devoted  to  modelling
the  supply  side of the labour market. In Chapter 3 a modification of our
standard model is formulated taking explicit account of nonconvexities  in
the  budget  set, related to the Dutch social security and welfare system.
This provides us with  a  more  realistic model. Chapter  3  shows  that
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adapting  the  standard  model  by also modelling behaviour of individuals
receiving a benefit hardly changes the estimation results.
As in most econometric studies of labour supply we assume that the
number of hours an individual prefers to work depends  on  a  single  wage
rate  independent of the number of working hours. If the income tax system
is progressive (as is the case in The Netherlands) this assumption is  not
correct. Modelling the progressive tax system, however, leads to nonlinear
budget sets. In Burtless and Hausman (1978) an algorithm is  presented  to
estimate  such  models.  An application of this on models of labour supply
can be found in Van Soest, Woittiez and Kapteyn (1989). We  need  not  use
this  algorithm when we exploit answers to a specific question in both our
surveys about how many hours an individual would like to work (Chapters  3
through  5)·  These  answers are referred to as the respondent's preferred
hours. While asking the respondent for these preferred hours it is pointed
out  that  the average after tax wage rate would remain constant. In other
words, the respondent is  offered  a  linear  budget  constraint.  We  had
expected  that  the  wage  elasticities would be lower in the actual hours
version of the supply equation than in the preferred hours version, since
actual  hours  are partly determined by institutional constraints. In most
cases we found however that  the  wage  elasticities  were slightly (not
significantly) lower in the preferred hours version (Chapter 3).
When predicting labour supply over a longer period it seems hardly
reasonable to assume that preferences remain constant. Chapter 4 therefore
allows for habit formation (present tastes depend on own  past  behaviour)
and interdependent preferences (present tastes depend on past behaviour of
others). An important determinant of preferences is what  happens  in  the
social  reference  group  of  a  household. In the first part of Chapter 4
social reference group variables have been constructed on the basis  of  a
set of assumptions. The significance of reference group influences for the
labour supply of households is confirmed by the data. In the  second  part
of  Chapter  4  direct information in the SEP data on reference groups has
been used to construct a latent variables model of the influence of
reference groups on labour supply. This latent variables model strengthens
our earlier conclusions about the determinants of shifts  in  preferences.
The  results indicate that direct information improves the accuracy of the
estimates and the statistical significance of preference formation. In all
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estimated versions the influence of habit formation relative to preference
interdependence is overwhelming. One of the most  interesting  conclusions
of  this chapter is that the inclusion of  preference formation leads to a
decrease in the short run labour supply wage elasticities in all cases.
In general, a  labour market transaction can be viewed as a tied
sale in which the worker sells labour services and buys the attributes  of
his job. Hence the worker can maximize utility defined over job attributes
by choosing the appropriate type of job and employer.  Very  few  studies,
however, incorporate  nonpecuniary  job  characteristics  into  a utility
maximization model. In Chapter 5 we develop such a structural model of job
choice, labour  supply  and  wages.  The  actual  wage paid in the market
results from two transactions, one for labour services and worker
characteristics  and  another for job characteristics. The amount of money
which makes an individual  indifferent  between  work  with  good  working
conditions  and work with bad working conditions is called his reservation
wage differential. For married males the estimated reservation wage
differential  for  clean  work  is  about 6.6% of his income. In models in
which job choice is not modelled the  differential  is  much  smaller  and
insignificant  (see  Chapter  5).  In  much  empirical  research  on  wage
differentials the estimated differential is small  and  statistically  not
significant.  This could possibly be due to the simultaneity bias as these
studies do not take account of the endogeneity of job choice. Our  results
are  not  uniformly  satisfactory,  especially  not  for other groups than
married males. Note that the number of individuals in these groups who are
working in jobs with bad working conditions is very small.
Two possible extensions of  the  model  in  Chapter  5  are  worth
mentioning. First, note that the model is static and describes the
equilibrium state of a dynamic process. An interesting subject  of  future
research  could  be  the  development of a model of job choice in a search
theoretic framework (see for example Burdett et al.  (1984)).  Second,  an
important  problem  in  job  choice  models  is  the  measurement  of  job
characteristics. Our data set contains a  large  number  of  variables  on
working  conditions. A factor analysis model could be used to estimate the
real but unknown job amenity. This is left for future reasearch.
Many  workers  do  not have complete flexibility in choosing their
working hours. One can argue that the effective choice is between  working
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a  standard  full  time  week,  20  hours  per week or not working at all,
whereby 20-hour jobs are relatively scarce. Individuals who prefer to work
20  hours per week, but who can only find a 40-hour job, may decide not to
work.  If  that  is  the  case  unemployment  is  the  result   of   hours
restrictions.  The  labour  supply decision can be described as the choice
between a set of distinct  points  representing  job  opportunities.  Each
alternative  in this choice set is offered with an unknown probability. In
Chapter 6 we present and estimate a model that allows for the simultaneous
estimation  of  these probabilities and the labour supply parameters. This
model allows us to capture the sample distribution of working  hours  very
well,  for  males as well as for females, both single or married. The rare
occurrence of individuals working only a few hours per week  is  explained
in  this model by hours constraints. One should note that this explanation
is a plausible interpretation, among many  others.  Other  interpretations
could  be  the  existence  of fixed costs on the supply side of the labour
market, unobserved preference variation, or unobserved wage variation.
Identification  of  the  model  in  Chapter  6  relies  on several
assumptions. We could get rid of these identifying assumptions if we could
use independent information on the supply side of the labour market, about
preferred hours, and on the demand side, about job offers. In Renes (1989)
a  model  on  vacancies  has  been  developed  and  estimated in which the
existence of various types of vacancies (such as part-time) is  explained.
Integration  of  this  model  and the model developed in Chapter 6 of this
thesis seems very promising.
Finally  in  Chapter  7  we  present  an overall evaluation of the
empirical results of this thesis. In  all  estimated  models  single  and
married  males  appear  to have wage elasticities close to 0, while female
elasticities vary mainly from about 0.5 to about 5. Our  estimated  values
are  in  line  with other estimates of Dutch elasticities as reported in a
survey article by Theeuwes (1988). Male elasticities are reported to  vary
from  -0.25  to  0.27,  while female elasticities show a much larger range
form 0.20 to 3.23. The simultaneous model of job choice, labour supply and
wages leads to few obvious conclusions. Goodness of fit tests show that
extending  the  standard  model  with preference formation or hours
restrictions improves the fit significantly. Both extensions lead to lower
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wage elasticities. Given the statistical significance of these  extensions
it seems that a realistic model of labour supply cannot do without them.
The differences in estimates for the different samples, supposedly
drawn  from  the  same  subset of the Dutch population, are disconcerting.
Apparently we have a selection problem  at  hand.  This  demonstrates  how
important  sampling  is.  Moreover  it  warns  us to be careful in drawing
strong conclusions on the basis of one set of estimates.
Several issues for  future research have been mentioned already.
Modelling job choice in a search theoretic framework is one of them. Using
a  factor  analysis  model  to  obtain  estimates  of the real but unknown
amenity of a job is another. Also integrating a model  on  vacancies  into
the  hours  restrictions  model seems promising. The availability of panel
data calls for dynamic specifications of labour supply models. Finally, an
integration of all extensions, if feasible, could lead to a more realistic
model of labour supply.
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Samenvatting
Een  van de belangrijkste doelstellingen van politici in Nederland
is het terugdringen van het hoge werkloosheidspercentage (11% in 1988). De
omvang van de werkloosheid hangt zowel af van de vraag naar arbeid als van
het aanbod van arbeid. Daarom is het niet alleen van belang maatregelen te
nemen  die een positieve invloed hebben op de werkgelegenheid, maar is het
ook belangrijk  de  factoren  te  kennen  die  van  invloed  zijn  op  het
arbeidsaanbod. In  dit proefschrift trachten we het begrip daaromtrent te
vergroten door middel van het construeren van gedetailleerde modellen  van
arbeidsaanbod.
Zo is bijvoorbeeld behalve  de  loonvoet  ook  de  hoogte  van  de
werkloosheids- en bijstandsuitkeringen een determinant van het
arbeidsaanbod in onze modellen. Tevens worden verschillende aspecten
geincorporeerd die de preferenties  ten  aanzien  van  arbeidsaanbod
beinvloeden, zoals gezinssamenstelling, het verschijnsel dat onze  huidige
wensen  afhangen  van onze ervaringen in het verleden (gewoontevorming) en
het verschijnsel dat onze wensen afhangen van wat we  anderen  zien  doen.
Ook  wordt er bekeken in hoeverre niet-geldelijke karakteristieken van een
baan van belang zijn voor arbeidsaanbod. Bovendien houden we rekening  met
het feit dat het aantal te werken uren per week vaak niet ter keuze van de
werknemer is.
De data  die  we  gebruiken  hebben  betrekking  op  Nederlandse
huishoudens in 1985. Er wordt  onderscheid  gemaakt  tussen  verschillende
groepen: eenpersoons huishoudens (alleenstaande mannen en alleenstaande
vrouwen) en tweepersoons huishoudens. Door voor elk van  deze  groepen  de
verschillende  modellen  te  schatten  die  in dit proefschrift ontwikkeld
zijn, zouden de effecten van een verschuiving in de samenstelling  van  de
beroepsbevolking geanalyseerd kunnen worden.
Na een inleidend hoofdstuk volgen vijf hoofdstukken waarin telkens
een  ander aspect van het arbeidsaanbod gedrag wordt belicht. In Hoofdstuk
zeven worden de schattingsresultaten van de verschillende  modellen  naast
elkaar  gezet.  De modellen warden onder andere vergeleken op basis van de
geschatte loonelasticiteiten.  Het  geheel  wordt  gecompleteerd  met  een
concluderend  hoofdstuk.  Opvallend  is  dat  in  bijna  alle  gevallen de
loonelasticiteit van mannen klein is. De loonelasticiteiten van vrouwen
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zijn groter, maar varieren sterk tussen de modellen. Vooral
gewoontevorming  blijkt  een  belangrijke  invloed te hebben OP het
arbeidsaanbod van zowel mannen als vrouwen. Tenslotte heeft het rekening
houden met het feit dat werknemers niet  altijd  het  aantal  uren  kunnen
werken dat ze zouden willen een daling van de elasticiteiten tot gevolg.
In Hoofdstuk twee staat het model beschreven dat als  uitgangspunt
dient  voor  de  overige  modellen.  We  beginnen  met  de analyse van het
arbeidsaanbod gedrag van een huishouden dat bestaat uit San  individu  dat
beschikbaar  is  voor  de arbeidsmarkt (we zien dus af van een analyse van
het  gedrag  van ouderen, zieken, studenten, militairen etc.). We
veronderstellen  dat  het  individu  een  optimale keuze moet maken tussen
inkomen en vrije tijd. Die optimale keuze volgt uit de  maximalisatie  van
een nutsfunctie, gegeven een lineaire budget restrictie. Uit de door ons
gekozen specificatie van de nutsfunctie volgt een  vraagvergelijking  naar
vrije  tijd  die  kwadratisch  is  in  het  loon  en lineair in de overige
variabelen. Vervolgens wordt een model voor  een  tweepersoons  huishouden
geintroduceerd, waarin de gezamenlijke arbeidsaanbod beslissing van man en
vrouw wordt gemodelleerd.
Tevens wordt in Hoofdstuk twee een uitgebreide beschrijving van de
data gegeven. Bij het schatten gebruiken we informatie van zowel  werkende
als  niet  werkende  individuen, wat leidt tot een "Tobit" model. Omdat er
voor niet werkenden geen loonvoet wordt waargenomen, schatten we op  basis
van gegevens van werkenden een loonvergelijking in termen van opleiding en
leeftijd, waarbij we corrigeren voor "selection bias". Deze  voorspelde
lonen  worden  gebruikt in de modellen van de Hoofdstukken twee tot en met
vier. In het vijfde en zesde hoofdstuk worden de parameters in de loon- en
urenvergelijking simultaan geschat.
In Hoofdstuk drie worden eerst enkele complicaties  van  het
Nederlandse  sociale  zekerheidssysteem geintroduceerd. Als iemand, die
werkloos is en een werkloosheidsuitkering ontvangt, een baan vindt,  wordt
hij/zij gekort op zijn/haar uitkering. Dit introduceert niet-convexiteiten
in de budget restrictie. Indien de budget restrictie niet  convex  is,  is
het mogelijk dat er meerdere raakpunten zijn tussen de indifferentiecurven
en de budget restrictie. Met behulp van  nutsvergelijking  wordt  dan  het
punt  corresponderend  met  het  het  hoogste  nut  gekozen en daarmee het
optimale arbeidsaanbod bepaald.
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Een  andere  aanpassing  van de eenvoudige modellen uit het tweede
hoofdstuk (en van veel modellen  uit  de  empirische  literatuur)  is  het
gebruik  van  gewenste  uren in plaats van feitelijke gewerkte uren. Omdat
individuen vaak niet vrij het aantal uren  kunnen  kiezen  dat  ze  willen
werken,  zullen  in  veel  gevallen  de  gewenste  en feitelijke uren niet
overeenkomen. Door gewenste uren te gebruiken wordt  een  model  verkregen
waarin de vraagzijde van de arbeidsmarkt geen rol speelt. In Hoofdstuk zes
wordt een model beschreven waarin vraagrestricties expliciet  gemodelleerd
zijn.
In Hoofdstuk vier ligt de nadruk op de invloed van het gedrag van
anderen  (interdependentie van preferenties) en van gewoontevorming op het
arbeidsaanbod. Beide invloeden  worden geoperationaliseerd door aan van de
parameters  in  het model afhankelijk te maken van het aantal uren dat het
individu vorig jaar werkte en van het  aantal  uren  dat  mensen  in  zijn
"sociale  referentiegroep"  vorig  jaar werkten. In het eerste deel van
Hoofdstuk vier worden de sociale referentiegroep variabelen  geconstrueerd
OP basis van een aantal aannames. In het tweede deel wordt een factor
analyse model  gebruikt  om  de  "werkelijke",  maar  niet  geobserveerde,
referentiegroep variabelen te schatten.
In Hoofdstuk vijf wordt de keuze van een baan, het aantal uren dat
daarin  gewerkt wordt en het loon dat men daarin verdient in een simultaan
model beschreven. Nagegaan wordt in hoeverre niet-geldelijke
karakteristieken  van  een baan van belang zijn voor arbeidsaanbod en loon
("wage differential theory").
Tenslotte wordt in Hoofdstuk zes een eerste stap gezet om de vraag
naar arbeid te betrekken in arbeidsaanbod modellen. Dit  is  voornamelijk
van belang  als  arbeidsvraag  en  arbeidsaanbod  niet  goed  op  elkaar
aansluiten. Een voorbeeld daarvan is het tekort aan  part-time  banen.  In
dit  model  kiest  het  individu  die  baan  (i.e.  het urenaantal) uit de
verzameling mogelijke banen die het hoogste nut oplevert.
In Hoofdstuk zeven warden de verschillende modellen uit  de
voorgaande hoofdstukken vergeleken.  Zowel  formele  vergelijkingscriteria
(statistische toetsen) als informele  vergelijkingen  op  basis  van
gesimuleerde urenverdelingen en elasticiteiten worden besproken.
Conclusies  uit  de vergelijkingen van Hoofdstuk zeven zijn in het
laatste hoofdstuk te vinden. De verschillen in schattingen tussen de  twee
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steekproeven onderstrepen  hoe  belangrijk  het  is  om  goede  data  te
verzamelen. Wat betreft de loonelasticiteiten kunnen we stellen dat die
van  mannen  dichtbij nul liggen, terwijl die van vrouwen grofweg varieren
tussen de 0.5 en 5 met uitschieters van  0.0  en  7.5.  Dit  betekent  dat
volgens  onze  modellen  het arbeidsaanbod van vrouwen nogal toe zou nemen
als gevolg van stijgende lonen. Statistische toetsen  tonen  aan  dat  het
uitbreiden van het standaard model uit Hoofdstuk twee met interdependentie
van preferenties en gewoontevorming (Hoofdstuk  vier)  en  urenrestricties
(Hoofdstuk  zes)   de "fit" significant verbetert. Beide uitbreidingen leiden
tot lagere loonelasticiteiten dan anders het geval zou zijn.  Het  opnemen
van  urenrestricties in het model leidt tot een gesimuleerde urenverdeling
die zeer goed de feitelijke verdeling benadert.
STELLINGEN
bij het proefschrift
MODELLING AND EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF LABOUR SUPPLY BEHAVIOUR
van
ISOLDE WOITTIEZ
1.    Het  verwij t van Leontief  (1971) dat econometrie slechts een poging 6. Het vergelijken van loonelasticiteiten, zoals bijvoorbeeld in over-
is om de zwakheid van de verkrijgbare data te compenseren door het zichtsartikelen van Pencavel (1986) en Killingsworth (1986) verliest
gebruik van steeds geavanceerdere technieken is onjuist. Het onder- veel aan betekenis als niet ook de bijbehorende standaardfouten
streept niettemin het grote belang van goede dataverzameling gepresenteerd worden.
Zie  Leontie f,  W.  (1971) , "Theoretical Assumptions and Nonobserved Zie Pencavel, J.  (1986)," Labor Supply of Men: A Survey",  in:
Facts", American Economic Review, 61, 1-7. Handbook of Labor Economics,  O.C.  Ashenfelter and R.  Layard
(eds.), North-Holland, Amsterdam en Killingsworth, M.K. en J.J.
2.  Het arbeidsaanbodgedrag van individuen wordt statistisch significant Heckman (1986) , " Female Labor Supply: A Survey", in: Handbook
beinvloed door gewoontevorming en door het gedrag van anderen in of Labor Economics, O.C. Ashenfelter and R. Layard (eds.), North-
hun sociale omgeving. Het rekening houden met deze invloeden leidt Holland, Amsterdam.
tot lagere loonelasticiteiten dan anders het geval is.
Zie Kapteyn, A., I. Woittiez en P. ten Hacken (1989)," Household 7.  Kracht en zwakte
van een niet-parametrische benadering  van
Labor Supply  in The Netherlands  in the Eighties  and the Nineties", schattingsmethoden zijn beide gelegen in het zo min mogelijk opleggen
OSA-werkdocument, W61 en Hoofdstuk 4 van dit proefschrift. van een structuur.
3.  Indien in een nutsmaximalisatiemodel de prijzen afhangen van de 8.    De  theorie  van de "compensating wage differentials" wordt ondersteund
beslissingsvariabelen, moeten de prijzen en de vraagfuncties simul- door de waarneming dat er nog steeds economen en econometristen werk-
taan geschat worden (zie Hoofdstuk 5 van dit proefschrift). In Rosen zaam zijn als universitair docent.
(1976) wordt dit ten onrechte niet gedaan.
Zie Rosen, H.S. (1976)," Taxes in a Labor Supply Model with Joint 9.  Teneinde open te staan voor nieuwe ideeen strekt het tot aanbeveling
Wage-Hours Determination", Econometrica, 44, 485-507. om minstens dan maal per jaar letterlijk en figuurlijk grote afstand
te nemen van het werk.
4.  Uit de schattingen van de preferentieparameters en de parameters
die de beschikbaarheid van verschillende banen met bijbehorende uren-
10. De tolerantie ten aanzien van het gedrag van drugsverslaafden neemt
aantallen aangeven, kan worden afgeleid dat de lage participatiegraad
recht evenredig af met de afstand tot hun verblijfplaats.
van getrouwde vrouwen in Nederland mede een gevolg is van het tekort
aan part-time banen. 11. Er worden wel goede scheidsrechters (namelijk bonds-) ingezet bij
Zie Hoofdstuk 6 van dit proefschrift. derde klasse herenhockey en hoger en niet bij eerste klasse dames-
hockey en lager. Daaruit blijkt dat ruw spel beloond wordt met
5.  Een nadeel van X2 goodness-of-fit testen is het informatieverlies betere wedstrijdleiding.
dat onstaat als gevolg van het groeperen van observaties in klassen.
Dit nadeel wordt gecompenseerd door het voordeel dat de
asymptotische verdeling van de test-statistic bekend is.
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